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By Noah Moss Brender 
Supervisor: Jeffrey Bloechl 
 
This dissertation takes up Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished project of 
developing an ontology of nature whose concepts are drawn from the phenomenon of 
life, rather than from human techne. I argue that the question of life has been hopelessly 
obscured by the collapse, in the Modern era, of the distinction between nature and 
artifice. We cannot hope to understand the difference between life and non-life until we 
understand the difference between the living body and the machine.  
Merleau-Ponty's constant aim was to show that the living body is not a blind 
mechanism, and that the body has its own endogenous sense which is not projected onto 
it by a disembodied consciousness. Central to these efforts were the phenomena of 
learning and development, and the concept of form or Gestalt. Development is what 
distinguishes the living body, which is an open-ended process of becoming, from the 
machine, whose possibilities are determined in advance by its creator. In order to 
conceptualize the phenomenon of development, Merleau-Ponty appropriated from 
psychology the concept of form (Gestalt): a dynamic, self-organizing whole that cannot 
be decomposed into independent parts. Where the conception of nature as mechanism 
implies that everything is determined in advance, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of nature 
as Gestalt allows for the genesis of genuinely new phenomena through nature's own self-
organizing movement. We would thus be able to understand the genesis of sense in 
nature as a process of morphogenesis—the genesis of form.  
However, Merleau-Ponty struggled to clarify the ontological status of form. He 
lacked the conceptual resources to explain form in its own terms, rather than by contrast 
with the decomposable wholes of human artifice. This dissertation attempts to locate 
these conceptual resources in the science of complexity that has emerged since Merleau-
Ponty’s death, and whose descriptions of complex systems are uncannily anticipated in 
Merleau-Ponty’s writings. I take from this new science the conception of form as 
asymmetry or difference, and of morphogenesis as symmetry-breaking or self-
differentiation. In order to investigate how meaning emerges out of form, I turn to recent 
work in biology and psychology that applies the concept of symmetry-breaking to the 
phenomena of anatomical growth and motor development. By studying the development 
of the living body and its behavior, I show how nature articulates itself into perceiver and 
perceived. In the movement of the living body, form folds back upon itself, giving rise to 
a new kind of meaning: a pre-reflective, motor significance that is neither mechanism nor 
mental representation. 
In Chapter One, I distinguish the living body from a machine or artifact by 
distinguishing between manufacturing and growth. This distinction, which seemed 
obvious to the Ancients, has been obscured by Modern science's pivotal decision to treat 
nature as if it were a product of human artifice. This decision has committed us to an 
atomistic ontology, which takes nature to be a synthetic whole composed of mutually 
indifferent parts. However, this ontology faces a basic problem, which I call the problem 
 of form: how to explain the synthesis of indifferent atoms into the complex, harmonious 
wholes we observe in nature, without appealing to an intelligent designer. Nowhere is 
this problem more acute than in the phenomenon of anatomical development or 
embryogenesis. I argue that biology has been unable to explain this phenomenon in 
mechanical or atomistic terms: the Neo-Darwinist view of the living body as a synthetic 
whole determined in advance by a genetic blueprint or program has succeeded not by 
explaining development, but rather by ignoring it. 
In Chapter Two, I argue that the problem of form—and of living form in 
particular—can only be resolved by abandoning our atomistic ontology, and with it our 
synthetic understanding of form as a shape imposed on an indifferent material. Recent 
developments in the science of complexity have yielded a new definition of form as 
asymmetry or difference. On this view, the genesis of form in nature is not the synthesis 
of wholes out of pre-existing parts, but the self-differentiation of wholes into parts 
through symmetry-breaking. In order to understand how natural wholes become less 
symmetrical over time, I introduce three further concepts from the science of complexity: 
nonlinearity, stability, and instability. With these concepts in hand, I return to the 
problem of embryogenesis, in order to show how complex living forms can develop 
reliably and robustly without being determined in advance by a design or program. 
In Chapter Three, I turn from anatomical development to the development of 
behavior, in order to see how the genesis of form becomes a genesis of sense. I begin by 
criticizing three mechanistic theories of behavior—Behaviorism, Cognitivism, and 
Connectionism—which suffer from the same problem of form that plagues mechanistic 
theories of anatomical development. Behavior grows like an organ: by symmetry-
breaking, not by synthesis. Learning is not a matter of association, but of differentiation: 
the perception of increasingly subtle asymmetries in the body's environment through 
increasingly asymmetrical movements. It is the world that teaches the organism how to 
move—but a world that is only revealed to the organism by its own movements. Thus the 
living body and its world grow together dialectically, each driving the other to become 
more determinate through its own increasing determinacy. 
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PREFACE 
Thus, on the one hand it is necessary to follow the spontaneous development of the positive 
sciences by asking whether man is really reduced to the status of an object here, and on the other 
hand we must reconsider the reflexive and philosophical attitude by investigating whether it really 
gives us the right to define ourselves as unconditioned and timeless subjects. It is possible that 
these converging investigations will finally lead us to see a milieu which is common to philosophy 
and the positive sciences, and that something like a third dimension opens up, this side of the pure 
subject and the pure object, where our activity and our passivity, our autonomy and our 
dependence no longer contradict one another.1 
 
[M]y general aim is always to… confront the concepts which we are accustomed to using, and 
which I am accustomed to using, with the realities they are supposed to designate.2 
 
The phenomenological method is founded on Husserl's ideal of a 
"presuppositionless science": an inquiry that would not prejudge the phenomena it is 
investigating by deciding on the terms of this investigation in advance. Instead, a 
phenomenological inquiry would allow the phenomena themselves to generate the 
concepts we use to think about them. This would be a thoroughly empirical philosophy: 
rather than trying to deduce a priori truths from first principles, phenomenology would 
return "to the things themselves" and allow them to speak for themselves. To understand 
the meaning of the phenomena, however, we must learn to speak their language. 
Phenomenology thus sets itself the task of learning the logos of the phainomena—letting 
the phenomena teach us their native tongue, rather than forcing them to speak in terms 
that we already understand. 
However, phenomenology does not fall into the typical Modern error of trying to 
wipe the slate clean, to rid ourselves all at once of the concepts and presuppositions we 
have inherited and start fresh from a new foundation. Nor does phenomenology follow 
                                                
1 TT 13 (translation from Waldenfels 1980, p. 21). 
2 Merleau-Ponty, "Les voyages du philosophe," eleventh interview with Georges Charbonnier, R.T.F., first 
broadcast July 31, 1959. (Citation and translation from Noble 2011, p. 93.) 
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the Romantic path of trying to abandon concepts and theories altogether in search of an 
immediate, intuitive coincidence with nature. Instead, phenomenology starts just where 
we are, with the phenomena as they appear to us from our present theoretical standpoint, 
and looks for those aporia—those puzzles, problems, and antinomies—that indicate the 
places where our concepts are inadequate to the phenomena they describe. Thus 
phenomenology is a dialectical philosophy: it uses the phenomena revealed by our 
present concepts and questions to challenge those very concepts and formulate better 
questions, which in turn disclose new phenomena.3 This is an endless task: each new 
generation of phenomenologists seeks to unearth foundational assumptions that their 
predecessors have left unexamined, and to hold them up to the light of the phenomena. In 
this way, each generation strives to penetrate more "radically" into the roots of its own 
thought. 
Of course, the concepts and theories that phenomenology takes as its starting 
point do not come from nowhere; we have inherited them from a long philosophical 
tradition. But this tradition is not transparent to itself: our inheritance largely takes the 
form not of explicit claims but of unstated assumptions, which seem so obvious to us that 
they no longer require justification. Indeed, these assumptions are for the most part so 
familiar that they are no longer visible to us at all—they have become part of the 
conceptual bedrock of our lives, buried under centuries of sedimented thought. Thus the 
phenomenological project of tracing our aporia to their sources is a historical or 
                                                
3 I have chosen the term "dialectical" over the more common "hermeneutical" deliberately, in order to 
suggest that there is a certain methodological continuity between Plato's Socrates, Hegelian 
phenomenology, and twentieth-century phenomenology—though I will not argue for this continuity here. 
On Socratic dialectic, see Republic 510b-511d. On the relation between Hegelian and twentieth-century 
phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty, "Hegel's Existentialism" (SN, pp. 63-70); Russon 2010. 
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genealogical task: it brings to light conceptual prejudices which have been hidden by 
their long familiarity, and makes them appear strange and new again. Studying the 
history of our tradition as it has been preserved and passed down to us in historical 
documents, is an indispensable part of this project. To read the history of philosophy 
phenomenologically is to see the past neither as completely alien—an object of mere 
curiosity; nor as utterly familiar—a story of progress culminating in the present. Rather, 
phenomenology reads the tradition as a series of choices that could have been made 
otherwise and questions that could have been answered differently. For phenomenology, 
the past is not over and done with, but alive with possibilities that we can take up anew in 
the present. 
 Certain readers may be surprised to see a description of the phenomenological 
method that makes no mention of "qualia," "lived experience" or the "first-person 
perspective." To define phenomenology in these terms would be to presuppose the 
distinctions between introspection and scientific observation, first-person and third-
person, or "lived experience" and scientific theory. But there is nothing self-evident about 
these distinctions: they are highly theoretical, embodying a whole complex of inherited 
ontological assumptions. Thus any inquiry that defines itself in terms of these oppositions 
is not a phenomenological inquiry in the sense that I am defending here. Far from pre-
supposing these concepts or treating them as self-evident, a phenomenological 
philosophy would have to take them as objects of investigation. We would have to ask 
whether these distinctions can be justified empirically, or whether, on the contrary, the 
phenomena themselves demand that these traditional concepts be rejected. 
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This three-fold determination of the phenomenological project as empirical, 
dialectical, and historical is likely to give rise to two apparently fatal objections. First, 
someone will say that phenomenology has arrived on the scene several hundred years too 
late. The method it proposes might have been novel or radical before the Scientific 
Revolution; but nothing could be more commonplace today than to suggest that 
philosophy ought to be empirical, or that our theories should be progressively improved 
by testing them against the phenomena they reveal. This is precisely what the natural 
sciences have been doing, with consummate success, for centuries. To call, today, for a 
return "to the things themselves" seems absurd—one might as well call for the end of 
mercantilism, or try to write Don Quixote. 
This first objection will quickly be followed by a second: that the 
phenomenological project of reaching "the things themselves" is hopelessly naïve. It 
seems that the phenomenologist is oblivious not only to the existence of Modern science, 
but also to the history of Modern philosophy, which has firmly established that we can 
only know our own representations. Sense perception cannot give us the things 
themselves, but only their effects on us; and there is no reason to suppose that these 
effects resemble their causes. Moreover, the testimony of our senses is confused and 
contradictory; it can only be made intelligible by the operations of the mind. Thus even 
our perceptions, to the extent that anything meaningful or objective is to be found in 
them, are products of consciousness' own synthetic activity. We do not perceive reality 
with our bodies, but rather construct it with our minds. But this means that we are never 
conscious of things as they are in themselves, but only of our own ideas. If there is a 
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world beyond thought, it is unknowable to us, for thought knows only itself and is subject 
only to its own internal necessities.4 
Either one of these objections on its own would suffice to dissuade us from 
pursuing phenomenology any further. And yet there is something strange, even 
paradoxical, about the two objections taken together. One claims that phenomenology is 
unnecessary; the other, that it is impossible. One dismisses phenomenology because its 
project has already been accomplished; the other, because it cannot be accomplished. 
How is it that both of these objections seem persuasive to us? How can phenomenology's 
principles appear at once trivially true and demonstrably false?  
These contradictory objections are an indication of the paradoxical situation in 
which we find ourselves today. When we are engaged in the practice of science, we meet 
with success after success. We know more about the natural world than ever before, and 
this knowledge manifests itself in an unprecedented mastery over nature—including the 
human body. Each day brings new discoveries and new inventions, and the pace of this 
progress seems only to increase with time. And yet, when science turns its attention to the 
phenomena of perception and cognition, it arrives at a shocking and paradoxical 
conclusion: that the human mind cannot know the external world. The brain, after all, is 
encased inside the skull; its only access to the world is through the nervous signals it 
receives from the body's sense organs. Thus the brain must piece together a picture of the 
external world from its effects on the body. All of our knowledge consists of inferences 
                                                
4 On this point, Post-Modernism simply reaffirms the conclusions of Modern philosophy. We can replace 
"thought" with "language" or "power" without altering the force of this objection to phenomenology: if 
there is nothing outside of discourse, or if we can only know our own social constructs, then 
phenomenology's naïve attempt to return to "the things themselves" will succeed only in uncritically re-
inscribing existing regimes of power. 
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from given effects to hidden causes: we are constantly constructing an internal model of 
the world that would explain the sensations we have received. But this model is never 
more than a hypothesis, for we can never get outside of our own heads to compare our 
representations with the things they are supposed to represent. The only measure of the 
model—the only standard to which it can answer—is its predictive power: whether it 
allows us to correctly infer from our past sensations what sensations will arrive next. 
Thus we find ourselves in the same position as the prisoners in Plato's cave, staring at the 
shadows of material things and trying to guess which shadow will appear next. But our 
situation is even worse than that of Plato's prisoners: they could be freed from their 
chains and dragged out into the light to confront the material world directly; but only 
death awaits the brain freed from the confines of its skull. Our brains cannot confront the 
external world directly. They require the mediation of the senses. And yet this very 
mediation seems to leave us stranded inside of our own heads, permanently cut off from 
the objects of perception and knowledge. Thus the nature that science had naïvely taken 
to be out there in the world, independent of our knowing activity, turns out—on science's 
own account of cognition—to be a mental representation. In an abrupt and dizzying 
change of perspective, nature and consciousness switch places: where consciousness had 
been just another object within nature, suddenly nature becomes just another idea within 
consciousness. It is as if nature were a bag that science had tried to sew shut, and 
consciousness were its lining; the bag was all but closed except for a little thread of 
consciousness still dangling outside of it—but when we yanked on this thread the whole 
bag turned inside out, and nature was trapped within the very consciousness it was 
supposed to enclose.  
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What is the cause of this uncanny reversal? The problem arose as soon as science 
attempted to explain human perception and cognition. These appear to be natural 
phenomena like any other; as such, they ought to be susceptible to the same scientific 
methods that have succeeded so well in every other area of nature. However, there is 
something special about these phenomena that sets them apart from the rest of the natural 
world: perception and cognition are the activities that the scientist herself is engaged in 
when she investigates nature. In studying these phenomena, then, the scientific method 
was unwittingly turned back upon itself. So long as science's gaze is turned resolutely 
outward, its progress is unchecked; but when knowledge becomes its own object—when 
science attempts to reflect on itself, to explain itself as it has explained everything else—
it becomes mired in the most baffling aporia. This is not to say that the scientific study of 
human perception and cognition has ground to a halt; on the contrary, these investigations 
proceed confidently, seeming to make steady progress alongside every other specialized 
science. Contradictions only appear when we recall that the cognition we are studying is 
our own—that the cognitive scientist is herself engaged in the very act that she is 
investigating. The problem, in other words, is that we cannot seem to reconcile the 
human being as knower with the human being as object of knowledge. When we try to 
complete our picture of nature—to sew the bag shut, as it were—we always find 
ourselves qua knowers standing on the outside of nature looking in. As in a dream or an 
out-of-body experience, we can see ourselves—or at least our bodies—there within the 
system of nature, moving according to the same scientific laws as everything else; and we 
can even be quite content with this view, so long as no one asks us where we take 
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ourselves to be standing. Then suddenly the bottom falls out, and the abyss yawns 
beneath us; we realize that we must be dreaming, and yet we cannot wake.  
For the most part, of course, we are content to go on sleeping, beguiled by the 
dream of mastery over nature. The aporia I have described is seen as a philosophical 
problem, not a scientific one. The scientist is not asked to reflect on her own standpoint, 
and indeed is discouraged from doing so; such reflections do not produce results, but only 
conundrums. Thus science and philosophy go their separate ways: science goes about its 
business with continued success, and it is left to philosophy to consider the consequences. 
Since philosophy for the most part feels itself incapable of questioning science's results, it 
can only counsel resignation: we must accept that we have no ground on which to stand, 
and try to overcome our fear of falling. Thus we arrive at our present, paradoxical 
situation: science assures us that we know more than ever, while philosophy tells us with 
equal assurance that there is no such thing as knowledge. There is only calculation, only 
power: power over nature, over others, and over ourselves. For the most part, we hold 
both of these views simultaneously—unable to reconcile them, but equally unable to 
choose between them, since they share a common root. If the problem could be located 
entirely within philosophy, then we could simply abandon this outmoded practice in 
favor of its superior offspring, the natural sciences. But this is impossible; for what seems 
to be a conflict between science and philosophy is really a conflict within science itself, 
which philosophy merely calls to our attention. It is science that tells us both that we are 
masters of nature and that free will is an illusion. If nature is a machine, its movements 
determined in advance by immutable laws, then we can predict and control it; but if 
nature is a machine then so are we, and our actions too must be determined in advance—
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including those of the scientist. Thus science affirms the self-contradictory claim that we 
are masters of nature and also, at the same time, its slaves. 
 
It is this paradoxical situation that calls for phenomenology, and to which 
phenomenology attempts to respond. Rather than resigning ourselves to the antinomies of 
Modern thought, phenomenology takes them as a sign that our thinking has somewhere 
gone astray. If our arguments generate contradictions, then at least one of our premises 
must be false. We must therefore go back and examine our assumptions to see which of 
them are truly grounded in the phenomena, and which are merely prejudices that we have 
inherited uncritically from our predecessors. As I have briefly indicated, the perplexities 
in which we find ourselves are tied inextricably to the principles and practices of Modern 
science. Thus phenomenologists have been driven repeatedly to confront the origins and 
development of the natural sciences. In The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (1970 [1954]), Husserl traces our present perplexities to 
Galileo's claim, at the very origin of Modern science, that nature itself is mathematical, 
and that the qualities we perceive therefore reside not in things but in us, as the effects of 
quantitative reality on our bodies. Heidegger, for his part, observes that by construing 
nature as an object of knowledge, Modern science implicitly locates the subject of this 
knowledge outside of nature (1982b). Thus Modern science is implicitly theological, or in 
Heideggerian terms, "metaphysical": it presupposes a God's-eye-view, a transcendent 
standpoint which would apprehend the true world behind the world of mere appearances. 
Heidegger (1982a) also traces the development of this scientific worldview into our 
present, "technological" worldview: the cleavage between subject and object ultimately 
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undermines the very possibility of knowing nature as it is in itself; thus the only possible 
relation to nature becomes one of calculation and manipulation, prediction and control. 
Nature no longer even appears to us as an object of knowledge, but only as a resource for 
our own activities, and the question of truth is thus supplanted by the question of what 
works. 
The phenomenologist who engages with Modern science in the most thorough-
going and fruitful way, however, is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Both Husserl and Heidegger 
offer insightful analyses of Modern science's foundational assumptions. But these 
analyses take place from a philosophical standpoint. They are external criticisms rather 
than immanent critiques. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, does more than simply 
expose the foundational assumptions of the natural sciences: he engages directly with 
their empirical results, in order to show how the sciences' own findings contradict their 
methodological principles, and so demand a reform at the level of basic concepts. 
Merleau-Ponty thus seeks to avoid perpetuating the conflict between philosophy and 
science by taking up the natural sciences on their own terms—arguing not that they have 
been insufficiently philosophical, but that they have been insufficiently scientific. At the 
same time, Merleau-Ponty challenges philosophy to be more resolutely empirical. His 
goal is not simply to criticize the natural sciences, but to learn from them: 
How could one want to know what Nature is and not be interested in science? If 
Nature is something all-encompassing [un Englobant] then we cannot think it 
starting from concepts, let alone deductions, but must rather think it starting from 
experience, and in particular from experience in its most regulated form—namely, 
science. (N 87/122, translation modified) 
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Merleau-Ponty's first book, The Structure of Behavior, opens with the question of 
the relation between consciousness and nature—where nature is to be understood as "a 
multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by relations of causality" 
(SB 3/1).5 This question, and the particular formulation that it takes, are no accident: this 
is the form that the most urgent philosophical questions have assumed in our time. Thus it 
is here that we must begin. However, Merleau-Ponty does not simply take this starting-
point for granted. On the contrary, his aim—in the dialectical movement which is 
characteristic of phenomenology—is to subject this question and the terms in which it is 
posed to the most searching scrutiny:6 
                                                
5 Merleau-Ponty's first published work was unduly neglected in the secondary literature for many years. 
However, there has been a recent renewal of interest in The Structure of Behavior. For many years, the best 
resource on the Structure available in English was a special issue of Research in Phenomenology published 
in 1980 (X, 1). This situation has recently improved significantly with the publication of two books that 
include excellent exegeses of The Structure of Behavior: Evan Thompson's Mind in Life (2007) and Ted 
Toadvine's Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Nature (2009). I take the reading of the Structure that I will 
offer here to be broadly compatible with those of Thompson and Toadvine. (For other recent work on The 
Structure of Behavior, see Buchanan 2008; Low 2004.) 
6 I am here disputing the influential reading of Renaud Barbaras (2001), which claims that Merleau-Ponty 
does not question this view of nature until much later in his career. For example, Barbaras writes that "It is 
only very late in Merleau-Ponty’s work that the concept of nature becomes the object of a separate 
reflection. Until 1956–57 Merleau-Ponty utilized this notion in a non-critical way and conferred upon it the 
current philosophical meaning. Thus, The Structure of Behavior opens with these words: 'Our goal is to 
understand the relations between consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or even social. By 
nature we understand here a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by relations of 
causality.' This certainly is the classic conception of nature, common to Descartes and Kant, which 
Merleau-Ponty retains here, even if, to be sure, he inquires at the same time into the possibility of the 
upsurge of consciousness in the midst of this nature" (2001, p.  23). 
This reading amounts to a denial of the dialectical character of the Structure: it takes Merleau-
Ponty's initial formulation of the question to be a final and definitive statement, rather than the beginning of 
an investigation that will be transformed by its own results. I suspect that this way of reading the Structure 
stems from the view—widely held among Merleau-Ponty commentators—that Merleau-Ponty did not 
become concerned with ontological issues until his last, unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible. My 
reading of the Structure will show, on the contrary, that Merleau-Ponty was dealing with ontological 
questions from the very beginning of his career—even though he does not begin to use the term "ontology" 
until later. 
 We find a more nuanced and sympathetic reading of the Structure in Barbaras' more recent work, 
such as "A Phenomenology of Life" (2005). Here Barbaras sees in the Structure's focus on life important 
anticipations of Merleau-Ponty's later ontology, and especially of the questions Merleau-Ponty grapples 
with in his lectures on Nature. 
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Might mechanistic science have missed the definition of objectivity? Might the 
cleavage between the subjective and the objective have been badly made; might 
the opposition between a universe of science—entirely outside of itself—and a 
universe of consciousness—defined by the total presence of self to self—be 
untenable? (SB 10/8) 
 
Merleau-Ponty pursues these questions by returning to the phenomena 
themselves—specifically, the phenomenon of animal and human behavior 
[comportement]. Again, this choice is far from accidental. The living body is the site of 
all the aporia of Modern thought: it is both a natural phenomenon and the seat of 
consciousness, the place where subject and object meet, mix, and become confused. It is 
in human behavior that we witness the appearance of consciousness in nature. Thus it is 
here that we must look to see if our received concepts of nature and consciousness, body 
and mind, are empirically justified. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, behavior "taken in itself… 
is neutral with respect to the classical distinctions between the 'mental' and the 
'physiological' and thus can give us the opportunity of defining them anew" (SB 4/2). 
In order to avoid prejudicing the issue, Merleau-Ponty begins from within the 
"universe of science," studying the phenomenon of behavior as it appears to the 
psychologist and the physiologist. This is a methodological necessity. If the conception 
of nature that science begins with is inadequate to the natural phenomena it studies, then 
this must be evident from within the scientific perspective itself. To challenge the 
assumptions of natural science from any point of view other than its own would merely 
be to oppose one perspective against another, with no way of adjudicating between them. 
But this juxtaposition of incompatible perspectives, each valid in its own right, is 
precisely the aporia that Merleau-Ponty is trying to resolve. To criticize natural science 
from the point of view of philosophy, or that of "lived experience," would only be to re-
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inscribe existing dualisms, or generate new ones. Thus the only way to criticize the 
assumptions of the sciences is to do so on from within, on their own terms. Merleau-
Ponty's argument in the Structure is that biology and psychology have been insufficiently 
empirical: that they have maintained, contrary to their own principles, certain 
metaphysical presuppositions that cannot be justified empirically. Specifically, Merleau-
Ponty argues that they have uncritically inherited the Cartesian view that nature in 
general, and the living body in particular, are machines. 
The essence of the machine is its decomposability: to say that nature is a machine 
is just to say that it can be analyzed into independent parts.7 From a "naïve," pre-
scientific point of view, behavior—both human and animal—appears to be a coordinated, 
goal-directed activity that responds to the meaning of its situation in a more-or-less 
intelligent way. If the living body is a machine, however, then its behavior must admit of 
a mechanical explanation: both behavior and its causes must be decomposable into 
simple parts in such a way that the same elementary cause always produces the same 
elementary effect. 
To explain nerve functioning can only be to reduce the complex to the simple, to 
discover the constant elements of which behavior is constituted. Thus one would 
decompose the stimulus as well as the reaction until one encountered the 
'elementary processes' composed of a stimulus and a response which were always 
associated in experience. (SB 11/9).  
 
                                                
7 Merleau-Ponty's description of these parts as "outside" of one another is a reference to Descartes' famous 
definition of extension as "parts outside of parts" (partes extra partes). The exteriority in question is not 
just spatial, but ontological: the parts of the machine are not only spread out in space, but also exist 
independently of one another. See Descartes' letter to Henry More (5 February 1649): ""I call extended 
only what is imaginable as having parts outside of parts" ["ita illud solum quod est imaginabile, ut habens 
partes extra partes, . . . dico esse extensum"] (CSMK Vol. 3, p. 362; AT V, p. 270). (I have modified the 
English translation, which for some reason renders "partes extra partes" as "parts within parts.") Merleau-
Ponty cites this passage in his lectures on The Incarnate Subject (IS 50/33). 
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This was precisely the project of the reflex theory of behavior, which dominated 
psychology and physiology in Merleau-Ponty's time. According to this theory, "the order 
in the reflex—that is, the adaptation of the response to the stimulus and the coordination 
of partial movements in the total gesture—is assured by pre-established connections from 
the sensible surface to the effector muscles" (SB 10/8, my emphasis). Thus the apparent 
unity and goal-directedness of behavior are mere illusions produced by the cunning 
design of the body-machine: 
If behavior seems intentional, it is because it is regulated by certain pre-
established nerve pathways in such a way that I in fact obtain satisfaction. The 
'normal' activity of an organism is only the functioning of this apparatus 
constructed by nature; there are no genuine norms; there are only effects. (SB 9/7) 
 
Consciousness, on this view, plays no causal role in human behavior; it can only 
be an illusion or an epiphenomenon—an incidental side-effect of the body's mechanical 
activity. If this conclusion is counter-intuitive then our intuitions must be at fault, for no 
alternative view is possible within the ontology of mechanistic science: 
[A]s soon as one ceases to place confidence in the immediate givens of 
consciousness and tries to construct a scientific representation of the organism, it 
seems that one is led to the classical theory of the reflex—that is, to decomposing 
the excitation and the reaction into a multitude of partial processes which are 
external to each other in time as well as in space. … The classical theory of the 
reflex and the methods of realistic analysis and causal explanation, of which the 
reflex theory is only an application, alone seem capable of constituting an 
objective and scientific representation of behavior. (SB 8-9) 
 
The reflex theory of behavior suggested a clear research program: by 
systematically subjecting an animal body to one stimulus at a time and observing the 
response produced, one ought to be able to map the anatomical connections between the 
body's sensory surfaces and its muscles, and in so doing to generate a predictive theory of 
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that animal's behavior. However, when this research program was put into effect, it 
yielded quite unexpected results. The "elementary reflex" which was supposed to be the 
basic unit of behavior—a single stimulus that always produces the same simple 
response—turned out to be largely mythical. Such constant conjunctions were hardly to 
be found, even under the most artificial laboratory conditions. Instead, experiment 
revealed that the effect of a given "elementary stimulus" cannot be isolated from its 
context. That is, the animal's response depends on the other stimuli that are present at that 
moment; on the past stimuli to which the animal has been subjected; and on the 
prospective activity in which the animal is presently engaged. Despite these discoveries, 
most psychologists refused to abandon the reflex theory, instead attempting to prop it up 
with an ever-growing number of auxiliary hypotheses.8 To abandon the reflex theory 
would have meant abandoning the tried-and-true methods of realistic analysis and causal 
explanation, leaving psychology with no way to explain behavior: "If order cannot be 
based on pre-established anatomical structures, from where does the coherence of our 
reactions and their adaptation to the stimulus come?" (SB 32/32). 
 
However, there were a few psychologists who argued that these experimental 
results demanded new concepts and new methods. In order to describe the observed facts 
of animal behavior, these psychologists introduced the concept of the Gestalt, which 
Merleau-Ponty translates as form (forme): a whole that cannot be decomposed into 
                                                
8 "[T]he classical theory of nerve functioning is led by the force of things to burden itself with auxiliary 
hypotheses which are almost in contradiction with it, just as the Ptolemaic system revealed its inadequacy 
by the large number of ad hoc suppositions which became necessary in order to make it accord with the 
facts" (SB 16/15). 
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independent parts. The failure of the reflex theory demonstrated the existence of form at 
three levels: perception, behavior, and anatomy. If the effects of one stimulus cannot be 
isolated from those of another, then perception cannot be decomposed into a collection of 
elementary stimuli. If there are no elementary stimuli—i.e. no stimuli that invariably 
produce the same motor response—then behavior cannot be decomposed into a collection 
of elementary reflexes. And if there are no elementary reflexes, then the nervous system 
cannot be decomposed into a collection of autonomous circuits connecting sensors on the 
body's surface to effector's in the body's musculature. Thus the living body is not a 
machine that can be decomposed into real elements; and the order of behavior—its 
coherence and its adaptation to the body's situation—cannot be explained by pre-
established anatomical structures. 
If the decomposability of the machine implied a mechanical understanding of 
causality, then the existence of form implies a non-mechanical causality, which Merleau-
Ponty calls "dialectical" (SB 160/174). The machine was defined by the exteriority—
spatial, ontological, and causal—of its parts: each could come to be, change, or pass away 
without affecting the others. In a Gestalt, on the contrary, a change to one part alters 
every other part. "We will say that there is form whenever the properties of a system are 
modified by every change brought about in a single one of its parts and, on the contrary, 
are conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship among 
themselves" (SB 47/50). Thus the Gestalt exhibits a circular causality between part and 
whole: "The genesis of the whole by composition of the parts is fictitious. It arbitrarily 
breaks the chain of reciprocal determinations" (SB 50/53). In other words, a Gestalt must 
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be self-regulating or self-organizing (Morris 2006b). It is precisely this property that 
allows it to explain the order of behavior.  
"What troubles and compromises anatomical conceptions is that they cannot 
easily introduce a regulation of the reflex either by the situation to which it responds or 
by its proper effects" (SB 35/35). For the reflex theory, the adaptiveness of behavior can 
only be explained in terms of blind mechanisms that are fixed in advance. 
But from the point of view of this theory this adaptiveness is not a property of the 
actions themselves, but is instead a mere impression which they give to the 
onlooker. The actions are not determined in any way by the intrinsic nature of the 
situation, but altogether by these pre-existing bond-devices. The situation enters 
only as an agency which turns the key, presses the button, makes the machine go. 
But, like a true machine, the animal can only act according to the system of pre-
established bonds, whether such an action be adequate to the circumstances or 
not. The relationship between situation and response is consequently purely 
contingent. (SB 35/35)  
 
As a result, the reflex theory is incapable of explaining the flexibility and creativity of 
behavior—its capacity to respond dynamically and intelligently to situations it has never 
before encountered: "A machine is capable only of operations for which it has been 
constructed; the idea of a machine which would be capable of responding to an indefinite 
variety of stimuli is a contradictory one, since automation is obtained only by submitting 
the initiation of work to certain chosen conditions" (SB 87/96). 
The dialectical view of causality, on the other hand, allows us to explain the 
intelligence of behavior without appealing to pre-established mechanisms, by showing 
how behavior is self-regulating. At the level of perception, we saw that the organism 
perceives its situation as a Gestalt: a whole in which a change to any one part affects 
every other part. Thus the organism's situation has a total significance for it, which is 
indivisible; and its behavior can only be understood as a response to this significance. 
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When we move from perception to behavior, we find that the significance of the 
organism's situation is indivisible from its own activity. Perception is not a passive 
reception, but an active exploration: the body does not wait to be stimulated by its 
surroundings, but "stimulates itself" by moving. Thus perception is both the cause and the 
effect of movement; there is a circular causality between "stimulus" and "response" 
which makes it impossible to treat them as independent events. "The facts suggest, on the 
contrary, that the sensorium and the motorium function as a single organ" (SB 36/36). At 
the level of anatomy, then, we can no longer understand the nervous system as a 
collection of independent mechanisms which would be triggered by individual stimuli. 
Instead, the function of the nervous system would be to connect the organism's muscles 
to its sensory fields in such a way that movement could be regulated by its own 
perceptual results: 
 [W]e should consider the afferent sector of the nervous system as a field of forces 
which express concurrently the intraorganic state and the influence of external 
agents; these forces tend to balance themselves according to certain modes of 
preferred distribution and to obtain movements from the mobile parts of the body 
which are proper to this effect. These movements, as they are executed, provoke 
modifications in the state of the afferent system which in turn evoke new 
movements. This dynamic and circular process would assure the flexible 
regulation which is needed in order to account for effective behavior. (SB 46/48-
9) 
 
 
The concept of a self-organizing whole allows us to explain the intelligence of 
behavior without appealing either to fixed mechanisms or to mental representations (SB 
127/138). The phenomenon of animal behavior thus appears as an intermediary between 
matter and mind: it exhibits an intelligence that is not yet self-consciousness, and a 
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meaning that is not yet an idea. The problem with which the Structure began is thus 
transformed.9 The relation between consciousness and nature is split in two by the 
appearance of behavior as a mediating term, and revealed as two distinct relations: one 
between inanimate nature and living behavior, and one between behavior and 
consciousness. The introduction of this intermediate term transforms the terms it 
mediates: if the living body is not a machine, then neither is the inanimate nature from 
which it emerges; and if consciousness emerges from behavior, then the mind cannot be a 
disembodied region of pure self-presence. The study of behavior thus leads Merleau-
Ponty to a Gestalt ontology in which nature is organized into three distinct levels of 
organization: the physical, the vital, and the human. The key to this ontology is the 
concept of form: "Equally applicable to the fields which have just been defined, it would 
integrate them as three types of structures by surpassing the antinomies of materialism 
and mentalism, of materialism and vitalism" (SB 131/141). 
We find already within the physical order (i.e. inorganic nature) the existence of 
form. It is this which has led physicists to introduce the concept of the field: 
The notion of form which was imposed upon us by the facts [of behavior] was 
defined like that of a physical system, that is, as an ensemble of forces in a state 
of equilibrium or of constant change such that no law is formulable for each part 
taken separately and such that each vector is determined in size and direction by 
all the others. Thus, each local change in a form will be translated by a 
redistribution of forces which assures the constancy of their relation; it is this 
internal circulation which is the system as a physical reality. And it is no more 
composed of parts which can be distinguished in it than a melody (always 
transposable) is made of the particular notes which are its momentary expression. 
(SB 137/147-8) 
 
Thus it is not only in psychology and biology that we are forced to abandon the 
mechanical ontology; in physics too, we must move beyond the atomistic view that 
                                                
9 Compare Toadvine 2009, p. 39. 
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nature can be decomposed into "elements or particles invested with absolute properties" 
(SB 138/148). If nature is not a machine, then we must abandon the notion of a 
clockwork universe whose every motion would be determined in advance by immutable 
natural laws. 
It can happen that, submitted to external forces which increase and decrease in a 
continuous manner, the system, beyond a certain threshold, redistributes its own 
forces in a qualitatively different order which is nevertheless only another 
expression of its immanent law. Thus, with form, a principle of discontinuity is 
introduced and the conditions for a development by leaps or crises, for an event or 
for a history, are given. (SB 137/148) 
 
If nature is self-organizing then the laws of nature are not fully given in advance. 
Rather, systems will generate their own laws, and there will be a circular relation between 
the laws that govern a physical system and the novel structures the system gives rise to: 
 [E]ach form constitutes a field of forces characterized by a law which has no 
meaning outside the limits of the dynamic structure considered, and which on the 
other hand assigns its properties to each internal point so much so that they will 
never be absolute properties, properties of this point. (SB 137-38/148) 
 
The living body would be one such novel structure. Life emerges from inorganic nature 
as a new kind of system with a new form of organization. Behavior qua movement is a 
form spread out in time and space; but at the same time, behavior qua perception is the 
perception of form. In other words, behavior is a form that is sensitive to the forms 
around it. However, the organism's perceptions and behavior are not simply or fully 
determined by the physical form of its surroundings:  
On the contrary, as we have seen, physical stimuli act upon the organism only by 
eliciting a global response which will vary qualitatively when the stimuli vary 
quantitatively; with respect to the organism they play the role of occasions rather 
than of cause; the reaction depends on their vital significance rather than on the 
material properties of the stimuli. Hence, between the variables upon which 
conduct actually depends and this conduct itself there appears a relation of 
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meaning, an intrinsic relation. One cannot assign a moment in which the world 
acts on the organism, since the very effect of this "action" expresses the internal 
law of the organism. The mutual exteriority of the organism and the milieu is 
surmounted along with the mutual exteriority of the stimuli. (SB 161/174) 
 
Thus behavior is a folding back of physical form upon itself which gives rise to a new 
kind of form: a pre-discursive, non-representational meaning that Merleau-Ponty will 
later call "motor significance" (PP 144/178). 
It is out of this vital behavior and its pre-discursive significance that the mental or 
distinctively human order emerges. Just as perception and behavior were natural forms in 
which form itself became thematic, giving rise to a form of the second order, self-
consciousness emerges when behavior begins to thematize its own meaning, generating a 
meaning of the second order—a symbolic meaning (SB 120-22/130-33). What 
distinguishes human behavior from that of other animals is our capacity to reflect on the 
meaning of our own behavior, and express this meaning in "symbolic behavior." Vital 
behavior already expresses the vital significance of the organism's situation. But it is only 
in symbolic behavior that this expression becomes the point of behavior—that behavior's 
expressive character becomes explicit for itself. Thus it is here that the question of 
truth—of the adequacy of expressive behavior to that which it is trying to express—arises 
for the first time (SB 122/133). The emergence of this new perspective transforms the 
human body's whole orientation toward its world. For the first time, the body is able to 
take up an outside perspective on its own situation; to see the world as a collection of 
independent objects, and its own body as one of these objects. 
At the same time, however, self-consciousness remains a form of behavior—a 
way of moving and perceiving. As such, it is intrinsically visible: "The mental thus 
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understood is comprehensible from the outside" (SB 183/198). The mind is not a realm of 
pure interiority, shut up in itself and in principle inaccessible to others. On the contrary, 
what we call consciousness is an expressive, bodily activity that takes place in the world, 
and the meanings it expresses are there to be seen in the way that the human body acts 
and responds to its situation. However, this means that the mind is not transparent to 
itself: self-consciousness takes the form of a behavior that is oriented toward the 
meanings it itself is enacting in the world, but this reflection is always a work in 
progress—a project that can never be accomplished once and for all. It follows that we 
have no privileged introspective access to the meaning of our own actions. But this is not 
to say that we must reject introspection in favor of external observation. "There is no 
reason either to reject introspection or to make it the privileged means of access to a 
world of psychological facts" (SB 183/198). If I am not transparent to myself, than you 
and I are in the same position when it comes to interpreting my behavior: 
The child who is supposed to say which colors appear similar to him and the 
monkey which has been trained to put all the slugs of the same color in a saucer 
are in the same situation. Nothing is changed when the subject is charged with 
interpreting his reactions himself, which is what is proper to introspection. (SB 
183/198). 
 
To know oneself is no easier than to know another. Indeed, it often happens that others 
understand better than I do the meaning of my own conduct. A mind that was completely 
transparent to itself would be completely opaque to others, and they to it; the price of 
total self-certainty is solipsism. Only a being that does not fully coincide with itself can 
be open to others, and to a world: that being is not consciousness, but the living body. 
 
PREFACE  
 xxvii 
With this, Merleau-Ponty moves decisively beyond any understanding of 
phenomenology as an introspective method or a turn away from objective reality to first-
person experience.10 Far from taking the distinction between subjective meanings and 
objective facts for granted, phenomenology demonstrates precisely that this distinction is 
unfounded—that the scientist cannot explain the facts of behavior without taking 
meaning into account. Thus the basic question of phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, is 
to understand how meaning arises within nature. This is not a matter of showing how 
meaning is always already given in advance, but rather of understanding how nature 
generates meaning: how sense arises from non-sense, or as Merleau-Ponty will later 
write, how nature can be "the autoproduction of a meaning" (N 3/19). 
Unlike the Gestalt psychologists, who ultimately betrayed their own central 
insight by attempting to reduce mental and vital forms to physical ones, Merleau-Ponty 
insists on the originality of each ontological order with respect to that from which it 
emerges (Toadvine 2009, pp. 32-33). The emergence of life in nature or that of mind in 
life constitutes the appearance of a genuinely new kind of form, which operates according 
to its own distinctive logic and requires its own endogenous mode of explanation. "The 
advent of higher orders, to the extent that they are accomplished, eliminate the autonomy 
of the lower orders and give a new signification to the steps which constitute them" (SB 
180/195). Thus Merleau-Ponty distinguishes his position from any kind of physicalism or 
reductive naturalism. At the same time, however, he is careful to distinguish his views 
from those of "critical" (i.e. Neo-Kantian) philosophy, which attempts to flatten out 
                                                
10 This insight in The Structure of Behavior, which Merleau-Ponty gains from Gestalt psychology (Embree 
1980), is crucial to his interpretation and appropriation of Husserl's phenomenological method in The 
Phenomenology of Perception (PP 57-60/84-87). 
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reality in the other direction by reducing the physical and vital orders to the mental. 
"Lower" forms are never completely assimilated into "higher" ones: there remains always 
an element of opacity, an excess of the lower over the higher. The integration of lower 
forms into higher ones is always threatened by an inevitable dis-integration: mind is 
always disintegrating back into "mere" life through fatigue, illness, or injury; and life is 
constantly disintegrating back into "mere" matter in death. 
 [T]he notions of soul and body must be relativized: there is the body as mass of 
chemical components in interaction, the body as dialectic of living being and its 
biological milieu, and the body as dialectic of social subject and his group; even 
all our habits are an impalpable body for the ego of each moment. Each of these 
degrees is soul with respect to the preceding one, body with respect to the 
following one. The body in general is an ensemble of paths already traced, of 
powers already constituted; the body is the acquired dialectical soil upon which a 
higher 'formation' is accomplished, and the soul is the meaning which is then 
established. (SB 210/227) 
 
Although it is clear already in The Structure of Behavior that Merleau-Ponty 
wishes to avoid falling into the idealism of critical philosophy, he does not arrive at a 
decisive refutation of this position until his second book, the Phenomenology of 
Perception. In the Structure, realism (i.e. reductive physicalism) and idealism (i.e. 
reductive intellectualism) appear as two alternatives to be avoided. In the 
Phenomenology, however, Merleau-Ponty comes to the pivotal realization that these two 
seemingly opposed positions are in fact one and the same. Far from opposing the 
mechanical ontology of the realist, idealism simply takes it to its logical conclusions. If 
nature is a machine then it possesses no intrinsic unity and no endogenous meaning. Only 
the mind of the scientist can synthesize the disconnected parts of nature into an 
intelligible whole. 
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We began from a world in itself that acted upon our eyes in order to make itself 
seen by us; we have arrived now at a consciousness or a thought about the world, 
but the very nature of this world is unchanged. It is still defined by the absolute 
exteriority of its parts and is merely doubled across its extension by a thought that 
sustains it. We pass from an absolute objectivity to an absolute subjectivity, but 
this second idea is worth only as much as the first, and only finds support in 
contrast to the first, which is to say, through it. The kinship of intellectualism and 
empiricism is in this way much less visible and much more profound than is 
believed (PP 41/64) 
 
Thus the refutation of mechanism is equally a refutation of transcendental idealism. In 
showing that the living body is not a machine, Merleau-Ponty has also demonstrated that 
the mind is not a constituting consciousness. "[B]ehavior is not a thing, but neither is it an 
idea. It is not the envelope of a pure consciousness and, as the witness of behavior, I am 
not a pure consciousness. It is precisely this which we wanted to say in stating that 
behavior is a form" (SB 127/138). The discovery of form thus opens up a new ontological 
field which is not reducible to the antinomies of Modern philosophy.  
 
It must be admitted, however, that this new ontology remained elusive, despite the 
significant progress made by Merleau-Ponty before his untimely death. The concept of 
form remained for him more the index of a problem than a solution. This problem 
manifests itself in The Structure of Behavior as a problematic ambiguity in Merleau-
Ponty's account of the relation between form and consciousness, or matter and mind 
(Toadvine 2009, pp. 24, 38; Morris 2006b). I noted above that Merleau-Ponty is careful 
to distinguish his own position from transcendental idealism by insisting that form does 
not require a consciousness to constitute it. However, he argues that physical form is a 
perceptual being, "conceivable only as an object of perception" (SB 144/156). This claim 
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must be understood in the context of Merleau-Ponty's argument that perception is a 
bodily rather than an intellectual activity: to say that form can only be conceived as an 
object of perception is not to take the idealist position that form only exists as an object 
of thought. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty's formulation risks reinscribing the logic of 
transcendental idealism at the level of the living body. In place of a constituting 
consciousness projecting meaning onto nature, we would have a living body that 
constitutes its environment as meaningful through its own movements. But we must still 
ask: is this meaning simply projected onto the world by the moving body, or do the 
body's movements express a sense which is already nascent in inorganic nature, before 
perception arrives on the scene? How can Merleau-Ponty claim both that life emerges 
from inorganic form, and also that form exists only for perception? 
This ambiguity is symptomatic of a fundamental problem: Merleau-Ponty's failure 
to clarify the ontological status of form. The concept of form that Merleau-Ponty takes 
over from Gestalt psychology defines it as a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of 
its parts. In a working note entitled "Gestalt" that Merleau-Ponty wrote near the end of 
his life, he criticizes this as a "negative, external" definition: it says what form is not, but 
does not succeed in explaining what it is (VI 204/255, translation modified). If form can 
only be defined by contrast with the decomposable wholes of mechanistic ontology, then 
it is only a criticism of this ontology, and not a genuine alternative. Merleau-Ponty never 
abandoned the Gestalt ontology that he articulated in The Structure of Behavior, and he 
never stopped searching for a positive account of form that would explain it on its own 
terms. In his 1957-58 lecture course on The Concept of Nature, we find Merleau-Ponty 
again posing the question: "How then are we to understand this relation of the totality to 
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its parts? What status must we give totality?" (N 145/194, translation modified). He calls 
this "a question which is at the center of this course on the idea of nature and maybe the 
whole of philosophy" (N 145/194). 
In this course on Nature and its sequel the following year, Merleau-Ponty turns 
from psychology to biology in search of an answer to this question. As I noted above, 
Merleau-Ponty's criticism of the reflex theory in The Structure of Behavior already had 
implications for physiology and anatomy. The reflex theory sought to explain behavior in 
terms of pre-established anatomical structures; thus its failure suggested that the living 
body is not a machine whose anatomy could be decomposed into independent parts. In 
the Nature lectures, Merleau-Ponty takes up again the connection between behavior and 
anatomy, drawing on biologist G. E. Coghill's Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior. 
Coghill's studies of the axolotl salamander led him to argue that behavior is continuous 
with anatomical development: "if behavior is a mystery for a congealed anatomy, is 
because it can be understood only by a dynamic anatomy. …[T]he maturation of the 
organism and the emergence of behavior are one and the same thing" (N 144/192-3). The 
organism is not a machine, whose fixed architecture would determine its movements in 
advance. Rather, the organism is a dynamic form that is constantly being transformed by 
its own activities; thus growth is a slow behavior, and behavior a kind of second body, an 
extension of anatomy. 
The problem of learning and behavior thus leads us back to the problem of growth 
or embryogenesis: how a complex and highly organized multi-cellular body grows from a 
single cell. The facts of embryogenesis, like those of behavior, pose a challenge to the 
mechanistic understanding of nature. Here, as in The Structure of Behavior, we discover 
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the existence of Gestalts: self-organizing wholes that cannot be decomposed into 
independent parts. Merleau-Ponty cites the embryological studies of biologist H. Driesch, 
who sought to determine the mechanisms behind the embryo's differential development: 
what causes one part of the embryo to develop into an arm and another part to grow into a 
leg, in such a way that the whole body develops into an organized, functional whole 
rather than a monstrous mishmash of body-parts? (N 230ff/293ff). What Driesch 
discovered was that the developmental destiny of any given cell in the growing embryo 
depends on its place within the whole. An embryo that is divided in two will not grow 
into two halves of an organism, but two smaller organisms, each fully formed (N 
230/293). The growing body exhibits a circular causality in which each part is a possible 
cause of morphogenesis and differentiation for every other part. Thus the form of the 
adult body is not given in advance in any one of its parts, but arises only through the 
interaction of the parts—an interaction that is spread out over space and time. 
Faced with the failure of mechanistic explanation, however, scientists and 
philosophers alike have often resorted to vitalism and teleology. Thus Driesch appeals to 
an unknown "factor E" (for "entelechy") which would explain the robust self-regulation 
of embryonic development. This move is parallel to the move from mechanism to 
idealism that Merleau-Ponty criticizes in his early works (Morris 2008): if the form of the 
organism cannot be explained away by dissolving it into independent parts, then it must 
be given in advance in some idea or telos which would organize the parts of the organism 
from the outside, thus ensuring the development of a species-typical form. This move 
explains nothing; it is merely a "retrospective illusion that makes us project what is yet to 
come into the past, or double the sensible world with an intellectual world, which adds 
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nothing to our understanding" (N 152/203, translation modified). Mechanism cannot 
explain the robustness of development—its apparent goal-directedness, the way it 
produces species-typical outcomes even in the face of external interference. But vitalism 
and finalism cannot explain the contingency of development—its dependence on external 
conditions and its capacity for bizarre "mistakes." The problem, once again, is to explain 
the relation of the whole to its parts without denying the existence of the whole on the 
one hand, or making the whole into a separate and pre-existing entity on the other. The 
organism is not located at a single point in space and time, but it is also not aspatial or 
atemporal. It is material without being mechanical, meaningful without being ideal.  
Growth, like behavior, exhibits a kind of intelligence which is not that of a human 
mind; nature generates complex, organized forms in an entirely different way from that of 
human engineering. "Human teleology constructs by assembly of machines, whereas the 
organism does it by auto-differentiation.… There is not the work of an exterior form on a 
mechanical cause, but the work from within to without, by growth and differentiation" (N 
182/238). The natural phenomenon of the living body demonstrates the insufficiency of 
both mechanism and finalism. However, the sciences of Merleau-Ponty's time did not yet 
have a concept of form that could explain the self-organization of the organism. Thus 
Merleau-Ponty was able to show the shape that a solution must take, and the errors that 
must be avoided; but his turn to biology did not ultimately yield the solution he was 
seeking. 
 
The present study takes up Maurice Merleau-Ponty's unfinished project of 
developing an ontology of nature whose concepts are drawn from the phenomenon of 
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life, rather than from human techne. Merleau-Ponty is a phenomenologist, and his 
philosophical project is a phenomenological one. To take up his project for ourselves, 
then, cannot be merely to study the things he wrote. Rather, we must return to the 
phenomena themselves that Merleau-Ponty studied, and to which he constantly drew our 
attention. This is what I have attempted to do in this dissertation. Rather than offering a 
commentary on Merleau-Ponty's texts, I have tried to build on his insights by studying for 
myself the phenomena of behavior, perception, and development. It would be strange if 
in returning to these phenomena, we were to limit ourselves to the scientific evidence 
available during Merleau-Ponty's life. This would be to treat Merleau-Ponty's thought as 
a museum-piece, rather than a living project of thought. Merleau-Ponty took up the latest 
scientific developments of his time—both to learn from them and to criticize them—and 
we must do the same if we wish to follow his method. The science of complexity and 
self-organization has made significant progress since Merleau-Ponty's death, and it is to 
this science that I will turn in search of a new, positive account of form. At the same 
time, the mechanistic theories that Merleau-Ponty criticized—notably the reflex theory in 
psychology—have been supplemented and supplanted by new theories: Neo-Darwinism 
in biology and Cognitivism in psychology. Merleau-Ponty presciently noted in The 
Structure of Behavior that the refutation of mechanism can never be completed, "since 
behaviorism can always invent other mechanical models with regard to which the 
discussion will have to be recommenced" (SB 127/138). To take up Merleau-Ponty's 
project today, then, we must recommence this discussion and show that these new 
theories, too, are inadequate to the phenomena they seek to explain. 
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I also follow Merleau-Ponty's method in The Structure of Behavior of beginning 
from within the universe of science, rather than from an explicitly philosophical or 
transcendental standpoint. There are two compelling reasons for proceeding in this way. 
The first is that it allows us to criticize science on its own terms, rather than opposing 
ourselves to it from the outset. If Modern science has been held back by mechanistic 
prejudices that are not adequate to natural phenomena, then it should be possible to 
demonstrate this empirically, from within the scientific standpoint. The present gulf 
between science and philosophy is more than a simple division of labor; it is an artifact of 
the Modern oppositions between subject and object, materialism and idealism. In 
overcoming mechanistic ontology, we will also overcome the artificial division between 
science and philosophy—which means arriving not only at a more self-conscious science, 
but also at a more empirical philosophy. This brings us to the second reason for 
beginning from within the scientific standpoint, which is to learn from science what 
nature is and how to understand our place within it. It would be easy to simply begin 
from the standpoint of reflection, rather than demonstrating through long and painstaking 
inductive research that science must become self-reflective. If we make the 
transcendental turn prematurely, however, we will arrive straightaway at an idealism 
which is only the obverse of scientific realism. The mind that we "discover" by pure 
reflection is as much a product of our mechanistic prejudices as the material world 
discovered by the scientist. By proceeding empirically, however, we will learn that 
neither the body nor the mind are what we thought they were. It is not within ourselves 
but in nature that we will discover the truth of who we are. 
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My approach in this dissertation has been influenced significantly by the work of 
Renaud Barbaras and Evan Thompson. Both Barbaras and Thompson draw on Merleau-
Ponty's work in their own attempts to re-think the relation between consciousness, life, 
and nature. Both combine Merleau-Ponty's ontology with some further account of the 
living body: Barbaras (2003, 2008, 2010) takes up Hans Jonas' account of life as 
metabolism, while Thompson (2007) carries on the account of life as autopoiesis 
developed by his teacher, Francisco Varela. These thinkers have in common a project of 
understanding consciousness by studying the phenomenon of life. My hope in this 
dissertation is to make some contribution to this project. However, I differ somewhat 
from these thinkers in my approach to the phenomenon of life. Both Jonas and Varela 
attempt to answer the question: "What is life?" That is, they attempt to distinguish what is 
living from what is not. I share their interest in this question, but I do not believe that we 
are presently in a position to answer it directly. The question of life has become 
hopelessly obscured in the Modern era by the mechanistic view of nature. As a result, we 
cannot hope to understand the difference between life and non-life without first 
understanding the difference between the living body and the machine. When we move 
directly to the more originary question of life without first grappling with the question of 
mechanism, our thought remains entangled in mechanistic concepts and the essence of 
life eludes our grasp.  
For Jonas, the defining characteristic of life is metabolism: "the process through 
which a form maintains itself as identical through a continuous renewal (replacement) of 
matter" (Barbaras 2003). The living body depends for its continued existence on the 
exchange of matter with its surroundings. But this means that the organism cannot be 
PREFACE  
 xxxvii 
identified with the matter that composes it at any particular time. On the contrary, the 
organism can only maintain its identity by changing the matter that composes it. "In the 
realm of the lifeless, form is no more than a changing composite state, an accident, of 
enduring matter" (Jonas 2001 [1966], p. 80). It is only in the emergence of life that the 
difference between matter and form becomes a concrete reality. Metabolism represents 
"the emancipation of form… from the immediate identity with matter" (Jonas 2001 
[1966], p. 81). However, the organism's freedom from matter, its non-identity with the 
stuff that composes it, is also at the same time a dependence on matter. For the organism 
can be more than this material only by constantly taking in new material. Its unique 
power of changing its own matter is equally the necessity that it do so (Jonas 2001 
[1966], pp. 83-4). 
Jonas' study of the living body's way of being pushes the traditional concepts of 
form and matter to their breaking point—but never goes beyond them. He does not 
recognize that these categories are alien to the phenomenon of life, transplants from the 
realm of human techne. As a result, he never fully succeeds in refuting the reductionist 
view which holds that the form of the living body is not an efficacious reality, but merely 
an epiphenomenon of the underlying movements of atomic matter. Jonas argues that a 
mathematician God would be unable to recognize the phenomenon of life at all (2001 
[1966], p. 87). Against this view, Jonas can only offer the scientist's own experience of 
herself as living. But the reductionist is perfectly happy to accept this contradiction of her 
own experience, and to explain the phenomenon of life by explaining it away. Evidently, 
it is not enough to show that the consequences of reductionism are absurd from the 
standpoint of lived experience. We must show that reductionism fails on its own terms—
PREFACE  
 xxxviii 
that is, that it does not succeed at explaining the phenomena it sets out to explain, and 
that even a mathematician God would be forced to admit into his mathematical 
explanations the existence of forms or molar entities that cannot be located at a single 
point in space and time. Otherwise, we remain mired in the dualism between atomic 
matter and macroscopic form, mathematical science and lived experience. 
We encounter similar difficulties in Thompson's Mind in Life (2007). My own 
turn to the science of complexity was inspired in part by Thompson, who uses dynamic 
systems theory to bolster Merleau-Ponty's claim that inorganic nature already exhibits a 
non-mechanistic, dialectical causality which makes the emergence of life possible (2007, 
Ch. 4). However, Thompson does not take the critique of atomism far enough: he argues 
against compositional reductionism, but he offers no new ontology to take its place. As a 
result, many of the old ontological assumptions remain operative. This is most apparent 
in Thompson's account of behavior and perception or "sense-making." For Thompson, as 
for Jonas, the self-organization of the organism brings forth not only an identity, but also 
a perspective on the world: its concern for its own continued existence endows things and 
events with a valence or significance (helpful or harmful, food or poison). "An organism's 
environment is not equivalent to the world seen simply through the lenses of physics or 
chemistry" (2007, p. 153). Following Varela, Thompson describes the difference between 
the "physicochemical world" and the meaningful environment of the organism as a 
"surplus of significance" (2007, p. 154).  
We find here the same problematic ambiguity that we noted in The Structure of 
Behavior. This is not surprising, since Thompson takes over Merleau-Ponty's ontology 
without clarifying the ontological status of form. What is the relation between the so-
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called "physicochemical world" and the meaningful environment of the organism? Is the 
"surplus of meaning" simply a projection of the organism upon the indifferent world of 
atomic matter? If so, then perception never really knows the natural world from which it 
emerges. Because Thompson does not arrive at a new concept of form, we are left with 
the old concept of matter. Mechanism sneaks back in, under the guise of 
"physicochemical laws," and the dualism of mind and body reappears as a dualism of life 
and matter.  
In order to avoid falling into similar perplexities, I have chosen in the present 
study to set aside the question of what distinguishes the living from the non-living—
along with that other most perplexing question, the difference between the human and the 
animal—in favor of a less primordial but more urgent and tractable question: what is the 
difference between a living body and a machine? This question will force us to face head-
on the mechanistic and atomistic prejudices that are so deeply entrenched in Modern 
thought. And it will also lead us to a phenomenon that Thompson and Barbaras largely 
ignore: the phenomenon of development. The autopoietic account of life takes the 
individual cell as its paradigm; the multi-cellular organism is then understood by analogy 
to the single cell, without any account of how the former develops out of the latter. By 
studying the phenomenon of embryogenesis, the present study will bridge the gap 
between these two levels in a phenomenological—which is to say, empirical—way. 
Merleau-Ponty began his career by studying behavior, and arrived only later at the 
study of embryogenesis. I have chosen, however, to follow the development of the living 
body, rather than the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought. Thus I begin in Chapter 
One by studying the growth of the living body, in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
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our current, techno-logical concepts of form and matter. In Chapter Two, I turn to the 
emerging science of complexity for a new concept of form that does not depend on the 
traditional opposition between form and matter, and which will allow us to explain the 
facts of embryogenesis for the first time. Finally, in Chapter Three, I extend this account 
of anatomical development to the development of movement and perception. Although I 
have not attempted to follow Merleau-Ponty's thought chronologically or to duplicate his 
results exactly, I often found myself echoing Merleau-Ponty's arguments, confirming his 
conclusions, and expanding on or nuancing some of his key claims. I have tried 
throughout to indicate these points with footnotes citing relevant passages in Merleau-
Ponty's texts, though the reader familiar with Merleau-Ponty's work will no doubt spot 
even more parallels than I have marked. 
 
 
This dissertation is the fruit of a double apprenticeship. I have attempted to follow 
in the footsteps of Maurice Merleau-Ponty by following the examples of two living 
philosophers: Kym Maclaren and David Morris. I would like to take this opportunity to 
thank Prof. Maclaren, who has been a teacher, role model, and friend to me for over a 
decade. I am also indebted to Prof. Maclaren for introducing me to John Russon, whose 
summer seminars I have been privileged to attend for many years. I would like to thank 
Prof. Russon and the members of these seminars for showing me what philosophy can be, 
and what can be achieved when people think and talk together about the things that 
matter.  
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It was through Prof. Russon's seminars that I first met David Morris. I was 
extremely fortunate to find myself living in the same city as Prof. Morris just at the time 
that I decided to write my dissertation on Merleau-Ponty. I am immensely grateful to him 
for taking me on as a student and advisee, and for his generosity and support over the last 
four years. The influence of his writing and teaching can be found on every page of this 
work.  
This dissertation would not have been possible without the unflagging support of 
Jeffrey Bloechl. I am grateful to him for his encouragement and his confidence in my 
work. I am also grateful to my friends and colleagues in the Philosophy Department at 
Boston College, from whom I have learned a great deal. 
Finally, none of this would have been possible without the love and support of my 
family: my parents, Bill Brender and Rosanne Moss; my sister, Emma Moss Brender; and 
my partner, Marianne Pelton, to whom this work is dedicated. 
 
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as the Graduate School of Arts and 
Sciences at Boston College.
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INTRODUCTION: Returning to life 
A. Descartes' legacy 
We find ourselves today in a peculiar position with respect to the Cartesian 
legacy. We pride ourselves on having done away with Descartes' immaterial mind, 
replacing his incoherent dualism with a thoroughly consistent materialism. Advances in 
science since Descartes' time have allowed us to locate in the brain those functions which 
Descartes argued no mere body could perform. And yet, in our rejection of Cartesian 
dualism, we have preserved a great deal of Cartesianism—far more than is usually 
acknowledged. In order to see how and why this is so, we must examine what has 
changed in our view of the mind and the body since Descartes. 
Our central innovation, the one that allowed us to unify mind and brain, is the 
identification of thinking with computation. I will refer to this as the doctrine of 
computationalism.11 Computationalism, and the very idea of computation in its 
contemporary form, preceded the invention of the digital computer.12 Computationalism 
and the digital computer in fact share a common origin in the new mathematical logic 
developed toward the end of the nineteenth century. Logicians were interested in giving a 
formal, scientific account of how we establish one truth on the basis of another. Their 
goal was to explain the mysterious act of inference by breaking it down into steps that 
                                                
11 This doctrine is sometimes referred to in the Philosophy of Mind literature as "machine functionalism", 
and in Cognitive Science as "Cognitivism", although these terms may refer to broader positions than the 
one identified here. 
12 See the illuminating account provided by Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2009) in his history of the cybernetics 
movement. 
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require no thought or insight.13 To this end, they invented symbolic languages in which 
propositions could be expressed without the ambiguity of ordinary language.14 Logical 
inference could then be modeled in these languages by the derivation of one symbolic 
proposition from another according to a limited set of deduction rules. These rules were 
strictly formal or syntactic: they took account only of the symbolic form of propositions 
rather than their content. With these tools in place, logicians could model domains of 
(usually mathematical) knowledge as systems of propositions derivable from a given set 
of axioms. It then became possible to prove rigorous "metalogical" theorems concerning 
the provability and unprovability of propositions or sets of propositions within these 
axiomatic systems.15 Some logicians, identifying correct inference with thought itself, 
claimed to be giving exact mathematical descriptions of the "laws of thought."16 Thus, 
they came to understand thinking as a purely formal manipulation of symbols according 
to strictly syntactic rules. It was this conception of thinking as algorithm that made it 
possible for us to conceive—as Descartes could not have—that machines could think. 
The idea for the digital computer came from a 1936 paper by the logician Alan 
Turing, in which he tried to set out a purely theoretical definition of provability (i.e. 
derivability within a formal system). In order to capture the purely syntactic, 
"mechanical" nature of inference in a formal system, Turing imagined a machine that 
                                                
13 Notice the form that this explanation takes: it is an attempt to analyze thinking into its smallest parts, on 
the assumption that these parts will not themselves involve thought. In other words, it is an attempt to 
explain away thinking, to explain it in terms of something other than itself. We will encounter this style of 
explanation again and again in the coming chapters. 
14 The first such language was Gottlob Frege's Begriffschrift or "conceptual notation," which he described 
in his 1879 book of the same name. The subtitle of this book was "A formula language of pure thought 
modeled on that of arithmetic." 
15 It should be noted that these metalogical proofs are not themselves expressed in a purely symbolic 
language or arrived at through formal rules of inference; they are ordinary mathematical proofs, established 
and verified through human insight and expressed in "natural" (albeit technical) languages. 
Introduction  
 3 
could read and write symbols on an infinitely long tape. Moving up and down the tape, 
the machine's next step (erasing, writing, or moving) would be entirely determined by the 
symbol it was currently reading and the contents of its memory (a finite array of stored 
symbols). The initial state of the tape would constitute the machine's input or program, 
and the final state of the tape, if the machine ever came to a halt, would constitute its 
output. Prior to Turing's paper, the word "computation" referred to calculations 
performed by a human being; if such computation were sometimes described as 
"mechanical," this meant only that it could be performed by rote, with little or no thought 
or understanding. Turing's innovation was to realize that the "mechanical computations" 
of inference in a formal system could actually be performed by a machine. Though 
Turing's machine was purely theoretical (its infinitely long tape making it impossible to 
build in reality), it did not take long for scientists to begin conceiving and building real 
machines inspired by Turing's model. 
The attempt to give a purely formal model of thought by breaking inference down 
into thoughtless, mechanical steps thus led to the invention of machines that could carry 
out these steps. And this radical reconception of thought as mechanical is what finally 
broke down the wall Descartes had erected between mind and body. If machines can 
think, then we no longer need to posit an immaterial mind distinct from the material 
body. Instead, we can locate the machinery of thought in the body itself, specifically in 
the brain. Like a digital computer, the brain receives input from outside of itself, and 
responds with output. In the brain's case, this input comes from the body's sense organs, 
                                                                                                                                            
16 See e.g. the preface to Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic (1893/1997, pp. 202-204). 
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and output goes to the body's muscles.17 The brain draws inferences about the world from 
the data transmitted to it by the senses, and on the basis of these conclusions it instructs 
the body's muscles to move appropriately. Thus, both knowledge and action are a matter 
of drawing correct inferences from the data that the brain receives as input. These 
inferences amount to a symbolic representation of reality, a constantly updated map of 
the world that informs the brain's outputs to the body. The correctness of our beliefs and 
the effectiveness of our actions depend entirely on the accuracy of this map.18 
Undoubtedly, this constitutes a major revision of the Cartesian position. And yet, 
computationalism nevertheless preserves some of the most important elements of 
Descartes' ontology. First, we take for granted that the human body and brain are 
machines, partes extra partes—like the machines we build ourselves, though far more 
complicated. The preservation of this Cartesian understanding of the body is every bit as 
crucial to the new monism as its rejection of Descartes' immaterial mind. Second, thought 
for us remains in principle disembodied, just as it was for Descartes. The living body is 
inessential to the work of computation, and my brain could in theory be transferred to a 
different body without altering my identity. Even this particular brain is not essential to 
who I am: my "program," my distinctive set of algorithms for deriving output from input, 
could in principle be transferred to some other computing machine without changing 
anything essential about me. Finally, thought remains representational. Just as an idea, for 
Descartes, is a sort of mental image that may correspond more or less well to the physical 
                                                
17 This arrangement is not essential to the nature of thought: the brain must receive input from somewhere, 
in order to perform its computations, but this input need not come from a living body, as our own artificial 
computers amply demonstrate. 
18 This account of the nervous system's role in perception and behavior will be challenged in Chapter 
Three. 
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world, so is thought now understood as a symbolic representation of reality, inferred from 
the data of our senses. 
The appeal of computationalism lies primarily in its claim to have unified mind 
and body, and its promise of a thoroughly naturalistic and materialist explanation of 
human consciousness. However, there is reason to wonder whether computationalism 
delivers on this promise, whether it has truly freed itself—and us—from Descartes' 
dualistic ontology. 
 
B. The problem of meaning 
Despite computationalism's appeal and the confidence of its adherents, it has not 
been without its critics. One particular criticism will be our focus here: the so-called 
"Chinese Room" argument from John Searle's famous paper, "Minds, Brains, and 
Programs" (1980). Searle proposes the following thought-experiment (pp. 417-418): 
imagine that you have been placed in a room with a large pile of papers on which 
Chinese characters are printed.19 Through a slot in the wall, someone occasionally inserts 
some more pieces of paper with Chinese writing on them. You have been provided with a 
detailed set of rules (in English) for correlating one set of papers with the other, based 
only on the shape of the Chinese symbols. No prior knowledge of Chinese is required to 
follow these rules: you simply look up the symbols on the papers that come through the 
slot, choose the characters that the rule-book calls for from your stock-pile, and push 
these papers out of the room through the slot.20 Unbeknownst to you, the papers being 
                                                
19 Assume for the purposes of this example that you do not speak or understand Chinese. 
20 I have simplified Searle's description slightly, without altering the essentials. 
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inserted into the room are questions written by native Chinese speakers, and the papers 
you are pushing out of the room are answers to these questions. The set of rules you are 
following is so sophisticated that to those outside, the room (or whatever is in it) appears 
to be carrying on a perfectly fluent conversation in Chinese. You are equally unaware of 
the fact that those who designed the room and wrote the rules that you are following 
consider the papers that come in through the slot "input," the papers you push through the 
slot "output," and the rules you are following a "program." 
It should now be clear that this "Chinese Room" is a computer, albeit a rather odd 
one: instead of magnetic memory and a CPU made of silicone transistors, it is built out of 
stacks of paper and a human being. Nevertheless, the room functions in the same way 
that a digital computer does: it manipulates and responds to symbolic input according to 
purely syntactic rules. The point of Searle's thought-experiment is that even though the 
room appears, from the outside, to be speaking fluent Chinese, the human operator inside 
it has no understanding of the language, or of the conversation she is participating in. It 
follows, according to Searle, that even computers that can mimic human abilities and 
intelligence do not possess anything like human understanding, and do not explain 
anything about human understanding (p. 418).21 If it be objected that it is the system as a 
whole that understands Chinese, and not the person inside it, we can imagine that the 
person has memorized the rules, so that room and rulebook are done away with: now 
there is only a human being carrying on a conversation in Chinese by following a set of 
                                                
21 Searle was responding in particular to the work of Roger Schank, who wrote a computer program that 
could respond in a human-like way to questions about stories it was told. Advocates of computationalism 
(or what Searle calls "strong AI") claimed that the computer running Schank's program literally understood 
the stories it was told, and could be used to explain how human beings understand stories and answer 
questions about them (p. 417). 
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purely formal, syntactic rules. Here again, Searle argues, although the person in question 
may appear to be fluent in Chinese, she actually understands nothing of what she is 
reading or writing; its content is completely opaque to her (p. 419). Searle concludes that 
"whatever purely formal principles you put into the computer, they will not be sufficient 
for understanding, since a human will be able to follow the formal principles without 
understanding anything" (p. 418). 
This argument has been met with a number of objections, the principal one being 
that Searle hopelessly muddies the issues by inserting a human homunculus into the 
workings of his Chinese-speaking computer. One might defend Searle by arguing that he 
is merely returning to the roots of computationalism, when "computation" referred 
precisely to operations performed by rote by a human "computer". The point then would 
be to contrast such rote operations with intelligent, insightful action, and to argue that the 
latter cannot be reduced to the former. For example, the algorithm for long division will 
allow you to compute the right answer without understanding anything about arithmetic, 
but the correctness of this answer—and hence of the algorithm itself—can only be 
verified by someone with a non-formal understanding of division and its meaning.  
The computationalist may still reply, however, that what we call "non-formal 
understanding" is really nothing but a more sophisticated algorithm whose workings we 
are not privy to. Indeed, critics of Searle's argument have argued that it relies on vague, 
introspective intuitions about what and how we understand, intuitions that may or may 
not be empirically accurate. The only objectively valid criterion for understanding, 
according to the computationalist, is the results it produces. If a computer's performance 
of a given task is indistinguishable from that of a human being, then the computer 
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understands the task just as well as the human does, regardless of what it "feels like" for 
either one.22 
The answer to this criticism, and the true strength of the Chinese Room argument, 
lies in a further point that Searle makes about the meaning of the computer's inputs and 
outputs: "the formal symbol manipulations by themselves… are quite meaningless; they 
aren't even symbol manipulations, since the symbols don't symbolize anything. In the 
linguistic jargon, they have only a syntax but no semantics" (1980, p. 422, emphasis in 
original). The computer only appears to be thinking—to know and understand things 
about the world—because its inputs and outputs are symbolic, and thus appear to have a 
meaningful content. But symbols have no content in themselves, for in themselves they 
are not symbols at all, but only things—ink on a page, or pixels on a screen. They are 
meaningful only for beings who can interpret them as symbols, and discover a meaning 
in them. Searle's crucial point about the computer is that it is not such a being. The 
Chinese Room's inputs and outputs appear to its human observers to be meaningful 
Chinese sentences, but they have no such meaning for the computer itself. The 
"correctness" of the computer's outputs, its apparent fluency in Chinese, lies entirely in 
the interpretation given to these outputs by its human interlocutors. The Chinese Room 
itself is utterly incapable of distinguishing between correct and incorrect outputs, since 
for it these outputs are nothing but causal effects of physical inputs, the end of a complex 
chain reaction.23 
                                                
22 This of course is the famous “Turing Test” of machine intelligence (Turing 1950). 
23 The problem Searle identifies here has become known in cognitive science as "The Symbol Grounding 
Problem," after Stevan Harnad's (1990) article of the same name. 
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In attempting to give an objective definition of understanding, the 
computationalist ends up attributing to the computer properties that are only in the eye of 
the observer. This can be seen even more clearly if we imagine that, instead of 
"conversing" with human interlocutors, the Chinese Room exchanges inputs and outputs 
with another, identical Chinese Room. There should be no temptation, in this scenario, to 
say that Chinese is being spoken or understood. There is here only a mechanical 
exchange of inputs and outputs, one computer triggering an automated response in the 
other, in a closed feedback loop. This is not a conversation. The computationalist might 
insist, of course, that to a (human, Chinese-speaking) observer it is indistinguishable from 
a real conversation. But this would again be to import into the situation an outside 
observer for whom the signs exchanged are meaningful. The Chinese Rooms are 
completely incapable of generating meaning on their own. As Searle puts it, you cannot 
get semantics from syntax. 
We see here a general problem with any attempt to give an "objective" account of 
meaning or subjectivity. The computationalist is right to criticize introspective accounts, 
which would reduce the meaning of my situation to the meaning I think it has. However, 
we are no better off if we exchange the introspective standpoint for a purely external one. 
We will then arrive only at a description of what the situation means to the observer, 
when the whole problem was to describe (objectively) what it means to the system being 
observed. If we take the observer's perspective for granted then we only postpone the 
problem we set out to solve, for the observer is also a thinking being, and her perspective 
must also be accounted for. The claim that computers are thinking can only be sustained 
by appealing illicitly to the perspective of an observer who is not a computer, whose 
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thought is more than an algorithm. In its attempt to give an objective account of thought, 
computationalism ends by emptying thought of all meaning. 
 
C. The meaning of life 
This critique of computationalism immediately raises a larger problem: if 
meaning cannot be generated by formal symbol-manipulation, then where does meaning 
come from? How are human beings able, as computers are not, to endow symbols with 
meaning? More broadly, what makes human conduct meaningful in a way that the 
computer's activity is not? In what follows, I will attempt to answer these questions by 
returning to the phenomenon of the living body. This phenomenon calls for both 
scientific explanation and philosophical reflection—perhaps more than any other 
phenomenon. The living body is nature at its most complex, its most astounding: 
nowhere else in nature do we find such a diversity of parts and forms working together in 
such harmony and coordination. It is this complexity and harmony that call for scientific 
explanation. At the same time, the living body is the kind of being that we ourselves are. 
If we wish to understand ourselves and our relation to nature, as philosophy does, then 
we must begin with the phenomenon of life. 
In the following chapters, I will argue that the failures of computationalism stem 
from its preservation of Descartes' mechanistic ontology: the assumption that nature in 
general—and the living body in particular—are complex machines composed of mutually 
external parts. As we will see, this attempt to explain the natural world—including 
ourselves—using concepts drawn from human techne renders the phenomenon of 
meaning incomprehensible. Rather than imposing on the living body an extrinsic set of 
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concepts drawn from a foreign domain, my goal is to allow life itself to show us the 
ontology that is appropriate to it, and to generate the concepts we need to understand it. 
We will find that the phenomenon of life undermines the mechanistic ontology that 
underlies both Cartesian dualism and computationalism. And we will see, further, that the 
phenomenon of life is the key to understanding the genesis of meaning, which this 
mechanistic ontology has so thoroughly obscured. In allowing life to show us what it 
means, we will discover the very meaning of showing and meaning. 
  12 
CHAPTER ONE: Is the living body a machine? 
 
"[W]e cannot think Nature without taking into account that our idea of Nature is impregnated with 
artifice" (N 86/120, translation modified.) 
  13 
1. What are living bodies made of? 
It seems natural to begin our discussion of the living body by asking what living 
bodies are made of. Thanks to centuries of painstaking work by physicians, anatomists, 
and biologists, we now have a number of answers to this question at our disposal: living 
bodies are made of organs and tissues, which are composed of living cells; these cells are 
built out of proteins and other organic molecules, which are in turn made of elements like 
carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. Rather than proceeding directly to these answers, 
however, I propose that we dwell for a while on the question itself, to see if it is truly as 
natural as it first appears. What does it mean to ask what something is made of? What 
sort of answer are we looking for, and what are we assuming about the thing in question?  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. An antique roll-top desk. 
 
Consider a simple example: an old roll-top desk that I've had since I was a child 
(Fig. 1). What is it made of? If we could pose this question to the artisan who made it, we 
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would probably learn that she had built the desk out of wood and various metal fasteners. 
In other words, she would tell us about the materials from which it was constructed. 
When we ask what an artificial thing is made of, this is the sort of answer we expect: we 
want to know what materials we would need if we wanted to build a desk ourselves. We 
would be taken aback if the artisan replied that the desk was made of carbon and iron, for 
we know that she did not craft the desk from atomic elements, but from wood, nails and 
screws. 
When we learn what materials went into the desk's construction, our question is 
answered. It would be strange if, upon learning that the desk was made of oak, we 
continued pestering the craftsperson to tell us what the oak was made of. She would 
surely reply that she hadn't made the wood—it was cut from an oak tree. Similarly, the 
steel fasteners were forged out of iron ore, which was not made but rather mined from 
within the Earth. My desk, like all manufactured things, is made of materials that were 
not themselves manufactured. Human manufacturing depends on "raw" materials like 
wood and ore, which are natural formations rather than artificial products. When we ask 
what an artificial thing is made of, we are ultimately asking after these raw materials, 
from which every manufacturing process begins. 
What would it mean to ask what these raw materials are made of? When we asked 
what the desk was made of, we were asking about the materials that its maker used in 
constructing it. The desk was made from the wood of the oak tree. But it makes no sense 
to ask what materials the oak tree's maker used in constructing it, since we know that the 
oak tree had no maker. No one made the oak tree out of anything, for the oak tree was not 
made at all. A tree can be cultivated, but it cannot be constructed or manufactured. Like 
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all living bodies, the tree is not built, but grown. What is the difference between 
manufacturing and growth? To answer this question, we will have to study these two 
ways of coming to be in more detail. 
 
2. What is the difference between manufacturing and growth? 
The goal of manufacturing is to furnish us with things that do not occur naturally, 
by constructing them out of raw materials that can be found in nature. If desks grew on 
trees, we would not need to manufacture them; since they do not, we have to build them 
ourselves. In the previous section, we considered the raw materials that my desk is made 
of. Now, let us consider how it was made. The construction of my desk began with a 
design: a plan in the designer's head or on paper that specified what the final product 
would look like. Because the desk is made from many parts, its design had to indicate the 
shape and dimensions of each part, how these parts would fit together, and what materials 
they would be made of. To make this design a reality, the artisan had to select some large 
pieces of wood cut from the trunk of an oak tree, and cut and shape these into the parts of 
the desk whose various forms were laid out in the plan. Once these parts were shaped to 
the plan's specifications, they could be assembled and fastened together to form the final 
product. 
We can distinguish three stages in the making of my desk, which are 
characteristic of manufacturing in general:  
1) formulation of a plan or design;  
2) shaping of parts from raw materials; and  
3) assembly of these parts into the final product.  
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Like my desk, most human artifacts are complex wholes made of various different 
parts. Thus manufacturing is almost always a process of assembly, in which a complex 
whole is put together out of several parts in such a way that they form a useful whole. 
This is why we tend to use the word "synthetic" as a synonym for "artificial": human 
manufacturing is, by and large, a process of synthesis.  
More often than not, the parts from which the final product is assembled were 
themselves synthesized out of other parts. In the manufacture of a cotton shirt, for 
example, the raw cotton is harvested, processed, and spun into thread; this thread is then 
woven into cloth; and this cloth is finally cut into pieces and sewn together to make a 
shirt. Thus there may be several stages of "refinement" between the raw materials from 
which manufacturing begins and the material from which the parts of the final product 
are shaped. Within this process of refinement, "material" and "product" become relative 
terms: the same cloth that is a finished product for the textile manufacturer is a material 
for the clothing manufacturer. Another way of putting this is to say that human artifacts 
tend to have a hierarchical organization: they are wholes made of parts that are 
themselves made of further parts, just as the shirt is made of pieces of cloth that are 
themselves made out of thread. At the bottom of this hierarchy, however, we always find 
the raw materials from which the manufacturing process began, which were not 
themselves manufactured. 
A complex whole like a desk or a shirt cannot be assembled out of any old 
collection of parts. In order for the parts of a complex artifact to work together in just the 
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right way, they must be crafted with foresight and intelligence.24 Both the production of 
the parts and their assembly into a useful whole must be guided by a careful plan which 
describes the form of each part and how they will fit together. Thus manufacturing is a 
conceptual or intellectual process: it can only be carried out by an intelligent being whose 
idea of the finished product precedes the existence of the product itself, and orders the 
creation and assembly of its parts. 
 
Manufacturing is the method human beings have devised for producing complex, 
organized wholes. Nature, however, accomplishes this in quite a different way. 
Manufacturing is an intrinsically conceptual or intellectual process: it can only be carried 
out by an intelligent being whose idea of the finished product precedes the existence of 
the product itself, and orders the creation and assembly of its parts. The living body, on 
the other hand, must come to be without the foresight and direction of an intelligent 
being. It must somehow organize itself into a complex whole, of its own accord, without 
a plan or an idea of what this whole will look like.25 
Consider the oak tree, from whose trunk my desk was made. No designer sets its 
dimensions in advance, or plots out the forms its leaves and branches will take. No one 
knows exactly what the tree that grows from an acorn will look like, or even if that acorn 
will germinate at all. The tree begins its life not as an idea in someone's mind but as part 
                                                
24 “Take a look at painters for instance, if you would, or housebuilders or shipwrights or any of the other 
craftsmen you like, and see how each one places what he does into a certain organization, and compels one 
thing to be suited for another and to fit it until the entire object is put together in an organized and orderly 
way” (Gorgias 503e-504a). 
25 Of course, human beings can and do intervene in the growth of trees and other living things—cultivating 
those that are useful to us and inhibiting the growth of others. However, the work of cultivation is quite 
different from that of manufacturing; and most living beings are perfectly capable of reproducing without 
human intervention. 
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of another tree's living body—a part that breaks off to begin its own separate existence as 
a new organism. This new tree will resemble its parents in many ways, but it will also be 
shaped by the conditions it encounters over the course of its own life. It will be a new 
individual with its own unique history, and its body will bear the traces of that history.26 
No builder crafts the parts of the oak tree. Its cells come to be by cell division, 
and they are all descended from a single cell. As the cells of the developing tree embryo 
divide and multiply, they differentiate themselves into various different cell-types. These 
specialized cells continue to reproduce and increase in number, organizing themselves 
into tissues and organs to form the familiar structures of a living oak: a hard, woody trunk 
that branches repeatedly into roots below the soil and branches and twigs above, from 
which sprout photosynthesizing leaves. The mature tree is a complex whole, within 
which we can distinguish many different parts. But the tree was not assembled out of 
these parts—it did not begin its life as a disconnected pile of leaves, branches and bark. 
Instead, it generated its own organs "on the fly" over the course of its development. As 
the tree grew from a shoot to sapling to mature tree, its trunk slowly divided into 
branches, its branches divided into twigs, and these twigs sprouted leaves.  
The desk is built one piece at a time, gradually approaching completion, until 
finally every piece is in place. There are no baby desks—only incomplete ones. The tree, 
on the other hand, is never unfinished, but only immature: at every moment of its 
existence, it is a living, functioning whole from which nothing is missing. The tree is 
                                                
26 It has become commonplace today to say that the organism's genome constitutes a design or blueprint for 
its mature form. I will address this claim at length in section 1.4. For now, it will suffice to point out that 
even the proponents of this view admit that the living body is shaped by its environment as well as its 
genes. Thus the so-called "genetic blueprint," unlike the design of an artifact, would not fully determine in 
advance the form of the adult organism. This difference between the living body and the artifact is far from 
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never incomplete—but it is never complete, either. Unlike manufacturing, which comes 
to an end when the product matches its design, growth has no end-point. The processes 
that produce the adult tree also keep it alive once it has reached maturity, and they will 
stop only when the tree is dead. Manufacturing always precedes its own product: the 
manufacturing process comes to an end as soon as its product comes into existence. 
Growth, on the other hand, is contemporaneous with its product: it comes to an end only 
when its product ceases to exist.27 
No intellect commands the tree to grow, or supervises its development. The oak 
rises unbidden from the soil, its towering form emerging slowly and improbably from the 
tiny acorn. Somehow the little seed is able to produce the mature tree—or more 
accurately, the seed somehow has the power to become the tree, to transform itself into 
the fully-grown oak. Of course, this is not an unconditional power. The acorn can only 
become an oak if it has the rain, sun and air that it needs. Nevertheless, the sun and the 
rain do not build the tree; the acorn is not a passive material on which the environment 
acts. On the contrary, the tree is the agent of its own development. 
This is the wondrous thing about the living body, a wonder we are so familiar 
with that we have almost forgotten it: the living body generates itself—it is both cause 
and effect of itself.28 If this seems paradoxical to us, it is because we have come to think 
of all creation on the model of manufacturing. It is impossible for a being to synthesize 
itself, for synthesis always proceeds from part to whole: first the parts are formed, and 
                                                                                                                                            
insignificant; it shows that the very notion of a "genetic blueprint" is at best an imperfect analogy, and at 
worst a serious category error. 
27 This is not to say that the living body increases in size until its death, but rather that its cells are 
constantly dying and being replaced by new cells; life is not a static property or fixed state, but a process. 
28 See Kant's Critique of Judgment (§64). 
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then they are assembled into a finished product. This product cannot be responsible for 
the genesis of its own parts, or their assembly, since it does not exist until these tasks are 
complete. Thus manufacturing requires the intervention of some external agent, an 
intelligent being who can envision the final product and organize raw materials to realize 
this idea. 
If the living body generates itself, it cannot be by manufacturing. But what is the 
alternative? Self-genesis still appears to be a paradox: in order to generate itself, to be its 
own cause, the living body would have to somehow precede itself—to exist before it 
exists. This paradox is resolved when we realize that the organism doing the generating 
both is and is not the organism that gets generated. The acorn, the sapling, and the mature 
tree are all the same organism—and yet they are not identical to one another. A being can 
be both cause and effect of itself only by changing over time. Again, if this is surprising 
to us, it is because we are accustomed to the perspective of manufacturing. The 
manufactured thing is a finished product, designed not to change once it is complete. 
Having no principle of change within itself, the artifact will only change if external forces 
act on it.29 It persists by a sort of inertia: all it must do to continue existing is not change. 
If external forces alter it too much from its original design, we say that it has ceased to 
exist, ceased to be the thing it was made to be. The living body, on the other hand, stays 
alive only by changing itself. If it does not change, it will die—it will cease to be itself. 
Thus the living body can remain itself only by changing itself. Its existence is an active 
project. 
                                                
29 See Aristotle's Physics 192b. 
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What is the nature of this project? How must the living body change itself in order 
to stay alive? The organism keeps itself alive through the activity of metabolism, in 
which it takes in nutrients and energy from its environment, and expels waste products 
from its body (Jonas 2001, pp. 75-84). It is tempting to think of metabolism by analogy to 
the engines we build, as if food were fuel that the living body burns. But in fact, the 
living body's relation to its food is quite different from that of an engine to its fuel. A car 
needs fuel in order to run, but not in order to go on existing. The fuel passes through the 
car without becoming part of the car; aside from wear and tear, the parts of the car remain 
unchanged. The living body, on the other hand, needs food in order to survive. The 
nutrients it consumes do not simply pass through it, leaving its parts unchanged. On the 
contrary, these nutrients are incorporated into the living body, becoming part of it. It is 
by incorporating nutrients from its environment that the organism is able to grow, to 
repair parts of itself that have been damaged, and to replace the parts that it is constantly 
shedding. 
The parts I find in my desk today are the same parts I would have found in it 
when I was a child, and the same parts that the desk was first constructed out of whenever 
it was made. By contrast, the cells you will find in my body today are not the same cells 
you would have found there when I was a child. First of all, there are a great deal more of 
them; second, most (if not all) of the cells in my childhood body have died and been 
replaced by new cells. Which is the real me—my body today, or the body I had as a 
child? They are both me, and yet I am not simply identical to either one of them. The 
living body is somehow more than the parts that can be found in it at any given instant. It 
is a being that exists in time, that takes time to be what it is. The organism can never be 
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located in a single instant, or a single configuration of atoms and molecules; to freeze it 
or try to hold it still in this way is to miss it, for it exists only in movement—it is not a 
thing, but an activity. 
Every part of the living body participates in this metabolic activity, and every part 
depends on this activity for its own continued existence. The leaves of the oak tree cannot 
live without the water absorbed by its roots, and the roots cannot live without the 
photosynthesis that takes place in the leaves. Every part of the living body depends on 
every other part. Thus a change to any single part will affect all the others. In this, the 
living body stands in stark contrast to the manufactured thing. Each part of my desk was 
crafted separately from the others, and each one is self-sufficient; having come to be 
independently, they are perfectly capable of existing apart. The builder may assemble 
these parts into a functioning whole, but the parts themselves are entirely indifferent to 
this whole, and to one another. The desk is a purely extrinsic whole, imposed upon 
indifferent parts, just as the shapes of those parts were imposed on indifferent materials. 
Thus manufacturing produces wholes in which a change to one part does not affect the 
others. It makes no difference to one drawer whether the other drawers are present or not: 
if one part of the desk is damaged or removed, the others will not compensate for this 
loss. The parts of the desk did not produce one another, and so they will not generate new 
parts to replace those that are lost. Nor will one part of the desk split off and grow into a 
new desk.30 Reproduction and self-repair, so commonplace in nature, are utterly beyond 
the capacities of even our most sophisticated machines. But these amazing powers are 
simply extensions of the power of growth. It is no more miraculous that a living body 
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should be able to re-generate a lost limb than that the body was able to generate this limb 
in the first place. 
In looking at the different ways in which living bodies and human artifacts come 
to be, we have discovered that they also differ in their way of being. Indeed, we have 
discovered that growth is the living body's way of being—that how it comes to be and 
how it is are one and the same. The living body is a developmental being, a movement of 
becoming which is never fixed. If this is hard for us to conceive, it is at least in part 
because we have become accustomed to thinking of the living body, and nature in 
general, on the model of manufacturing and manufactured things. In the following 
sections, I will discuss the origins of this synthetic view of nature, and the conceptual 
difficulties it has engendered. 
 
3. Atomism and the problem of form 
The Ancient Greeks distinguished, as a matter of course, between "what is grown 
and what is put together" (Republic 533b): that is, between the products of nature and the 
products of human techne.31 Aristotle explains this distinction by saying that beings 
which come to be by nature are self-moving: natural beings have within themselves the 
source of their own growth and change, unlike things which come to be by techne, whose 
source lies outside of them in their human maker (Physics 192b). He goes on to say that it 
would be absurd to try to prove that nature exists, "for it is obvious that there are many 
things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark of a man who 
                                                                                                                                            
30 Aristotle famously observes that if one plants a wooden bed in the ground, it will never sprout another 
bed; if anything were to grow from it, it would be a tree (Physics 193b). 
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is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not" (193a). And yet, what 
seemed self-evident to Aristotle no longer seems so to us today. The ancient distinction 
between growth and manufacturing has collapsed, and with it the distinction between 
nature and artifice. Of course we know that the oak desk was built by human hands, while 
the oak tree was not. But this now appears to us a merely superficial difference, which 
conceals a more fundamental unity: that desk and tree are both made of the same "basic 
building blocks of matter"—protons, neutrons, and electrons. If the tree is made of cells, 
molecules, and atoms in the same way that the desk is made of wood, then everything is 
synthetic: growth and manufacturing are just two different ways of putting things 
together. 
The shift from Aristotle's view of nature to the one we hold today began in the 
seventeenth century (Arendt 1998; Lachterman 1989; Funkenstein 1986). It was part of 
the larger rejection of Ancient (and especially Aristotelian) ideas spearheaded by thinkers 
such as Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes, which inaugurated the Modern era. The collapse 
of the nature/artifice distinction played a particularly important role in the emergence of 
Modern science, for it inaugurated a radical new approach to the study of nature. This 
new approach can be summed up in one simple but radical proposal, which I will call the 
"mechanical hypothesis." We saw above (1.1) that manufacturing always begins with 
natural formations that were not themselves manufactured. The mechanical hypothesis 
proposes that we treat these natural formations as if they too were artifacts. In other 
words, the mechanical hypothesis is that nature is a machine—a synthetic whole, like the 
products of human engineering. It follows that natural phenomena can be reverse-
                                                                                                                                            
31 The Ancient Greek word for nature, physis, comes from the verb to grow (phuo). The word for "what is 
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engineered, by posing to them the same questions we pose to manufactured things when 
we want to understand them: "What is this made of, and how was it made?" If nature 
could be reverse-engineered, then we could understand it as completely as we understand 
the things we make ourselves.32 
Biologist Richard Dawkins (1996) articulates this method of investigating nature 
very clearly: "If we wish to understand how a machine or living body works, we look to 
its component parts and ask how they interact with each other. If there is a complex thing 
that we do not yet understand, we can come to understand it in terms of simpler parts that 
we do already understand" (11). This same principle was articulated much earlier by 
Descartes.33 The key assumption of this method is that the natural phenomena we want to 
explain are modular: that they can be divided into "simple parts," each of which can be 
understood in isolation from the others.34 Once we understand each of the parts 
individually, we can ask how they interact with one another; but we assume in advance 
that these interactions will not change anything essential in the parts themselves. In other 
words, we assume that the "simple parts" are indifferent to their interactions with one 
another—just like the parts of a machine. The parts determine the interactions, but the 
interactions do not in any way determine the parts. Causality and explanation are 
"bottom-up," moving from simple part to complex whole, and never in the other 
direction. Descartes captured this ontology of nature in his principle that all extended 
things—including space or "extension" itself—exist partes extra partes (parts outside of 
                                                                                                                                            
grown" is phuomenon, which is contrasted with syntithemenon—what is synthesized by human beings. 
32 See Kant's Critique of Judgment (§68): "[W]hen we study nature in terms of mechanism, we keep to 
what we can observe or experiment on in such a way that we could produce it as nature does, at least in 
terms of similar laws; for we have complete insight only into what we can ourselves make and accomplish 
according to concepts." 
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parts).35 By this he meant not only that their parts are spatially outside of one another (i.e. 
spread out in space), but also that they are external to one another in their very being—
that each part is what it is independent of all the others. 
In order to explain the natural world in this way, we must determine in each case 
how to divide the natural phenomenon under investigation into its "component parts", and 
where to stop dividing. In the artificial thing, the answers to these questions are clear: the 
artifact was built out of parts, so these are the parts we want to divide it into; and we stop 
asking what these parts are made of when we reach raw materials that were not 
themselves manufactured. But a rock or a tree could be divided in countless different 
ways. If we split the rock in half, do we discover what the rock is made of? Or have we 
simply turned one rock into two? Of course the divisions we choose to make are often 
suggested by the natural being itself, in conjunction with our own interests. If we are 
interested in the functions of the living body, we will divide it into organs and tissues; if 
we are interested in how these organs develop, we will have to divide them into 
individual cells. But each of these divisions offers only a provisional answer to the 
question of what the living body is made of.36 It may satisfy a particular, limited interest; 
but the parts arrived at cannot offer a final explanation for the organism, since they are 
themselves still open to the further question: what are these parts made of? Whatever 
                                                                                                                                            
33 Discourse on the Method, Part 2 (CSMK Vol. 1, p. 120; AT VI, p. 18). 
34 "Modularity is the human mind's lever against complexity" (Victor 2012). 
35 See Descartes' letter to Henry More (5 February 1649): ""I call extended only what is imaginable as 
having parts outside of parts" ["ita illud solum quod est imaginabile, ut habens partes extra partes, . . . dico 
esse extensum"] (CSMK Vol. 3, p. 362; AT V, p. 270). (I have modified the English translation, which for 
some reason renders "partes extra partes" as "parts within parts.") Merleau-Ponty cites this passage in his 
lectures on The Incarnate Subject (IS 50/33). 
36 "There is a hierarchy of subcomponents within components. We explain the behaviour of a component at 
any given level, in terms of interactions between sub- components whose own internal organization, for the 
moment, is taken for granted" (Dawkins 1996, p. 12). 
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parts we divide the natural being into can usually be divided still further. Where should 
this process of division end? At what point can we claim to have arrived at the ultimate 
constituents of the phenomenon, which would make it totally intelligible to us? 
Because it is committed to explaining complex wholes in terms of their simpler 
parts, mechanistic explanation is forced to keep on dividing the natural phenomenon until 
it reaches parts that cannot be divided further, and which can thus serve as ultimate terms 
of explanation. In other words, the dynamic of mechanistic explanation commits it to a 
doctrine of atomism, which says a) that there is a smallest unit or set of units into which 
everything that exists can be divided; b) that all beings are made out of these units, in the 
same way that an artifact is made out of raw materials; and c) that these indivisible units 
are the ultimate units of intelligibility, the ultimate terms in which all that exists must be 
explained. Notice that this is a methodological assumption of mechanistic science, not an 
empirical claim: the doctrine of atomism did not originate with the discovery of protons 
and electrons; nor did these discoveries constitute a proof of the doctrine. Conversely, 
one may dispute the claims of atomism without disputing the existence of quarks, or 
whatever particles physicists currently believe to be the most fundamental. Atomism is 
much more than the claim that beings in nature can be divided into tiny, indivisible 
particles; it is a claim about the relations of these particles to one another, and to the 
wholes in which they are found. 
 
Having discovered what nature is made of by dividing it into its simplest 
components, mechanistic science is obliged to explain how these components are put 
together—how they interact to form the complex wholes that we perceive in nature. 
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Since these atoms have been posited as completely indifferent to one another, they are 
not going to assemble themselves into complex wholes on their own. Like the parts of a 
machine, they require some external cause to bring this about. In manufacturing, this 
work is accomplished by the human craftsperson. In nature, according to the mechanical 
hypothesis, the work of shaping matter is accomplished by forces of nature, such as 
gravity or electromagnetism.37Atoms, by definition, cannot be changed, but they can be 
moved around with respect to one another, and this is what the forces of nature do. These 
forces operate according to the laws of nature, so called because they hold universally, 
without exception—they are the same everywhere and at all times.  
Atomic matter and the forces of nature together explain what nature is made of 
and how it is made. The natural world we see today was produced by the constant action 
of the forces of nature on matter, in accordance with natural laws. Thus Kant wrote in 
1755, "Give me the material, and I will build a world out of it! That is, give me the 
material, and I will show you how a world is to come into being out of it."38 The 
positions of the atoms that make up the cosmos and the laws that govern the movements 
of those atoms together constitute a full account of the natural world. Not only do the 
laws of nature explain how the present universe arose, through the actions of force on 
matter, but they also predict how the universe will be configured in the future. This claim 
was famously articulated by the mathematician and scientist Pierre-Simon Laplace 
(1814/1951): 
                                                
37 The European founders of the mechanistic research program did not initially reject the Christian view 
that the world was created by God. Rather, they proposed that God had made the world in roughly the same 
way that humans made artifacts, and that the natural world could therefore be understood by asking how 
God had made the world and what He had made it out of. It was only later that mechanistic science came to 
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Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by 
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as 
the past, would be present to its eyes. (p. 4, translation modified) 
 
The mechanical hypothesis thus leads to a deterministic view of nature as a clockwork 
universe, in which everything is determined in advance. 
Time, on this view, turns out to be a kind of illusion, produced by the limits of our 
own understanding. Our finite perspective on the world gives us the impression that 
events occur which are unprecedented, that nature produces phenomena which are truly 
new and could not have been predicted. But a greater intelligence, with a fuller 
understanding of nature than our own, would see that the whole history of the cosmos 
was already given at its inception. What appears to us as a new form of being is really 
just a different configuration of the same, unchanging matter. Form, like time, is in the 
eye of the beholder: it makes no difference to matter, or to the forces that move and shape 
that matter. The complex can always be explained in terms of the simple; thus complexity 
itself is a kind of illusion, an epiphenomenon that can be explained away, and which 
itself explains nothing. 
 
The appeal of the mechanistic research program's lies in its promise to explain the 
ever-changing diversity of nature in terms of an underlying unity that does not change. It 
claims to bring predictability and certainty to an uncertain world. And with the promise 
                                                                                                                                            
reject the hypothesis of a divine craftsman. However, this left science in the incoherent position of claiming 
that nature is an artifact without an artificer, a machine with no manufacturer. 
38 Cited in Arendt 1998, pp. 295-6. 
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of prediction comes the possibility of control over nature.39 We have seen that human 
manufacturing is limited by its dependence on nature for the "raw materials" which it 
cannot produce itself, and from which it must always begin. If nature is itself an artifact, 
however, then there is in principle nothing that human engineering might not build. Once 
science has shown how a natural being is put together out of the basic building blocks of 
matter, engineering should be able to produce that thing out of these building blocks, and 
even modify it to better suit human needs. This dream is evident in our visions of future 
technological utopias, such as television's Star Trek, in which food is not grown but 
simply synthesized or "replicated" out of atomic elements. It applies not only to our 
natural environment, but also to our own bodies: since we are ourselves machines, there 
is no reason why we ought not to be able to repair ourselves the way we repair our cars, 
conquering illness, aging, and even death itself. Thus the mechanistic research program 
promises not only understanding of nature, but ultimately freedom from nature. 
Can these promises be fulfilled? Is freedom from nature possible, or desirable? 
The mechanical hypothesis helped to usher in the age of Modern science, and it has 
produced astonishing results in a number of fields. Indeed, this approach has been so 
successful that it has become identified with science itself. What was once a hypothesis 
has become an ontology: we have gone from treating nature as if it were a machine, to 
taking for granted that nature actually is a machine. But the success of the mechanical 
                                                
39 This has always been an explicit goal of the mechanistic research program. See e.g. Descartes' Discourse 
on the Method (Part 6): "For my notions had made me see that it is possible to reach understandings which 
are extremely useful for life, and that instead of the speculative philosophy which is taught in the schools, 
we can find a practical philosophy by which, through understanding the force and actions of fire, water, air, 
stars, heavens, and all the other bodies which surround us as distinctly as we understand the various crafts 
of our artisans, we could use them in the same way for all applications for which they are appropriate and 
thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and possessors of nature" (CSMK Vol. 1, pp. 142-3; AT VI, p. 
62). 
1.4. The paradox of development 
 31 
hypothesis does not license this conclusion. Many highly successful research programs 
have been founded on hypotheses that were later overturned—think of geocentric 
astronomy, or Newtonian physics. The mechanical hypothesis has been very useful, but 
that does not make it true. Furthermore, the usefulness of this hypothesis is running out; 
in many fields, it is already more of a hindrance than a help. Nowhere is this more clear 
than in our attempts to understand the development of the living body. In the next 
section, we will look at how biologists have tried to make sense of development 
mechanistically, and the difficulties that these attempts have encountered. I will argue 
that development cannot, in principle, be explained in synthetic or mechanical terms, and 
thus that the phenomenon of development demands a new ontology whose concepts are 
not drawn from machines or manufacturing. 
 
4. The paradox of development 
I argued above that the process of development sets the living body apart from the 
machine or artifact, which is a product of manufacturing.40 In biology, however, it has 
become commonplace to treat the living body as if it were a machine or synthetic 
whole.41 In this section, I will argue that this view of the body has arisen not in light of 
the phenomenon of development, but rather in spite of it. By reviewing the history of 
biology's attempts to understand development, I will show that the facts of development 
                                                
40 Development is "the basic biological process. Development is what distinguishes biological systems 
from other sorts of systems" (Robert 2004, p. 34). 
41 As we will see, however, there are some important exceptions to this consensus. 
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cannot be explained in mechanical terms, and that it is only by systematically neglecting 
these facts that biologists have been able to maintain that the living body is a machine.42 
 
A. Epigenesis vs. preformation 
From the mechanistic point of view, the problem of development is a problem of 
form. The living body must ultimately be made up of the same matter as everything else; 
thus its special properties can only be explained by the complex way in which this matter 
has been arranged in the organism. The question, then, concerns the origin of this 
arrangement: how is matter shaped into the complex form of the living body? 
The origin of form presents no puzzle in the case of manufactured things: their 
form is given to them by their manufacturers, according to some design. Manufactured 
things are products of intellect, and their form originates in an idea. For a long time, this 
seemed to be the only plausible explanation for living forms: namely, that they too were 
created by some (divine) intellect. The eighteenth-century theologian William Paley 
(1802) put this point very clearly: If we happen to run across a watch lying on the ground, 
and observe the way that its many parts fit together in a complex and delicate way to 
serve a single function, we are bound to assume that it was made by some intelligent 
being to perform this very function. Similarly, when we see how complex and how 
organized the living body is, how well all of its various parts fit together, we cannot help 
thinking that some intelligence must be responsible for its design. However, this theory 
of special creation only answers half the problem of organic form: it explains the origin 
                                                
42 Though we will see that some biologists are actively trying to bring the study of development back into 
mainstream biology. For a more in-depth but still accessible introduction to this history, see Fox Keller 
2000. For a more detailed version of the argument I offer in this section, see Robert 2004. 
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of species forms, but not how these forms are recreated in each generation. How is the 
distinctive form of each species passed on from parent to child? What guides the 
development of the individual body into the mature form characteristic of its species? 
This is the problem of embryogenesis: to explain how the matter of the developing 
embryo is shaped into the mature form of the adult body. 
In response to this problem, late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century naturalists 
argued that when God created the first living bodies, he placed within them the seeds of 
every future living being. Thus the seeds of each generation were encased within the 
seeds of their progenitors, and each of these seeds held within it the seeds of all of its 
descendants. Moreover, each of these seeds was itself a sort of miniature organism, 
imbued already with the form of the adult body it would one day become. Development, 
then, did not have to generate a new form, but merely to "unbox" the form already 
present in the seed since Creation.43 This may seem preposterous to us today. But 
supporters of "preformationism" were often driven to this view by the seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties facing the alternative, "epigenetic" view, which held that 
mechanical forces shaped a new organism out of unformed matter over the course of 
embryogenesis. It seemed impossible to explain how blind forces acting on inert matter 
could produce the incredibly complex form of the living body.44 According to the basic 
hypotheses of mechanistic science, matter is passive and indifferent to the forms it is 
given; it can be shaped, but it will not shape itself. Thus the process of development 
                                                
43 This theory of "emboîtement" was first articulated fully by Malebranche. See Roe 2003, p. 5. 
44 See Roe 2003, p. 9: "Matter was viewed by most as entirely passive, put into motion only through 
mechanical laws. But since these laws of motion are blind, that they could know how to form a living 
organism seemed out of the question. Both self-active matter and a God actively involved in each instance 
of generation were ruled out in the mechanistic universe of late-seventeenth-century thinkers. The theory of 
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could not be explained by the embryonic matter, but only by the forces acting on this 
matter. According to mechanistic assumptions, however, these forces are "blind", i.e. 
indifferent to the forms they create. Forces act on matter at the atomic level; the 
macroscopic forms they produce are mere side-effects. But the living body is so complex 
and well-organized, its myriad parts all fitting together so perfectly, that it seemed absurd 
to claim that its form was merely an accidental side-effect. The only alternative was to 
attribute the living body's complex organization to some intelligent designer. Form, 
according to mechanistic ontology, must be either an epiphenomenon or an idea. 
 
B. Darwinism, genetics, and the Modern Synthesis in biology 
No compelling alternative to the theory of intelligent design was proposed until 
1859, when Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species. Darwin famously argued 
that the great variety of living forms, and their exquisite adaptedness to their natural 
environments, could be explained by "natural selection", a process analogous to the 
artificial selection carried out by human breeders. 
The practice of breeding plants and animals is older than recorded history. 
Breeders rely upon two key properties of sexual reproduction. One is that offspring tend 
to resemble their parents. Thus, breeding together organisms with desirable qualities is 
likely to produce more organisms with these same qualities. The second is that this 
resemblance is neither perfect nor uniform: the various offspring of a given mating pair 
are rarely identical to one another. Thus, the breeder can select from the litter or the field 
those offspring with the most desirable traits, and breed them with other desirable 
                                                                                                                                            
preformation offered the only account of embryological development consistent with this view of a 
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specimens, to yield organisms that are better adapted to the breeder's aims. Darwin's 
insight was that a similar process could be at work in nature. Instead of human breeders 
selecting the organisms that best fit their needs, and breeding them together to produce 
offspring, competition between organisms for limited resources and mates could "select" 
the organisms best adapted to their environments and allow them to have the most 
offspring. In the same way that human selection over a few thousand years has produced 
a variety of new breeds of pigeon (Darwin 1985 [1859], pp. 81ff),45 so natural selection 
operating over millions of years in a variety of environments could have produced, from 
some common ancestor, all the various species alive today. 
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was taken as a major victory for 
the mechanistic research program. Biologists interpreted natural selection as a force, a 
"selection pressure" which slowly shaped the bodies of living beings into the complex 
forms we see today. However, the problem of embryogenesis remained. Darwin's theory 
presupposes that organisms vary from one another, and can pass on some of these 
variations to their offspring; it does not attempt to explain how they reproduce 
themselves, how a single fertilized egg-cell is able to develop into a complex organism 
that resembles its parents. 
Although the theory of evolution did not resolve the outstanding problems of 
embryology, it did spur renewed interest in the field. Evolution and embryogenesis—the 
origin of species and the origin of individual organisms—were taken to be deeply 
connected, and it was expected that the study of each would shed light on the other. 
                                                                                                                                            
divinely created, mechanically operating world." 
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Similarities in embryogenesis across different animal species were one of the most 
important pieces of evidence for Darwin's claim that all life is descended from a common 
ancestor (Gilbert 2003, p. 468). As Darwin wrote in The Origin of Species (1985 [1859]), 
"Community of embryonic structure reveals community of descent" (p. 427). However, 
this evolutionary interest in the study of development did not last. In twentieth century 
evolutionary biology, embryology was supplanted by a new science: genetics, the study 
of inheritance. 
The scientific study of heritability did not begin in earnest until 1900, when the 
pioneering work of Gregor Mendel was re-discovered.46 Before this, it was generally 
assumed that offspring inherited a blend of their parents' traits. But in his work with pea-
plants, Mendel discovered traits that were inherited in a discrete or particulate fashion. 
For example, when pea plants with green seeds are crossed with plants that have yellow 
seeds, the seeds of the next generation are not a blend of green and yellow—their seeds 
are simply yellow, as if they had not inherited the green color at all. However, if these 
yellow seeds are planted, they do not produce another generation with all yellow seeds, as 
one might have expected. Instead, approximately one out of four plants in the third 
generation will have green seeds. In other words, while it seemed in the first generation 
that the green color had not been passed on, it had in fact skipped a generation, 
reappearing in the offspring of the yellow-seeded plants. In order to explain these results, 
Mendel postulated that each heritable trait is determined by two particulate "factors" 
                                                                                                                                            
45 Darwin (1985 [1859]) also notes that the effects of human selection can be observed over much shorter 
time scales: "It is certain that several of our eminent breeders have, even within a single lifetime, modified 
to a large extent some breeds of cattle and sheep" (p. 90). 
46 Mendel's work was published in 1866, but remained obscure for over thirty years until his results were 
independently reproduced by others. See Mendel et al 1950. 
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which the plant inherits from its parents. A given plant could have two green factors, two 
yellow factors, or one of each. In this last case, the yellow factor was "dominant" over the 
"recessive" green one, producing a plant with yellow seeds, as in the second generation 
above. In sexual reproduction, each plant passes on just one of its two factors to its 
offspring. Thus when plants with one yellow factor and one green factor are crossed 
together, there is a one in four chance that their offspring will receive two green factors, 
and so display the recessive trait of having green seeds. 
From Mendel's humble work with pea plants, the science of genetics was born. 
Mendel's heritable "factors" become known as "genes," and the alternate forms (dominant 
and recessive) of a given gene were named "alleles." At first it was not clear to biologists 
how this new understanding of heredity fit with Darwin's theory of evolution, or even if 
the two were compatible at all. However, this changed with the rise of population 
genetics in the 1920s and 30s (Okasha 2012). This new field used Mendel's laws of 
heredity to generate mathematical models of how allele frequency would change over 
time in a given breeding population. For the first time, questions about the kinds of 
changes natural selection could produce, and how long this would take, could be 
answered mathematically. Thus Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was 
combined with Mendelian genetics to yield a new understanding of evolution as a change 
in gene frequencies over time. This fusion became known as the Modern Synthesis in 
biology. 
The Modern Synthesis discouraged inquiry into developmental questions. 
Geneticists were focused on discrete traits that manifested themselves in the adult 
organism, and the discrete genes that were postulated as transmitting these traits from 
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parent to offspring. Development was treated as a "black box": the question of how 
exactly genotype led to phenotype could be answered later. The big picture, at least, 
seemed clear enough: one gene specifies a single trait; add up enough genes, and one has 
a blueprint for the whole organism. Tiny changes in this blueprint, brought about by 
random mutation, produce tiny changes in adult organisms which can then be acted upon 
by natural selection. Genes that produce fitter organisms multiply; genes that produce 
less well-adapted organisms disappear. Biologist Richard Dawkins has captured this 
understanding of evolution—which has become known as "Neo-Darwinism"—in his 
image of the "blind watchmaker," which is based on Paley's argument for intelligent 
design (see above). According to Dawkins (1996, p. 3), the living body is a complex 
machine, like Paley's watch. However, the "watch-maker" who designed the living body 
was not an intelligent being, but the blind forces of natural selection. Evolution is a blind 
watch-maker because it generates designs for working machines—but it accomplishes 
this without intelligence, purpose or foresight. 
The Neo-Darwinist account of evolution is thus a kind of hybrid theory, which 
mixes an epigenetic account of species formation with a preformationist account of 
embryogenesis.47 Species forms are generated by blind, mechanical forces, but the 
development of individual organisms is simply the "unfolding" or "un-boxing" of a form 
or design that resides already in the zygote's genes. As an account of embryogenesis, this 
is far from satisfactory, as we will soon see in more detail. However, it seemed plausible 
in the context of the Modern Synthesis, where genetics reigned supreme. From its 
                                                
47 "[D]evelopment is now standardly construed as the epigenesis of something preformed in DNA… 
However, if, as so many have argued, neither epigenesis nor preformationism is correct, then, to my mind, 
a monstrous hybrid should be no better" (Robert 2004, p. 35). 
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inception, genetics aimed at isolating discrete, heritable traits in adult organisms. The 
focus on discrete traits led to a view of the whole organism as a synthetic whole—a mere 
collection of independent parts; and the focus on heritable traits led to the tacit 
assumption that everything about the organism is determined in advance by its genes, just 
as a machine is determined in advance by its design. This preformationist view of 
development could persist only as long as genetics remained ascendant in the study of 
evolution, and embryology remained on the sidelines. Ironically, it was discoveries in 
genetics—starting with the discovery of the double-helix—that eventually overturned this 
state of affairs, and brought developmental considerations back into the study of 
evolution.  
 
C. DNA and the return of development 
If the Modern Synthesis constituted a first revolution in genetics, then a second 
revolution was brought about by the discovery in 1953 of the structure of DNA. At first, 
this discovery was taken as confirming and extending the Neo-Darwinist theory of 
evolution set out in the Modern Synthesis—and indeed, this remains a common view 
today. However, this second revolution in fact led to a series of discoveries that 
ultimately undermined the foundations of Neo-Darwinism—and with them, the view of 
the body as a synthetic whole constructed according to a genetic blueprint. 
The discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA promised answers to long-
standing questions about the mechanism of inheritance. Up until this discovery, the gene 
had been a strictly hypothetical entity: a particle of inheritance postulated to explain the 
observed facts of heredity. The discovery of the double-helix finally allowed biologists to 
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identify the gene with a concrete anatomical structure. The irregular, linear sequence of 
bases in a strand of DNA suggested that, as Watson and Crick put it in 1953, "the precise 
sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical information." The idea of 
the gene as information encoded in DNA strongly supported the received view of the 
genome as a design for the adult organism. It implied that if we could "crack" this code, 
we would be able to "read off" an organism's design from its genes—and perhaps even 
learn to design new organisms ourselves.48 
It had already been suggested, in the 1940s, that genes might specify heritable 
traits by producing proteins that control biochemical reactions—the one gene–one 
enzyme hypothesis. With the discovery of DNA's linear structure, this hypothesis 
appeared in a new light, suggesting that the sequence of nucleotides in a gene might 
correspond to the sequence of amino acids in a protein (Fox Keller 2000, pp. 51-54). In 
1957, Francis Crick formulated this "sequence hypothesis" as follows: "the specificity of 
a piece of nucleic acid is expressed solely by the sequence of its bases, [and] this 
sequence is a (simple) code for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein." It took 
several years to decipher this code, but by 1966 biologists could say with confidence that 
each of the amino acids found in proteins is coded by a different triplet of nucleotides in 
DNA. It would be difficult to overstate the excitement that attended this discovery: it 
seemed that we had found the book of life and learned to read its language. 
This simple and appealing picture continues to exert a powerful hold on our 
imaginations. However, subsequent discoveries in molecular biology have complicated 
                                                
48 This is the explicit aim of the relatively new sub-field of biology called "Synthetic Biology." As I noted 
above (1.3), the prospect of reverse-engineering natural phenomena always carries with it the dream of re-
designing these phenomena to better suit human needs. 
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and eventually undermined this simple picture. The first of these discoveries came just 
two years after Crick proposed his "sequence hypothesis." In 1959, F. Jacob and J. 
Monod showed that structural genes which "code" for proteins are not the only kind of 
gene; there exist also regulator genes that determine the rate at which structural genes are 
transcribed. Indeed, recent estimates suggest that only about three percent of the human 
genome codes for proteins—and this percentage may be even lower in other organisms 
(Fox Keller 2000, pp. 55-59). Further discoveries followed: we now know that messenger 
RNA does not passively "transcribe" DNA sequences into proteins, but actively edits 
these sequences by splicing together transcripts from different locations, and even 
replacing one base with another in the transcribed sequence (Fox Keller 2000, pp. 59-64). 
These discoveries severely undermined the one gene–one enzyme hypothesis: the vast 
majority of the genome does not "code" for protein at all, and those DNA sequences that 
are "transcribed" into proteins can generate a number—sometimes hundreds—of 
different proteins, depending on how they are edited in mRNA.49  
These discoveries also refuted Crick's "Central Dogma" of molecular biology, 
which held that "information" could only flow from DNA and RNA into protein, and not 
the other way. This hypothesis was crucial to the understanding of DNA as a fixed 
"blueprint" for the adult organism. We now know that the transcription of DNA into 
RNA, and RNA into protein, is subject to the "complex regulatory dynamics of the cell as 
a whole" (Fox Keller 2000, p. 63). Rather than a one-way, linear causality in which DNA 
                                                
49 Of course, the "one gene–one enzyme" hypothesis can be preserved by changing the meaning of "gene", 
as molecular biologists sometimes do, so that it refers not to sequences of chromosomal DNA but to mature 
mRNA transcripts that have already been spliced and edited. But this move comes at a high price: mRNA 
transcripts are short-lived entities, put together "on the fly"; unlike chromosomal DNA, they are neither 
1.4. The paradox of development 
 42 
would control the synthesis of proteins, we find in the cell a system of circular causality 
in which DNA's regulation of protein synthesis is itself regulated by the proteins 
synthesized—as well as by a host of other factors, such as proteins and hormones 
synthesized by other cells.50  
From a developmental perspective, the discovery of gene regulation was not at all 
surprising. Indeed, the biologist T. H. Morgan had anticipated Jacob and Monod's 
discovery by almost three decades, in a book titled "Embryology and Genetics": "The 
implication in most genetic interpretation is that all the genes are acting all the time in the 
same way. This would leave unexplained why some cells of the embryo develop in one 
way, some in another, if the genes are the only agents in the results. An alternate view 
would be to assume that different batteries of genes come into action as development 
proceeds."51 The central problem of embryology is to explain how a single cell can give 
rise to the complex, multicellular body characteristic of its species.52 As the cells of a 
developing embryo divide and multiply, they must differentiate themselves into hundreds 
of specialized cell types; and as these differentiated cells continue to reproduce, they 
must organize themselves in just the right way to form the many different organs and 
tissues of the growing body. All of these cells are genetically identical, being descended 
from the same fertilized ovum or zygote; and yet, something causes them to develop into 
                                                                                                                                            
stable nor heritable. On this definition of "gene", then, the gene is no longer the unit of inheritance (Fox 
Keller 2000, pp. 63-64). 
50 "Explorations of the mechanisms involved at the level of the DNA molecule itself, have not led to any 
privileged point of causal origins, but rather immediately refer back to the complex state of the 
cell/organism as a whole as the causal basis of the activity of the genes" (Moss 1992, p. 344). 
51 Cited in Fox Keller 2000, p. 56. 
52 "The central problem of developmental biology is to understand how a relatively simple and 
homogeneous cellular mass can differentiate into a relatively complex and heterogeneous organism closely 
resembling its progenitor(s) in relevant respects" (Robert 2000, p. 1). 
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blood cells or bone cells, neurons or myocytes. Thus the DNA sequence cannot, on its 
own, explain the process of differential development that produces the adult body. 
From the standpoint of development, the notion of the genome as a design or 
"blueprint" for the adult organism is absurd. A blueprint tells an intelligent builder what 
her final product should look like. From her standpoint outside of the thing she is 
building, she can compare what she has accomplished at each stage of construction to the 
goal set out in her plan. The cells in a growing body have no such external view of the 
body as a whole; each is responding only to its immediate surroundings. No cell is in 
charge of development; there is no central control center telling each cell what to do. And 
yet somehow, miraculously, these cells are able to organize themselves into a functioning 
body of incredible complexity. If DNA were a blueprint, then development would be like 
giving a trillion copies of the same blueprint to a trillion people, and asking them to build 
a city out of their own bodies. 
Over the last thirty-five years, a movement has arisen within biology to bring 
developmental questions back into the study of evolution. We might trace the beginning 
of this "counter-revolution" to biologist S. J. Gould's Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977); or 
the publication two years later of "The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist program" (1979), co-authored by Gould and R. 
C. Lewontin. This article criticized the Neo-Darwinist theory of evolution for dividing 
organisms into discrete "traits" and then trying to give an evolutionary account for each 
of these traits individually: "Organisms are integrated entities, not collections of discrete 
objects" (Gould & Lewontin 1979, p. 585). Gould and Lewontin argued that the form of 
an adult organism is not a collection of traits individually optimized by natural selection, 
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but an integrated whole that is subject to many different constraints, of which adaptation 
is only one. The Neo-Darwinist conception of the genome as a design suggests that any 
design is possible, and that the only constraint on these designs is adaptive success. But 
the adult life forms we see around us are not only products of evolution; each one is also 
a product of embryogenesis and development, and these processes place their own 
(physical, chemical, and biological) constraints on the kinds of organisms we see in the 
world.53 Thus the answer to the question of why a given species looks the way it does is 
not only that this form has proved well-adapted to its environment, but also that evolution 
has happened upon developmental pathways that could generate adult organisms of this 
form. The powerful suggestion here is that what evolves are not discrete traits of adult 
bodies, nor designs encoded in DNA that specify these traits, but rather developmental 
processes that consistently and robustly generate the adult form of a given species from a 
single cell. On this view, evolution generates new forms of life not by tweaking a design 
for the adult organism, but by tweaking the self-regulating developmental pathways that 
generate the adult form. This understanding of evolution has given rise to a whole new 
sub-field of biology called "evolutionary developmental biology" or "evo-devo" (Gilbert, 
Opitz & Raff 1996).  
Rather than thinking of the adult organism as a final product manufactured 
according to a design, the developmental standpoint prompts us to see the adult as a 
single moment in an on-going process. It is just one stage in the continuous life-cycle: 
reproduction–embryogenesis–maturation–reproduction (Thompson 2007, p. 188). In this 
                                                
53 The form of a given species is "so constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development and 
general architecture that the constraints themselves become more interesting and more important than the 
selective force that may mediate change when it occurs" (Gould & Lewontin 1979, p. 581). 
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perspective, the phenomenon of heredity is not a resemblance between adult organisms 
and their parents, but between a life cycle and its parent life cycle—a resemblance of 
process rather than product. DNA plays a vital role in this process, but it is development, 
not DNA, that produces the adult organism.54 
 
D. The concept of a genetic program 
The discovery of gene regulation and the renewed interest in development have 
led some biologists to re-examine the mechanistic and gene-centric assumptions of Neo-
Darwinism.55 However, mainstream biology has largely tried to avoid this re-
examination, by abandoning the model of the genome as blueprint in favor of a new 
model of the genome as a program for development: a set of instructions for each cell to 
follow, similar to a computer program. The concept of a genetic program is supposed to 
be able to account for the differential development of cells in embryogenesis, which the 
concept of a genetic blueprint could not explain. The idea is that the program contains 
many "modules" which can be turned on and off: one module contains the instructions 
that will lead a cell to develop into a white blood cell; another module will lead to the 
development of a muscle cell. Like a computer program, the genetic program is supposed 
to consist of a series of conditional statements: if protein x is present, start synthesizing 
protein y; if the concentration of hormone z exceeds threshold r, stop synthesizing protein 
q; and so on. This understanding of the genome attempts to account for the complexity 
                                                
54 We will return to the role of DNA in development at the end of Chapter Two. 
55 See for example the work of Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Evelynn Fox Keller, and Scott 
Gilbert. 
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and flexibility of development, without giving up the claim that the process of 
development is specified in advance in the organism's genetic code. 
Although the conception of the genome as a program for development attempts to 
overcome the difficulties facing the less sophisticated picture of the genome as a 
blueprint for the adult organism, it does not go far enough. Development is characterized 
by its robustness and flexibility—its capacity to resist and adapt to change in order to 
generate consistent outcomes in a variety of different circumstances. Programs, on the 
other hand—as we know from our experience with computers—are brittle and easily 
disrupted. Because programs proceed in a linear, step-by-step fashion, a tiny error in a 
single line of code can cause an entire program to crash. Furthermore, programs are 
flexible only to the extent that they anticipate various possible situations in advance, and 
have a pre-programmed response prepared for each one. When a program encounters a 
situation that it does not have a pre-set response for, it has no way to adapt.56 
Even if DNA can rightly be conceived in some sense as a type of "program," it 
must be recalled that this program is being carried out simultaneously by billions or 
trillions of cells, and that all of these cells are interacting with one another in real time. 
Even if we had a legible copy of the genetic program, there would be no way of 
predicting the behavior of a single cell without understanding the complex dynamics of 
its environment: namely, the interactions of all the cells in the developing body, moving 
and changing one another in space and time. The concept of a genetic program is often 
used to maintain our focus on DNA, as if it alone could account for the process of 
                                                
56 "A machine is capable only of operations for which it has been constructed; the idea of a machine which 
would be capable of responding to an indefinite variety of stimuli is a contradictory one, since automation 
is obtained only by submitting the initiation of work to certain chosen conditions" (SB 87/96). 
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development. But even if DNA does contain "instructions" that can turn a totipotent cell 
into a neuron or a skin cell, something has to trigger the initiation of one module or 
another. The puzzle of development is not simply how a single totipotent cell gives rise to 
a variety of specialized cells, but how the development of all these different cells is 
coordinated—without central control or external guidance—so as to produce a 
functioning, three-dimensional body. This coordination cannot be explained at the 
cellular level; it can only be accounted for in terms of the complex, cascading 
interactions of the cells in space and time.57 
The notion of DNA as a genetic program—like the other preformationist accounts 
that preceded it—is an attempt to avoid what I will term the paradox of development: 
zygotes consistently develop into the complex multi-cellular bodies typical of their 
species—but without this adult body being fully specified in advance anywhere in the 
zygote. When we encounter a system as orderly and complex as the living body, we find 
it impossible to conceive of this order as having arisen spontaneously, without being 
planned in advance. We feel compelled to trace it back to some already-given source of 
order and determinacy. Indeed, preformationism and epigenesis are both variations on 
this same theme. Preformationism explains the form of the adult body by referring it back 
to a design already given in the genes of the zygote; epigenesis explains it in terms of 
matter and forces of nature that are given in advance, and not subject to change.58 I have 
                                                
57 "[T]he developmentally specific information resides not in the genes but rather in the spatiotemporally 
delimited developing system, which is therefore the ontogenetically primary unit; accordingly, interaction 
[between the genome and its environment] is not limited to gene activation but rather implicates positive 
and negative feedback loops at a variety of levels within and without the developing system and which 
contribute to the very constitution of the organism" (Robert 2004, p. 63). 
58 "Biologists for over 200 years have been grappling with the problem of explaining organismic 
development in the light of an understanding of matter that does not readily lend itself to the task, resulting 
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argued, however, that the facts of development resist all such attempts. Development is a 
creative process (Robert 2004, p. 43), which generates new forms that are not fully given 
in advance.  
If this seems paradoxical to us, it is only because we insist on understanding the 
living body by analogy to the things we make. I have argued, however, that the living 
body is not a synthetic whole: development cannot be understood in mechanical terms as 
the external imposition of a form on passive materials, or the unfolding of a form that has 
already been completely determined in advance, like the design of a machine. In order to 
make sense of the phenomenon of development—which is to say, the phenomenon of 
life—this mechanical ontology must be abandoned.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The mechanistic conception of nature has evolved over time, and so has the 
mechanistic account of form. We can trace this evolution through four distinct stages. We 
encountered each of these stages already, one by one, over the course of Chapter One, but 
it will be helpful to review them all together now. 
The simplest version of mechanism understands nature as the product of a divine 
craftsman, who shaped the natural world out of matter in the same way that a human 
artisan shapes an artifact out of raw materials.59 According to this teleological 
mechanism, form in nature originates in a divine plan, an idea in the mind of God. Just as 
                                                                                                                                            
in an oscillation between some form of preformationism that defers the problem and an epigeneticism 
which finds a need to supplement the properties of living matter with special vital forces" (Moss 346). 
59 "Christian philosophy had long regarded God as the artifex maximus and his creations as analogous to 
human art" (Des Chene 2001, p. 4). 
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the form of a human artifact is set in advance by its designer, so are the forms we find in 
nature determined in advance by God. 
This simple mechanism slowly gave way, as Modern science developed, to a non-
teleological mechanism. Rather than supposing that nature was created by a divine 
artisan, this new mechanism held that nature is the product of blind forces acting on 
atomic matter. Nature, on this view, is an artifact without an artificer. Just as an artisan 
shapes raw materials into complex wholes, so do the forces of nature shape matter into 
the wholes we see in nature. However, the forces of nature are unlike an artisan in that 
they do not operate according to any plan or for the sake of any goal. Whereas for 
teleological mechanism form is the product of an idea, form on this account is a mere 
accident, a side-effect or epiphenomenon. Strictly speaking, in fact, there is no such thing 
as form in nature: it is only our minds which unite the atoms of nature into meaningful 
wholes. Nature in itself is composed of discrete, unchanging and indivisible parts, and it 
is these parts that the forces of nature act upon. The wholes that we perceive in nature 
have no causal power; they make no difference to the parts that compose them. Thus 
form is nothing but a subjective, anthropomorphic projection of meaning onto a 
meaningless, mechanical nature. If form is not an idea in the mind of God, then it must be 
an idea in the mind of the scientist. 
The 20th Century saw the emergence of two new varieties of mechanism. The first 
of these, which we called Neo-Darwinism, arose out of the fusion of Darwin's theory of 
evolution with Mendelian genetics, as we saw in Section 1.4. This third version of 
mechanism is a blend of the first two: in order to account for the genesis of living forms, 
it reintroduces the teleological notion of design; however, it avoids the appeal to 
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teleology by making this design the product of blind forces rather than a divine architect. 
The "forces" of evolution ("selection pressure" and "genetic drift") produce genetic 
blueprints for working organisms by causing tiny, random changes in existing designs 
and selectively propagating the "best" (i.e. fittest) variants. Thus Neo-Darwinism is a 
kind of mechanical teleology which attempts to explain the harmony and apparent 
purposiveness of living forms without resorting to the hypothesis of a divine creator. 
While this mechanical teleology might seem to grant a certain reality and efficacy to form 
in nature, this is only an appearance. In fact, the description of the genetic code as a 
"design" must be regarded, on Neo-Darwinism's own terms, as pure anthropomorphism. 
The genetic "blueprint" can only be incorporated into a mechanical universe if it is 
understood, not as a genuine whole, but as a collection of mutually external parts. 
Moreover, each of these parts, strictly speaking, must be indifferent to the fact that it 
specifies a part of the adult organism, for mechanical causes are indifferent to their 
effects. Thus it is only in the mind of the scientist that the organism's genes offer a 
"blueprint" for its adult body. Form remains either an idea or an epiphenomenon. 
The most recent version of mechanism is a variant of mechanical teleology which 
arose out of the invention of digital computers. Computers are the most powerful, 
sophisticated, autonomous machines that human beings have ever built, so it was natural 
that we would use them as models for those phenomena of nature that had thus far 
resisted mechanical explanation—in particular, cognition and development. As we saw in 
Section 1.4, the original Neo-Darwinian understanding of design as a static blueprint has 
been replaced by the more sophisticated concept of a genetic program, a modular set of 
sequential instructions analogous to a computer program. The theory of a genetic 
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program fits better with the facts of development (particularly its flexible and distributed 
character) than that of a genetic blueprint. This new computational mechanism allows us 
to attribute a certain amount of intelligence and agency to the cells of the developing 
embryo. In a similar vein, cognitive scientists have attempted to explain the intelligence 
and agency that animals exhibit by describing animal brains as computers whose 
"hardware" and "software" were "designed" by the blind forces of evolution. (We will 
address this computational theory of mind and behavior in Chapter Three.) Thus the cells 
of the developing embryo are understood as tiny computers whose evolved genetic 
programs produce, in higher animals, a much larger computer—the brain—with its own, 
even more sophisticated program. However, the same thing must be said of these so-
called "programs" as was said of the "blueprints" above: as long as nature is regarded as a 
pure mechanism, there can be "programs" only from the human point of view, and not in 
nature as it is in itself.60 
The mechanical understanding of nature has evidently undergone significant 
changes in the course of its history. Nonetheless, these four different accounts of how 
form arises in nature share certain essential features which justify our treating them all as 
varieties of mechanism. They all take nature to be a synthetic whole composed of 
discrete, mutually external parts—like a product of human manufacturing. (See Section 
1.2 above.) These discrete parts, like the raw materials used in human manufacturing, 
constitute a passive, indifferent substrate, devoid of causal agency. If they are to be 
moved and arranged into patterns or structured wholes of the sort that we find in nature, 
                                                
60 "Drawing an analogy with computer programmes is unhelpful in specifying the nature of putative genetic 
programmes, for a computer programme is such only on account of its relation to the intentional 
programmer" (Robert 2004, p. 49). 
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this must be accomplished by some external cause acting on passive matter. Thus the 
various versions of mechanism share a common conception of form as a shape imposed 
from the outside upon a passively indifferent material. They differ in their accounts of 
what precisely the external cause is that imposes form on matter. But crucially, they all 
agree that the cause of form must, like the matter on which it acts, be something given in 
advance, such that the forms of things have always already been determined in advance 
of the process of formation.  
Form is the problem that mechanism sets for itself. On the mechanical conception 
of nature, form is that which calls for explanation, that for which some cause must be 
found. And yet, the forms we observe in nature are precisely that which mechanism 
cannot explain, cannot find an adequate cause for. We could call this the "Humpty-
Dumpty problem": mechanistic science cannot put the phenomena back together out of 
the parts it has divided them into. We are like children who open up a favorite pet in 
order to see how it works, only to realize that by dividing it into parts we have killed the 
very thing we wanted to understand. By insisting on understanding the parts of a complex 
whole in isolation from one another, we foreclose in advance the possibility that these 
parts might come to be what they are only through their interactions with one another. 
We thus turn self-organizing phenomena into artificial wholes that require some external 
force to organize them, and are left unable to explain how this occurs. In particular, the 
genesis of living forms—with their immense complexity and astonishing harmony of 
parts—cannot be accounted for by mechanical explanation, in any of its incarnations. 
Development cannot be understood by analogy to manufacturing, as the external 
imposition of a pre-determined form upon a passive material. For as we have seen, the 
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living body is a dynamic, self-organizing whole which is generated by the interactions of 
its own parts.  
The problem of embryogenesis is not simply an empirical problem, which could 
be resolved by collecting more facts. It is also a conceptual problem, which demands that 
we revise our techno-logical concepts of matter and form. In the next chapter, I will 
attempt to develop an organic ontology of nature that can make sense of development. I 
will argue that nature is not fully given in advance, but constantly generates order and 
form anew, where they did not exist before. And I will show, contra atomism, that form 
is both real and efficacious in nature, where it is neither an idea nor an epiphenomenon. 
 
  54 
CHAPTER TWO. How does form arise in nature? 
 
 
"Human teleology constructs by assembly of machines, whereas the organism does it by auto-
differentiation" (N 182/238) 
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1. What is form? 
When we contemplate the natural world, we cannot avoid being struck by two 
wonders.61 The first is the harmony and order of nature: the coordination of its myriad 
parts, of its causes with its effects. The natural world does not appear to us a haphazard 
chaos. On the contrary, it strikes us as an orderly, intelligible whole, as if it had been 
orchestrated by some vast intelligence. However, when we investigate nature more 
closely, trying to understand the principles upon which it is organized and the 
mechanisms by which its order is maintained, we are confronted with a second wonder. 
Nothing in nature works the way we expect it to—that is, the way it would work if we 
humans had designed it. If nature seems to exhibit a kind of intelligence, it is a 
profoundly alien intelligence, one radically different from our own. The harmony and 
order we find in the natural world arise in very different ways than the harmony and order 
of the machines and artifacts we build for ourselves. 
In Chapter 1, we saw how the human way of creating complex, harmonious 
wholes (manufacturing) differs from nature's way of doing this (growth). And we also 
saw how our attempts to understand growth by analogy to manufacturing inevitably break 
down. In this chapter, we will try to develop a more adequate account of how nature 
generates complex forms—one which draws its concepts not from human manufacturing, 
but from natural phenomena themselves. The test of this account will be whether it can 
succeed where mechanical thinking failed, by making sense of development—the genesis 
of living form. 
                                                
61 See the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" in Kant's Critique of Judgment. 
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As long as we define matter as parts outside of parts, form can only be an idea, 
and never a reality. For form describes a molar being, an ensemble of relations, a whole 
spread out in space and time (N 157/209). There can be no form in a point or at an 
instant; and a form which can be decomposed into points or instants is not a form at all. 
Thus mechanistic science must deny the reality of form even as it tries to understand it; it 
can only explain form by explaining it away. But these explanations are never 
satisfactory. 
If, on the contrary, we were to admit that matter can be altered by its interactions 
with itself; that it can become entangled in systems which transform their own parts; and 
that the parts of such systems become so mutually implicated that they can no longer be 
separated or even fully distinguished from one another; then we would no longer need to 
deny the reality of form. We could allow ourselves to recognize the existence in nature of 
wholes that cannot be decomposed, of "total processes whose properties are not the sum 
of those which the isolated parts would possess" (SB 47/49). We would then have to pose 
the question of form in a new way: rather than searching for the forces that could impose 
form on indifferent matter, we would have to ask how matter organizes itself into the 
forms we see in nature. We would have to learn to see form, not as a static shape, but as a 
dynamic movement. Rather than searching for the origin of form—a past in which the 
determinacy of form would already be fully given—we would have to study the genesis62 
of form: the ongoing process in which existing forms complicate and transform 
themselves into new and more complex ones.63 
                                                
62 On the difference between genesis and origin, see Foucault 1977. 
63 The focus of this dissertation is the genesis of living form—specifically, the development of a complex 
multi-cellular organism out of a single cell, which while much simpler than the mature organism is already 
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However, this new way of thinking poses considerable challenges. How are we to 
understand the process of self-organization? What can we say about a whole which 
resists analysis? We cannot be satisfied with a vacuous holism—a Parmenidean monism 
which can say only "It is," or a Romantic intuitionism which rejects discursive 
understanding (SB 43/45). Where are we to find new concepts that can give us some 
purchase on the phenomena of form and development?  
The last fifty years have seen a new surge of scientific interest in the phenomena 
of complexity and self-organization. Innovations in mathematics have revealed the 
existence of order in systems that had previously seemed intractably complex or 
"chaotic." These innovations have led to the formation of a new subfield of applied 
mathematics called dynamic systems theory, which focuses on so-called "non-linear" 
systems that resist decomposition into independent parts. In this chapter, I will draw on 
dynamic systems theory to develop a new conceptual vocabulary for thinking about how 
form arises in nature—and in particular, how living bodies develop.  
My goal is not to offer a mathematical theory of development. Rather, I want to 
draw from this theory certain qualitative concepts, certain new ways of looking at 
dynamic, self-organizing phenomena. Mathematics has always been a source of 
conceptual innovation for Modern science. Too often, however, we have confused our 
mathematical models with the phenomena we were modeling, and so mistaken 
mathematical description for an end in itself, rather than a means to insight and 
understanding. This mistake is as old as Modern science, as old as Galileo's (1623/1957) 
                                                                                                                                            
quite complex and organized. I will not attempt to address the important and difficult question of how life 
arises from matter in the first place. (But see p. 63 below for a brief indication of the direction such an 
answer might take within my account.) For more on this question, see Thompson 2007, Ch. 5. 
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famous declaration that nature itself is mathematical, and that only the mathematical is 
real (pp. 237-8). More recent attempts to reduce mathematics to formal logic—to 
algorithms that a computer can carry out—have only exacerbated this error. More than 
ever, we fall into the trap of thinking that computation, rather than understanding, is the 
point; that the purpose of science is to arrive at the right answer through mechanical 
operations, to predict rather than to understand. My hope is that we can learn from 
mathematics and mathematical science without falling into this trap ourselves. After all, 
mathematics is a language, albeit a compact and often technical one; its concepts are no 
less valid than those coined by philosophers. What is more, mathematics excels at the 
precise description of structures and relations, which is precisely the task facing us now.65  
In section 2.2, I will introduce the mathematical concept of symmetry in order to 
propose a new view of form as asymmetry or difference. This will allow me to re-pose the 
question of how form arises in nature as the question of how difference arises out of 
indifference, or asymmetry from symmetry. In section 2.3, I will attempt to answer this 
question in a general way by studying the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking in some 
simple inorganic systems. By introducing some key concepts from dynamic systems 
theory—notably the concepts of nonlinearity and stability—I will offer a rough 
explanation of how and why asymmetry arises in nature. Finally, section 2.4 will apply 
these concepts to the phenomenon of embryogenesis or anatomical growth. I will offer an 
account of growth as a cascade of symmetry-breaking events, and show how it is possible 
for the complex form of the living body to develop in a robust and reliable way without 
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this form being imposed on the body from the outside or determined in advance by a 
blueprint or program. 
 
2. Form as asymmetry 
The first mathematical concept I want to introduce is the concept of symmetry. I 
noted above (in Section 2.1) that it is the order in nature that seems to call for 
explanation, the harmonious coordination of its parts into complex, patterned wholes. 
Symmetry is a concept that mathematicians use to talk about order, pattern and form in a 
precise and rigorous way. In everyday language, too, we associate symmetry with order, 
and even with beauty. However, the connection between order and symmetry—in the 
technical, mathematical sense of this concept—may surprise you. In this rigorous sense, 
greater symmetry does not mean greater order. On the contrary, order and form arise 
from the loss or breaking of symmetry (Ball 2009a, pp. 20-25; Stewart and Golubitsky 
1992, pp. 2-5).  
 
 
Fig. 2 
                                                                                                                                            
65 Indeed, it is ironic that mathematics has been so co-opted by positivist philosophies in the last century, 
since mathematics is the least positivist of all disciplines. There are no substances in mathematics; a 
mathematical entity can only be defined by its relation to other mathematical entities. 
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Consider the three images in Fig. 2. Which is the most symmetrical, and which is 
the least? Mathematicians measure symmetry by the number of transformations which 
leave a thing unchanged. The star in the box on the left is symmetrical (which is to say 
invariant) under six rotations and six reflections (i.e. "flips" or "mirrorings" across a 
given axis), for a total of twelve symmetries. The circle in the middle box, on the other 
hand, is symmetrical under an infinite number of rotations around its center and 
reflections across axes passing through its center; thus it has a much higher degree of 
symmetry than the star on the left. And the uniform, white field in the box on the right is 
even more symmetrical than the circle; it is invariant under rotations and reflections 
around any axis, as well as translations (shifting or sliding in the plane) in any direction.  
Contrary to what we might expect, then, greater symmetry does not imply greater 
order or structure. On the contrary, the greatest symmetry belongs to structureless 
uniformity (like the homogeneous field in Fig. 2). Form arises through the breaking-up of 
this uniformity, the introduction of differences which break one or more of its 
symmetries: the circle breaks the limitless symmetries of the white field by introducing a 
privileged point, the center, which is the axis of all symmetrical rotations, and through 
which the axes of all symmetrical reflections must pass; and the star on the left breaks 
these symmetries still further by introducing certain privileged axes which were not 
present in the circle.  
One might expect that the problem of how nature generates pattern and form 
would be to explain how symmetry arises out of chaos and disorder. But in fact, disorder 
is much more symmetrical than order. If we take a beautiful bronze sculpture and melt it 
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down into a uniform pool of liquid metal, its form and structure is lost—but it gains a 
great deal of symmetry. Thus the question of the genesis of form is not how symmetry 
arises out of disorder, but rather how the symmetry of disorder gets broken in determinate 
ways to produce the characteristic asymmetries of the forms we find in nature. 
We expect nature to be symmetrical. That is, we expect that things will be the 
same in one place or time and another unless there is some reason for them to be 
different. This is a deep presupposition of Modern science. How can we claim that 
experiments performed here on Earth reveal universal laws of nature, which are true 
everywhere and for all time? These claims are based on the indifference of our 
experimental results to the time and place where they occur (Morris 2006a, pp. 50-51). If 
an experiment assumes nothing about its location, and the same results can be obtained 
again and again by different observers at different times and places, then we have reason 
to believe that the results are universal, i.e. indifferent to where/when they occur. In other 
words, we assume that nature is the same everywhere unless there is some reason for it to 
differ, some difference that would make a difference to the phenomenon we are studying. 
However, if nature were perfectly symmetrical, there would be no phenomena to 
study—and no one to study them. A perfectly symmetrical nature would be perfectly 
uniform, entirely devoid of differences. When we seek to understand the order we find in 
nature, we are asking after the origin of nature's differences, of its asymmetries. We are 
asking why things are different in one place than they are in another, or why they are 
different now than they used to be. The basic question of Modern science, then, is not 
"Why is there something rather than nothing," but "Why is there difference rather than 
indifference or uniformity?" 
2.2. Form as asymmetry 
 62 
Because Modern science expects nature to be symmetrical, it is nature's 
asymmetries that call for scientific explanation. However, our expectation that nature is 
symmetrical leads us to assume that every difference must have a reason, must be 
explained by some cause. In other words, every difference must be the product of some 
prior difference; an asymmetrical effect must be the product of an equally asymmetrical 
cause. Or, stated conversely: symmetry is conserved; a symmetrical cause has an equally 
symmetrical effect.66 This is the implicit assumption of the mechanical explanations we 
examined in Chapter One, which can only explain form by showing that it was somehow 
given in advance. It is difference that calls for explanation; but mechanical explanation 
operates by transforming differences into discrete, self-identical things, and assuming that 
each thing must have its own discrete cause.67 For example, Neo-Darwinism attempts to 
explain the highly asymmetrical form of the living body by analyzing it into a collection 
of discrete traits, each of which would be determined in advance by a discrete gene. Thus 
the genome would already contain, prior to development, all the differences that 
constitute the adult form. 
If it were true that symmetry is conserved in nature, form would be a constant in 
the universe, neither created nor destroyed. Every asymmetry would have its explanation 
in some prior asymmetry, all the way back to the beginning of time. But this is not, in 
fact, what science tells us about the history of the universe. According to our current best 
theories, the universe began at a single point from which it exploded outward in all 
                                                
66 This principle was formulated explicitly by Pierre Curie (1894): "Lorsque certaines causes produisent 
certains effets, les éléments de symétrie des causes doivent se retrouver dans les effets produits. Lorsque 
certains effets révèlent une certaine dissymétrie, cette dissymétrie doit se retrouver dans les causes qui lui 
ont donné naissance." See also Stewart & Golubitsky 1992, pp. 7-8. 
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directions (the "Big Bang"). At its origin, then, the universe was highly symmetrical. If 
symmetry were conserved, one would expect to find that the universe today had perfect 
spherical symmetry, centered on its point of origin. Matter and energy would be 
distributed uniformly throughout the cosmos. There would be no galaxies, no stars, and 
no life. Of course, this is not the universe we live in. Since the Big Bang, the universe's 
initial symmetry has been broken again and again. As the universe expanded, matter 
became concentrated at certain points in space. Over time, these points of higher density 
developed through further losses of symmetry into galaxies, stars, and planets.  
These cosmological asymmetries—in particular, the energy gradient generated by 
the Sun's nuclear fusion, and the Earth's location in that gradient—created the conditions 
for the emergence of life on Earth. But this emergence required its own further cascade of 
symmetry-breaking events: the formation of early proto-cells broke the symmetry of the 
"primordial soup" by enclosing their chemical contents and isolating them from their 
surroundings; much later, multicellular life formed when cells began to stick together, 
forming newly asymmetrical structures. While we cannot go back in time to witness the 
origin of life on Earth, we can watch a single cell transform itself into a multicellular 
body: this process takes place in the life of every multicellular organism as it develops 
from a zygote into a mature adult. This process of development—which biologists call 
morphogenesis—is another cascade of symmetry-breaking events, in which a single 
spheroid cell differentiates itself into a highly asymmetrical body with a front and a back, 
a top and a bottom, a left and a right.  
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which have a one-to-one correspondence" (SB 160-61/174). 
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For atomism, the problem of form is a problem of synthesis: to explain how atoms 
are put together into the complex wholes that we observe in nature. But if we understand 
form as asymmetry, as I am proposing, then the problem of morphogenesis becomes a 
problem of differentiation rather than synthesis: the question is not how forms are put 
together out of already-differentiated parts, but rather how nature differentiates itself into 
parts in the first place. This allows us to pose the problem of embryogenesis, which we 
encountered above (1.4), in a new and more fruitful way: how does an embryo develop 
from a relatively symmetrical, spheroid zygote into the much less symmetrical form of a 
mature human body? We will return to this question in section 2.4. But in order to answer 
it, we must first understand the process of symmetry-breaking in more detail. How can 
we explain the differences we see in nature without appealing to pre-existing 
differences?68 What causes a system—be it a solar system or a living body—to become 
less symmetrical over time? How does form—now understood as asymmetry—arise in 
nature?  
 
3. Symmetry-breaking as the genesis of form 
We began this chapter with the question of how form—particularly the complex 
form of the living body—arises in nature. In the previous section, I proposed a new view 
of form as difference or asymmetry. On this view, the genesis of form in nature takes 
                                                
68 This is a version of what Waldenfels (2000) calls "the paradox of expression" in Merleau-Ponty, which 
we might also call the problem of the genesis of sense. The paradox is that expression must be different 
from what it expresses, for otherwise it would be a simple repetition rather than a true expression; but at the 
same time, expression must be the same as what it expresses in order to be an expression of it. (See Lawlor 
1998; Morris 2006b.) Here we see the same problem with respect to causal explanation: the cause must be 
the same as its effect in order to explain why the effect is the way it is; and yet, if the cause is the same as 
its effect then it does not explain it at all, but merely postpones explanation. (See Morris 2006a.) 
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place through the loss or breaking of nature's symmetries—the genesis of difference from 
indifference. In this section, we will study the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking, in 
order to understand how and why asymmetries arise in nature. In section 2.3.A, we will 
look at some examples of symmetry-breaking in simple, physical systems, in order to 
arrive at a basic description of how symmetry-breaking occurs. This description will 
introduce three key concepts from dynamic systems theory: nonlinearity, critical points, 
and symmetry-breaking bifurcations. In sections 2.3.B and C, I will try to explain why 
symmetry-breaking occurs by introducing two more concepts from dynamic systems 
theory: stability and instability. Finally, section 2.3.D will draw out some of the 
ontological implications of these concepts.69 
 
A. Symmetry-breaking bifurcations in nonlinear dynamic systems 
We will begin our study of symmetry-breaking by looking at a few simple 
examples, in order to arrive at a basic description of how symmetry-breaking occurs in 
nature. Consider a simple physical system: a load-bearing, cylindrical beam standing on 
its end (Fig. 3). There are two antagonistic forces at work in this system: the load exerts a 
downward force on the beam, and the structural integrity of the beam resists this pressure 
by pushing back against the load, supporting its weight. Now, suppose that the weight of 
the load can be varied continuously in real time. We are now considering a dynamic 
system—a system whose state is changing over time. When the load is light, the 
structural integrity of the beam is sufficient to support its weight. What will happen if we 
                                                                                                                                            
 
69 For the reader who wants a bit more mathematical detail, I have supplied a longer and slightly more 
technical introduction to dynamic systems theory in Appendix A. 
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gradually increase the load? At first, nothing: the beam maintains its shape and position. 
At a certain point, however, the beam can no longer support the weight being placed on 
it, and it abruptly buckles under the pressure, assuming a new, curved shaped.  
 
Fig. 3. A load-bearing beam (Strogatz 2001, p. 44) 
Three features of this system's behavior deserve our attention. First, notice that 
the shape of the buckled beam is less symmetrical than its earlier, vertical state. Before it 
buckled, the cylindrical beam was indifferent to rotations around its vertical axis. In other 
words, there was no way to distinguish one horizontal direction from another in terms 
intrinsic to the system itself. We could try to label these directions if we wanted to; but 
there would be no way to distinguish our beam from one that had been rotated by 180°. 
Thus our labeling would necessarily be arbitrary—an external imposition that finds no 
purchase within the system itself. When the beam buckles, however, this indifference is 
lost—the system itself now distinguishes one direction from all the others. Thus the 
buckling of the beam is a symmetry-breaking event, in which our dynamic system loses 
some of its initial symmetry. 
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Fig. 4. Linear behavior in a dynamic system 
 
Second, notice how the global state of the system—namely, the shape of the 
beam—changed as we varied the load on the beam. We generally expect that a small 
variation in one part of a system will produce a small change in the system's global 
state—and similarly, that a large variation will produce a large result. In other words, we 
expect systems to behave in a proportional or linear way (Fig. 4). However, this is not 
what we observed in the case of the buckling beam. The relation between the load on the 
beam and the beam's shape was nonlinear: changes in one did not produce proportional 
changes in the other. Instead, we found that variations in the load produced no observable 
change in the system's global state as long as the load remained below a certain critical 
value. When this critical point was reached, however, a very small increase in the load 
suddenly produced a disproportionately large change in the system's state—the buckling 
of the beam (Fig. 4).70 Thus a gradual, quantitative change in one parameter of the 
                                                
70 You can see why the study of systems that exhibit nonlinear behavior has sometimes been called 
"catastrophe theory." 
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system, when it reached a certain critical point, produced an abrupt qualitative change in 
the system—a loss of symmetry.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Linear behavior in a dynamic system 
 
Lastly, notice that when the beam buckles, it may assume one of several possible 
states—all of them less symmetrical than its initial, vertical shape. In dynamic systems 
theory, symmetry-breaking events such as the buckling of the beam are represented 
visually in what are called bifurcation diagrams (Fig. 5). In these diagrams, the line 
representing the state of the system splits when the "control parameter"—in this case, the 
load on the beam—reaches a critical point. Each branch of the line represents one of the 
new, less symmetrical states that the system can assume at this critical point. The term 
"bifurcation" is something of a misnomer, since there may be far more than two such 
possible states; nevertheless, these diagrams have taken their name from the simplest 
case, and symmetry-breaking events have become known in dynamic systems theory as 
symmetry-breaking bifurcations. As you can see in Fig. 5, a system may have several 
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critical points, and thus may undergo a whole cascade of symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations. In these cases, the system's bifurcation diagram becomes a "bifurcation 
tree," which shows how the system in question can become progressively less 
symmetrical—which is to say, more complex—as the control parameter varies. Notice 
again how the gradual, quantitative variation of the control parameter produces a series of 
abrupt, nonlinear, qualitative changes in the state of the system. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Bifurcation diagram (adapted from Mainzer 2005) 
 
Precisely which new states are available to the system when it reaches a critical 
point depends on the system's initial symmetries (Stewart and Golubitsky 1992, Ch. 3). 
Since our beam has a circular cross-section, it can buckle in any direction. A beam with a 
square cross-section, on the other hand, could buckle in one of only four directions (Fig. 
6). The set of all possible states that the beam can assume when it buckles has the same 
number of symmetries as the unbuckled beam. This follows from the fact that the 
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symmetries of a system represent differences to which it is indifferent. For the circular 
beam, one direction is as good as another; for the square beam, however, there are four 
privileged directions (corresponding to the four rotations that leave the square beam 
unchanged). The more symmetrical a system is, the greater the number of states it can 
assume at the critical point. If the system could somehow take on all of these states at 
once, it would remain just as symmetrical as it was before. But of course, this is 
impossible; at the critical point, only one of these states can be "chosen" by the system, 
which means that the system must become less symmetrical.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Directions in which a beam can buckle depend on its initial symmetries 
 
It is impossible to predict in advance, on the basis of the system's own internal 
characteristics, which of these possible states the system will "choose." Prior to the loss 
of symmetry, the system is precisely indifferent to the difference between one of these 
states and another—if it were not, then this symmetry would already have been broken. 
Thus there is no reason for the system to "prefer" one of these states over another; it is 
only after the loss of symmetry has occurred that we can even distinguish these states 
from one another with respect to the system itself. This poses a puzzle, however: if there 
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is no reason for the system to prefer one state over another, then how can it choose 
between them? This brings us back to the problem we posed in the previous section: how 
to explain the differences we see in nature without appealing to some pre-existing 
difference? The phenomenon of symmetry-breaking—the genesis of difference from 
indifference—presents us with a paradox. In order to become less symmetrical, a system 
must become less indifferent by choosing one of several equivalent possibilities; but if 
these possibilities are truly equivalent, then there is no way to choose between them. 
Either the choice has already been made, or it cannot be made; if things are not already 
different, then they can never become so. We will return to this symmetry-breaking 
paradox below (in 2.3B). But first, let us look at another example of symmetry-breaking 
in nature.  
 
The buckling beam is an example of symmetry-breaking in space: when the beam 
buckles, it assumes a less symmetrical shape then it had before. A system that underwent 
a whole cascade of such symmetry-breaking bifurcations could develop shapes of great 
complexity; indeed, this is precisely what we will see below when we study the 
anatomical development of the living body (Section 2.4). For now, though, let us 
consider another simple physical system. This system is an example of symmetry-
breaking in time rather than space. The system in question was discovered in the early 
1950s by a Russian scientist named Boris Belousov who was trying to create a simple test 
tube version of the Krebs cycle—a chemical reaction central to animal metabolism (Ball 
2009a, pp. 110-119; Strogatz 2001, p. 134). Mixing a few simple reagents together with a 
catalyst, Belousov found to his surprise that the yellow mixture faded to clear after about 
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a minute, then regained its yellow color a minute later, and continued to oscillate 
regularly between these two states for an entire hour. Belousov had discovered the first 
oscillating chemical reaction.71 The spontaneous oscillation of chemical reactions is now 
a well-known phenomenon. It is interesting for us because it represents a loss of 
symmetry in time, rather than in space. As long as the concentration of certain catalysts 
remains below a certain critical value, the mixture remains in a steady state. This state is 
uniform with respect to time, and therefore highly symmetrical with respect to time-
transformations such as shifting the system forward or backward in time (translation), or 
time-reversing the system's behavior (reflection). In its initial, steady state, all of these 
transformations leave the system unchanged. When the concentration of the catalysts 
reaches a certain critical point, however, a symmetry-breaking bifurcation occurs, and the 
concentrations of the reagents abruptly begin to fluctuate in a regular, periodic pattern 
(Fig. 8). This bifurcation breaks most of the system's initial temporal symmetries. Post-
bifurcation, the only time-shifts that leave the state of the system unchanged are those 
that shift the system forward or backward by the exact period of the system's oscillation, 
i.e. the amount of time it takes for the oscillating system to return to the same state. In 
other words, rhythm or periodicity is a temporal symmetry; but a periodic system is much 
less time-symmetrical than a system that is not changing at all. In time, as in space, order, 
structure, and pattern emerge through the breaking of symmetry. 
 
                                                
71 At the time, chemists believed that chemical reactions always move toward equilibrium in a linear way. 
Indeed, this belief was so entrenched that no one took Belousov's discovery seriously until years later, 
when another chemist named Zhabotinsky confirmed it. 
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Fig. 8. Dynamics of an oscillating chemical reaction before and after bifurcation 
 
Finally, let us look at a third physical system which undergoes a symmetry-
breaking bifurcation in both time and space. Consider a thin layer of fluid being heated 
from below and cooled from above, like oil in a frying pan (Ball 2009a 24-25; Stewart & 
Golubitsky 1992, pp. 118-122; Kelso 1995, pp. 6-8). As long as the temperature 
difference between the top and bottom layers of the fluid remains below a certain critical 
value, there is no large-scale motion in the fluid. At the microscopic level, of course, 
individual molecules are moving around at random; but all of these microscopic 
movements average out to rest at the macroscopic level, since the individual molecules 
do not "favor" any particular direction of movement. This fluid is highly disordered, 
which means that it is highly uniform, highly symmetrical. It makes no difference where 
in the fluid you look: all of the molecules are doing the same thing, namely moving 
randomly in all directions. When the temperature difference between the top and the 
bottom of the fluid increases past a certain critical point, however, the system undergoes 
a symmetry-breaking bifurcation in which the random micromotions of the molecules are 
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replaced by large-scale, coordinated movement. The warmer fluid at the bottom rises, 
while the cooler layer at the top sinks, and these two movements together generate a 
pattern of convection rolls (Fig. 9). Each convection roll rotates in either the clockwise or 
counter-clockwise direction. Once again, it is impossible to predict which of these two 
states the system will fall into when it reaches the critical point. In either of these new 
states, the system is far less symmetrical than it was before the bifurcation. Whereas 
before, it made no difference to a given molecule where in the fluid it was located, the 
motions of individual molecules now depend a great deal on their location within the 
macroscopic convection pattern. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Convection rolls in a fluid heated from below 
 
This loss of symmetry represents a significant increase in the order of the system. 
Before the bifurcation, the parts of the system (namely the individual molecules of the 
fluid) were largely independent of one another, and of the system as a whole. 
Consequently, the system exhibited very little order or organization. When the 
bifurcation occurs, the parts of the system begin to interact with one another in a complex 
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way, organizing themselves into a stable, system-wide pattern that coordinates the 
movements of each part. This system—known as Rayleigh-Bénard convection after two 
theorists who investigated it—is a classic example of self-organization in (inorganic) 
nature. Notice that the transition from disorder to order is driven by a simple temperature 
gradient, which cannot in any way be said to contain or pre-determine the orderly 
arrangement of the convection rolls. Rather, when the energy gradient breaks the 
symmetry of the uniform, unmoving liquid, the system falls into a new, less symmetrical 
state in which the parts of the system are no longer indifferent to one another. The order 
and coordination of the parts do not need to be imposed on them from the outside, or 
determined in advance by some design; they come "for free" when the symmetry of the 
system is broken. 
 
 
B. Stability and instability 
By studying symmetry-breaking phenomena in three simple physical systems, we 
have arrived at a basic description of how symmetry-breaking happens—and thus, of how 
form arises in nature. We observed that natural systems can behave in a nonlinear way: a 
change in one part of the system can produce a disproportionate change in the system as 
a whole. I introduced the concept of the critical point to describe the way that a gradual, 
quantitative variation in one part of a nonlinear system can produce an abrupt, qualitative 
change in the system's global state. We also observed that this change consists in the 
system's falling into one of several possible new states, all of which are less symmetrical 
than the system's previous state. To describe this phenomenon, I introduced the concept 
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of a symmetry-breaking bifurcation, and the technique of drawing bifurcation diagrams 
to visualize the various new states that the system can assume when it reaches a critical 
point. However, these descriptions raised a number of new questions. What exactly 
happens to the system when it reaches a critical point? What causes the loss of 
symmetry? And how does the system "choose" which new, less symmetrical state to fall 
into, if the system is symmetrical (which is to say, indifferent) with respect to these 
states?  
In order to answer these questions, I must introduce a new pair of concepts: 
stability and instability. Consider a simple dynamic system: a marble sitting at the bottom 
of a bowl. Left to itself, the marble will remain at rest. If some external force disturbs the 
marble, pushing it away from the bottom of the bowl, it will soon return to its original 
position. In dynamic systems theory, the marble's position at the bottom of the bowl is 
called a stable fixed point or a stable attractor. It takes energy to push the system away 
from this point, and the system will return to this point if left to itself. External forces can 
introduce fluctuations into the system, causing the marble to oscillate back and forth. 
However, these fluctuations are quickly damped out: the magnitude of the marble's 
oscillations rapidly decreases until it has once again returned to its resting position at the 
bottom of the bowl. No matter where the marble is placed in the bowl—that is, no matter 
what the system's initial conditions are—the marble will always end up resting in the 
same place. To say that this position is stable is to say that the system robustly produces 
and maintains it, regardless of its initial conditions, and in the face of fluctuations caused 
by external forces. This is not to say that the stable outcome is inevitable: external forces 
can keep the marble away from its stable attractor, or even send it flying out of the bowl 
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altogether. Within a certain range of initial conditions, however, and in the absence of 
external interference, the system will consistently return to its stable fixed point. 
Now, imagine that the bowl could be inverted without disturbing the marble. 
Instead of resting at the bottom of a bowl, the marble is now sitting at the top of a peak. 
So long as no external force disturbs the marble, it can remain in this position 
indefinitely. However, this state is highly unstable: the slightest disturbance will send the 
marble tumbling away down the slope. The marble's position at the top of the inverted 
bowl is called an unstable fixed point: a system that begins in this state will remain there 
indefinitely in the absence of external forces, but the slightest fluctuation will send the 
system away from this state, and toward the nearest stable attractor. 
This, in essence, is what happens to a dynamic system when it undergoes a 
symmetry-breaking bifurcation. When the control parameter reaches a critical point, the 
system's old state becomes unstable. Like the marble at the top of the bowl, the system 
can remain in this unstable state indefinitely so long as nothing disturbs it. The slightest 
perturbation, however, will send the system away from this unstable state toward one that 
is more stable—but less symmetrical. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Potential landscape with stable fixed point at x = 0 
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This image of the marble in a bowl can be used to visualize the behavior of any 
dynamic system with a stable fixed point, using what dynamic systems theory calls a 
potential landscape diagram (Fig. 10). Here the x-axis represents the global state of the 
system, and the V-axis represents the potential energy of the system—which we can think 
of as the amount of work required to move the system from one state to another, or the 
amount of work that the system itself will do if allowed to move from one state to another 
on its own. To read this graph, think of it as a landscape, and think of the state of the 
system as a heavy ball rolling through this landscape (Fig. 11). 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 
 
The potential landscape allows us to visualize the behavior of a dynamic system. 
Movement along the x-axis represents a change in the system's global state. The slope of 
the landscape represents the work required to produce such a change: it takes work to 
push the system "up-hill"; moreover, the system will tend of its own accord to roll 
"down-hill" toward the lowest points in potential the landscape. Places where the 
landscape is flat correspond to the system's fixed points: they are places where the system 
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can come to rest. In the landscape above (Fig. 11), we can see that x = 0 is a stable fixed 
point of this system: if a fluctuation moves the system "up the slope" in either direction, it 
will roll back down again to rest at this fixed point. We can indicate where the stable 
fixed points in the potential landscape are with a black ball (Fig. 12). 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 
 
A system with an unstable fixed point will have a different potential landscape 
(Fig. 13). Here we can see that x = 0 represents an unstable fixed point: the system is at 
rest in this state, but the slightest fluctuation will send the system "rolling down-hill" 
away from this point in one direction or another, toward the nearest stable attractor (not 
shown). We can indicate the unstable fixed points in the landscape with a white ball. 
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Fig. 13. Potential landscape with one unstable fixed point 
 
These potential landscape diagrams become especially useful when we consider 
systems with more than one fixed point, which are known as multistable systems. For 
example, consider the system whose potential landscape is shown in Fig. 14. This system 
has five fixed points: three stable, and two unstable. The fixed point at x = 0 is the global 
minimum, meaning that it is the system's most stable fixed point. However, a large 
enough fluctuation in x could push the system over into the basin of attraction of one of 
the system's other two fixed points. Thus a multistable system is capable of multiple 
stable behaviors; and a sufficient "push" in the right direction can shift it from one stable 
state into another. 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Potential landscape of a multistable system with five fixed points 
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The concepts of stability and instability help us to understand what happens to a 
dynamic system when it undergoes a symmetry-breaking bifurcation. In particular, these 
concepts help us to understand why some dynamic systems behave in a nonlinear way. 
When we change one part of a nonlinear dynamic system, this change may not produce 
an immediate effect in the system's global state. Instead, it may alter the system's 
potential landscape. Critical points are places where these variations produce a 
qualitative change in the potential landscape: causing a fixed point to appear or 
disappear, to change from stable to unstable, or vice versa. For example, consider a 
system that undergoes a simple symmetry-breaking bifurcation when one of its 
parameters exceeds some critical point (Fig. 15). At first the system rests at a stable fixed 
point, represented by a deep basin or well in the potential landscape (A). As the control 
parameter approaches the critical point, however, the stability of this initial state steadily 
decreases. In the system's potential landscape, the potential basin that the system is 
resting in becomes increasingly wide and flat (B). As a result, the system becomes 
increasingly sensitive to external forces: disturbances that would only have produced 
small changes in the system's state before now produce larger and larger fluctuations, and 
the system takes longer and longer to "damp them out" and return to its stable resting 
point. When the control parameter exceeds the critical point, the fixed point that was once 
at the bottom of a potential well becomes a local maximum—the top of a peak in the 
potential landscape (C, D). What had been a stable attractor of the system is now an 
unstable fixed point. The system can still remain in its formerly stable state indefinitely, 
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so long as no external forces act upon it. However, the slightest fluctuation will now send 
the system "rolling downhill" away from this fixed point, toward some newly stable state.  
 
  
 A B 
 
  
 C D 
 
Fig. 15. Changing potential landscape of a system undergoing a bifurcation 
 
This symmetry-breaking bifurcation can also be represented in a bifurcation 
diagram (Fig. 16). Now that we understand the concepts of stability and instability, we 
can make our bifurcation diagram more precise. The stable fixed point that the system 
was in prior to the symmetry-breaking bifurcation does not disappear entirely; rather, it 
becomes an unstable fixed point, which we can represent with a dotted line. The 
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bifurcation of the solid line represents the appearance, at the critical point, of two new 
stable fixed points—each of which is less symmetrical than the system's stable state pre-
bifurcation. We now know that this abrupt bifurcation is the result of gradual changes in 
the system's potential landscape (Fig. 15). Because of its shape, this simple bifurcation is 
called a pitchfork bifurcation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. "Pitchfork" bifurcation 
 
Not only do the concepts of stability and instability explain the surprising 
phenomenon of nonlinearity, but they also resolve the other puzzle we posed above, 
which I called the "symmetry-breaking paradox": how does a dynamic system "choose" 
one new state over another when it undergoes a symmetry-breaking bifurcation, given 
that the system pre-bifurcation is constitutively indifferent to the differences between 
these various possible states? (If it were not, then it would already have lost the symmetry 
in question.) The answer is that the system itself does not choose; indeed, left to itself, the 
system would remain in the same (unstable) state indefinitely, never losing its initial 
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symmetry. However, systems in nature are never isolated; they are always subject to 
disturbances from outside forces, however small. It is these external forces that cause the 
newly unstable system to fall into a less symmetrical (but more stable) state, and it is 
they—not the system itself—that decide which newly stable state the system will fall 
into. In the case of the buckling beam, for example, when the load on the beam reaches a 
critical point, the structure of the beam becomes unstable. In the absence of external 
forces, the beam could retain this unstable, vertical state indefinitely. However, the 
slightest perturbation will now cause the beam to buckle—falling out of its unstable state 
into a more stable but less symmetrical shape. Which way the beam buckles depends on 
the external forces that "knock" the system out of its unstable state. Notice, however, that 
these external forces are not responsible for the order that arises from the system's loss of 
symmetry. They determine which new state the system falls into, but all of these states 
are equally asymmetrical—which is to say, equally orderly. The stability of these less 
symmetrical states—the fact that the system is attracted to them—is not due to external 
forces, but to the system's endogenous dynamics. 
 
C. Limit cycles and Hopf bifurcations 
What about our other example, the oscillating chemical reaction? Potential 
landscapes are useful for visualizing a system's fixed points—places where the system 
comes to rest—but not so good at showing the dynamics of a system in motion. To do 
this, we can turn to a different tool: the phase portrait.72 Think of the phase portrait as a 
potential landscape seen from above, instead of in relief; a kind of contour map that 
                                                
72 For more on phase portraits, see Appendix A, pp. 217ff. 
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shows the paths a system's state will follow as it moves through the system's potential 
landscape. For a system with a single stable fixed point (Fig. 17A), the phase portrait 
might look something like Fig. 17B. The state of the system is represented by two 
variables, x and y. (In the case of the oscillating chemical reaction, x and y would 
represent the concentrations of two different reagents.) Every point in the phase portrait 
represents a possible state of the system, and the arrows represent changes in the state of 
the system over time. In this phase portrait, we can see that all the system's trajectories 
spiral into a point. This point is a stable attractor for the system: no matter what the 
system's initial state is, it will eventually end up resting at this point; and perturbations 
that push the system away from this point will be damped out. This phase portrait 
describes the state of the chemical oscillator before its bifurcation: when the 
concentration of the catalyst is below the critical value, the system rests at a stable fixed 
point, and it will damp out fluctuations in the reagent concentrations. 
  
A        B  
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Fig. 17. Potential landscape (A) and phase portrait (B) for a system with a single, 
stable fixed point73 
 
When the catalyst exceeds a critical concentration, however, a bifurcation occurs. 
The system's stable fixed point becomes unstable, and a new stable attractor appears. 
However, this attractor is not another fixed point, but rather a periodic oscillation, 
illustrated by the phase portrait in Fig. 18. The circular trajectory represents a periodic 
behavior in which the system cycles repeatedly through the same series of states, without 
ever coming to rest in any one state. A closed trajectory like this is called a limit cycle. 
Like a fixed point, a limit cycle can be stable or unstable. You can see from its phase 
portrait that this system's limit cycle is stable: all the system's trajectories spiral into it, 
indicating that the system will consistently fall into this pattern, regardless of its initial 
conditions, and that it will damp out perturbations that push it away from this trajectory. 
For comparison, Fig. 19 shows the phase portrait of a system with an unstable limit cycle. 
The system can stay in this cycle indefinitely, but any perturbation will send it spiraling 
away in one direction or another toward a more stable state. 
 
                                                
73 See Appendix A, pp. 222-3. 
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Fig. 18. Phase portrait for a system with a stable limit cycle 
 
 
 
Fig. 19. Phase portrait for a system with an unstable limit cycle 
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The bifurcation that the chemical oscillator undergoes—in which a stable fixed 
point becomes unstable and spawns a stable limit cycle—is called a Hopf bifurcation. We 
can draw a three-dimensional bifurcation diagram to visualize this bifurcation (Fig. 20). 
When the control parameter (in this case the concentration of a catalyst) is below a 
critical value, the system rests at a stable fixed point, indicated by a solid line with a 
trajectory spiraling into it, (as in a phase portrait). At the critical point this fixed point 
becomes unstable, and a new attractor appears: a stable limit cycle, indicated by a closed 
orbit with a trajectory spiraling into it and away from the now-unstable fixed point. 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Hopf bifurcation 
 
 
D. Nonlinearity, indecomposability, and unpredictability 
The concept of nonlinearity lets us see how continuity can give rise to 
discontinuity, how quantitative variation in a system's parameters can give rise to 
qualitative novelty in the system's behaviors. This is of special interest for our present 
study, since our whole project is to understand how nature generates new forms of order 
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which are both continuous and discontinuous with the older forms on which they are 
founded.74 We saw in the previous chapter (1.3) that the mechanistic view of nature 
makes time into an illusion: since matter and the forces of nature that shape it are 
immutable, the changes we observe in nature have all been determined in advance. What 
we experience as the coming to be and passing away of natural phenomena are nothing 
but the movements of unchanging atoms, which are entirely indifferent to the 
macroscopic forms their movements create. It is worth quoting once again the statement 
of Laplace (1814/1951) which sums up this view so well:  
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by 
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as 
the past, would be present to its eyes. (p. 4, translation modified) 
 
This view of nature as entirely decomposable into simple parts whose movements 
can be completely predicted in advance presupposes that nature is linear. Recall that in a 
linear system, effects are always proportional to their causes. As a result, causes and 
effects in a linear system are additive: the effect of two causes put together is simply the 
sum of the effects each would have on its own. This means that complex phenomena in a 
linear system can be decomposed into simple causes and effects, which makes linear 
systems highly predictable. In a nonlinear system, on the other hand, causes can have 
disproportionate effects: a small change can make a big difference, and a big change can 
make no difference at all. Thus causes and effects in a nonlinear system are not additive: 
                                                
74 "It can happen that, submitted to external forces which increase and decrease in a continuous manner, the 
system, beyond a certain threshold, redistributes its own forces in a qualitatively different order which is 
nevertheless only another expression of its immanent law. Thus, with form, a principle of discontinuity is 
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one cannot predict what a combination of causes will do by looking at the effects of each 
cause in isolation. This means that complex phenomena in a nonlinear system cannot be 
decomposed into simpler parts; and this makes the behavior of nonlinear systems 
inherently unpredictable.75  
Our measurements of natural phenomena are never perfectly accurate; they are 
always approximations. In a linear system, this is not a problem, since small errors in 
measurement will only lead to small errors in the predictions of our model. If we want 
our predictions to be more accurate, all we have to do is increase the accuracy of our 
measurements. In a nonlinear system, however, a small measurement error can produce a 
disproportionately large error in our model's predictions.76 Moreover, the problem cannot 
necessarily be solved by improving the accuracy of our measurements, since this 
improvement may not produce a proportional improvement in the accuracy of our 
predictions. 
                                                                                                                                            
introduced and the conditions for a development by leaps or crises, for an event or for a history, are given" 
(SB 137/148). 
75 "Why are nonlinear systems so much harder to analyze than linear ones? The essential difference is that 
linear systems can be broken down into parts. Then each part can be solved separately and finally 
recombined to get the answer. This idea allows a fantastic simplification of complex problems, and 
underlies such methods as normal modes, Laplace transforms, superposition arguments, and Fourier 
analysis. In this sense, a linear system is precisely equal to the sum of its parts. But many things in nature 
don't act this way. Whenever parts of a system interfere, or cooperate, or compete, there are nonlinear 
interactions going on" (Strogatz 1994, pp. 8-9). For more on this point, see Appendix A. 
76 "If we knew exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial moment, we could 
predict exactly the situation of that same universe at a succeeding moment. But, even if it were the case that 
the natural laws had no longer any secret for us, we could still only know the initial situation 
approximately. If that enabled us to predict the succeeding situation with the same approximation, that is all 
we require, and we should say that the phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by laws. But it 
is not always so ; it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in 
the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction 
becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon" (Poincaré 194, p. 68). This property of 
nonlinear systems is commonly described as "sensitivity to initial conditions." The famous image of the 
butterfly flapping its wings and causing a hurricane on the other side of the planet is an illustration of this 
sensitivity—weather patterns being one of the most well-known examples of nonlinear systems. 
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Scientists tend to focus on problems they can solve, and areas of investigation 
where existing methods prove fruitful; this is part of why Modern science has been so 
successful. Thus nonlinear systems were largely ignored for hundreds of years, in favor 
of more tractable phenomena. Unfortunately, this neglect led to a general ignorance of 
the phenomenon of nonlinearity, and a widespread assumption that all natural systems are 
linear. In fact, quite the opposite is true: the vast majority of natural systems exhibit 
nonlinear behavior. This is bad news from the point of view of prediction, but good news 
from the point of view of life; for it is nonlinearity that makes possible the genesis of 
novelty and form in nature—and in particular, the genesis of living form. In the next 
section, we will see how the concepts introduced in this section allow us to resolve the 
paradox of development—to understand how embryogenesis can reliably generate 
species-typical bodies without the forms of these bodies being predetermined by a design 
or program.  
The concept of stability gives us insight into how self-organizing systems can 
generate and maintain complex, orderly patterns of behavior. We have seen how a 
nonlinear system such as the oscillating chemical reaction can generate stable, periodic 
behavior (a limit cycle). Since all the system's trajectories are attracted to the limit cycle, 
the system will reliably generate this behavior regardless of its initial conditions, and 
also maintain it in the face of fluctuations and perturbations. Notice that this stable 
behavior is not "pre-programmed" anywhere in the system. There is no central agent 
measuring the difference between the system's present state and some "target" state. 
Rather, the stable behavior arises "naturally" or "spontaneously" out of the interactions of 
the system's parts, and is maintained in the same way. This concept of stability will be 
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key to understanding the robustness of development: its capacity to remain the same 
despite changes in its environment. 
The concept of multistability in dynamic systems helps us to understand how a 
self-organizing system can exhibit a variety of stable, orderly behaviors, and how it can 
switch between these different behaviors in response to environmental perturbations—
again, without there being any central control unit switching these behaviors on and off. 
This concept will be key to understanding the flexibility of development: its capacity to 
change and adapt in response to changes in its environment. 
Finally, the concept of symmetry-breaking bifurcations at critical points will help 
us to understand how the embryo develops from a single, relatively symmetrical cell into 
a highly asymmetrical, multi-cellular organism. 
 
4. The genesis of living form 
The problem of development is to understand how a complex, multicellular 
organism can develop—reliably and robustly—from a single cell. In Chapter One, I 
criticized mechanistic approaches to this problem, which assume that the form of the 
adult organism must already be determined prior to development by a genetic design or 
program. In this section, I will offer an alternative view of development which explains 
how the order and determinacy of the adult organism can arise dynamically through the 
process of development, rather than being fully given in advance.77 Applying the 
concepts developed earlier in this chapter, I will argue that the process of development 
must be understood as a cascade of symmetry-breaking bifurcations that transform the 
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relatively symmetrical zygote into the much less symmetrical form of the mature 
organism.78 
Every multicellular organism begins its life as a single cell, and grows by repeated 
cellular reproduction. Individual cells reproduce by division: the "mother" cell splits into 
two "daughter" cells, each of which inherits a copy of its mother's DNA and half of the 
mother cell's cytoplasmic contents. Daughter cells are usually identical to their mother, 
and to each other. Thus we would expect the repeated cell division of a spheroid cell to 
produce a roughly spheroid mass of identical cells. The mystery of embryogenesis is that 
it produces, instead, a highly asymmetrical body of cells which are highly differentiated 
from one another. As they divide and increase in number, the cells of the growing body 
become differentiated into various different cell types which differ greatly in size, shape 
and function. The "totipotent" zygote (which can generate any cell type) gives rise by cell 
division to "pluripotent" cells (capable of generating a more limited range of cells), and 
these in turn produce cells of progressively more limited potency, culminating in the 
various specialized cells of the mature body (which are generally "unipotent", capable 
only of reproducing cells of the same type). As the growing body becomes larger and 
more internally differentiated, it also takes on a series of different macroscopic shapes 
which eventually culminates in the organism's mature form. Development can thus be 
divided into three interactive processes, taking place at different spatiotemporal scales: 
division, differentiation, and morphogenesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
77 The empirical details of this account will be drawn largely from Forgacs & Newman 2005. 
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A. Division 
Our study of embryogenesis begins with a single cell: the fertilized ovum or 
zygote. A eukaryotic79 cell consists of a semi-permeable lipid membrane surrounding a 
partly organized, partly liquid medium (the cytoplasm), in which various organelles (such 
as the mitochondria and the nucleus containing the cell's DNA) are embedded. The 
membrane separates the interior of the cell from the surrounding environment, allowing 
only certain molecules to enter and leave. Thus the cell can be thought of as a bounded 
region, within which various chemical reactions are taking place. Certain reagents can 
cross this boundary; which ones, and at what rates, depends on both the cell's internal 
state and the state of its immediate environment. We can think of the biochemical 
contents of the cell as a self-regulating dynamic system made up of various chemical 
reagents whose concentrations are changing over time at different rates (Forgacs & 
Newman 2005, Ch. 3).80 
The first major step in development is cleavage, in which the unicellular zygote 
divides repeatedly to form a multicellular aggregate called the blastula (Forgacs & 
Newman 2005, Ch. 2). All cells reproduce by a process of division in which the cell 
membrane pinches closed down the middle, dividing the cytoplasmic contents of the 
"mother" cell into two separate "daughter" cells. This division is usually preceded by a 
replication of the cell's chromosomes, such that each daughter cell not only inherits half 
                                                                                                                                            
78 "Viewed from the perspective of physics, early development, during which the organism acquires its 
final shape, is a series of symmetry-breaking events starting from a highly symmetrical spheroidal egg and 
arriving at a body with a much lower degree of symmetry" (Forgacs & Newman 2005, p. 180). 
79 Eukaryotes are cells with nuclei, as opposed to prokaryotes such as the unicellular bacteria, which have 
no membrane-bound organelles. 
80 A more complicated model could also take into account the spatial aspect of the cell's biochemical state, 
since chemical concentrations may not be uniform throughout the cell. However, the simpler model is often 
sufficient. 
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of the mother cell's cytoplasmic contents, but also a complete copy of the mother's DNA. 
The timing of DNA replication and cell division is regulated by the dynamics of the cell's 
biochemical contents (i.e. the changing concentrations of chemical reagents within the 
cell).81 Ordinarily, the mother cell doubles in mass prior to division, so that each daughter 
cell is roughly the same size as its mother. In cleavage, however the zygote (whose 
diameter is roughly ten times that of most other cells in the human body) divides 
repeatedly without increasing in mass. As a result, the cells of the developing blastula 
become smaller in size as they increase in number.  
Experimental evidence indicates that the rhythm of cell division during cleavage 
is regulated by a biochemical oscillator (Forgacs & Newman 2005, Ch. 3): a chemical 
reaction that spontaneously generates a stable limit cycle, in which the concentrations of 
certain reagents vary periodically (see Section 2.3 above). Experiments with frog 
embryos have shown that the timing of cell division during cleavage is regulated by 
periodic oscillations in the concentration of a regulatory factor called cyclin B.82 
Fertilization of the ovum triggers the beginning of cleavage by generating a Hopf 
bifurcation (Novak and Tyson 1993): the concentration of cyclin B within the ovum goes 
from a stable steady state to a stable limit cycle—a pattern of regular oscillation. This 
                                                
81 "Molecular clocks that regulate entry into DNA synthesis and mitosis are based on temporal oscillations 
of the concentrations of members of the cyclin family of proteins. Such oscillations are the physical 
consequences of positive and negative feedback effects in dynamical systems, such as that represented by 
the cell's biochemistry" (Forgacs & Newman 2005, p. 27). 
82 Novak and Tyson (1993) have modeled this process as a nonlinear dynamic system whose state depends 
on the changing concentrations of nine regulatory proteins that together govern the concentration of cyclin 
B. 
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limit cycle is then passed on from mother cell to daughter cells, so that the cells of the 
growing embryo continue to divide at the same rate.83 
When a unicellular organism divides, the two daughter cells simply split apart and 
go their separate ways. When the zygote divides in two, however, its daughter cells 
adhere to each other, forming a new, multi-cellular body. This division separates the 
cytoplasmic contents of the zygote into two distinct regions, bounded by a double-layer 
of semi-permeable membrane. This boundary will only allow some chemicals to cross 
from one cell to the other; and the rate of diffusion across the membrane will be 
significantly slower than that within either cell. Thus each cell now has its own distinct 
biochemical state, and can follow its own unique destiny. It is this division of the 
unicellular zygote into two, (and then four, and so on), that makes possible the growing 
body's differentiation into a variety of different cell types, tissues, and organs. Thus the 
initial symmetry-breaking bifurcation that sets the process of cleavage in motion 
(breaking the time-symmetry of the dormant ovum) makes possible further losses of 
symmetry through the differentiation of one cell from another. 
Of course, the division of the zygote does not separate the two daughter cells 
completely: certain biochemicals can still travel slowly across the membrane barrier from 
one cell to another. Thus the biochemical states of the two cells can continue to influence 
each other. This mutual influence turns out to be every bit as crucial to development as 
the two cell's separation. Consider what happens to the growing embryo if, immediately 
                                                
83 Interestingly, the cyclin B oscillation will arise even in the absence of a nucleus, which means that the 
rhythm of cell division during cleavage (at least in its early stages) is not regulated by the frog's DNA. 
Daughter cells inherit the cycle of periodic division not through their genes, but by inheriting half of their 
mother's cytoplasm, which contains the reagents that generate the cyclin B oscillation. However, we will 
soon see how models such as this one can also be used to explain the role of DNA in development. 
2.4. The genesis of living form 
 97 
after the zygote's initial division, the two embryonic cells are carefully pulled apart. In 
normal development, each of these cells would ordinarily give rise through cellular 
reproduction to roughly half of the mature organism. One might expect, then, that if the 
embryo is divided in two at this stage of development, each cell will develop into one 
half of a normal adult body. Instead, experiment shows that this procedure yields two 
small but fully formed organisms. In other words, both cells of the two-celled embryo are 
totipotent: each is capable of developing on its own into a complete multi-cellular 
organism. And yet, if these two cells are allowed to adhere to each other they will not 
develop into two small organisms but into a single larger one. Evidently, there is 
something about the relation between the two cells that shapes how they each develop; 
the cells of the developing embryo mutually regulate one another, and it is this mutual 
regulation which explains how the process of development robustly produces species-
typical outcomes without these outcomes being fully given in advance like the design of 
an artifact. 
If each cell is a self-regulating dynamic system in its own right, then the division 
of one cell into two mutually regulating cells generates a second-order dynamic system: a 
self-regulating system of self-regulating systems. The number of variables involved in 
such a system is rather daunting; however, it is possible to simplify matters somewhat. 
We can distinguish intra-cell dynamics from inter-cell dynamics by the different scales 
on which they take place. Since chemicals can diffuse more quickly within a cell than 
across cell membranes, chemical reactions happen more quickly within cells than 
between them. At small time-scales, then, we can treat the biochemical contents of a 
single cell as an isolated system, ignoring its interactions with neighboring cells. Once we 
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have a grasp on these local dynamics, we can ask what happens at progressively larger 
space- and time-scale when these local dynamics interact with the local dynamics of 
other cells. 
 
B. Differentiation and the role of DNA in development 
We have seen that an individual cell can be regarded as a nonlinear dynamic 
system, thanks to the complex interactions between the many biochemical reagents 
enclosed within the cell's lipid membrane. We have also seen that cells can regulate one 
another's biochemical dynamics by exchanging chemicals across their membrane 
boundaries, and that this mutual regulation plays a key role in development. In particular, 
these inter-cell dynamics within the growing embryo are what regulates the 
differentiation of embryonic cells into specialized cell types which will eventually form 
the various tissues and organs of the mature body. In order to understand this process, we 
need to understand the role that DNA plays in the biochemical dynamics of each cell. 
We can distinguish one type of cell from another by the different set of proteins 
each is capable of producing (Forgacs & Newman, Ch. 3). This is determined by the 
physical state of the chromatin in a cell's nucleus—a complex of DNA and protein. 
Recall from Chapter One that certain genes (i.e. stretches of an organism's DNA) specify 
particular proteins (as sequences of amino acids). The cell can generate the protein 
specified by such a sequence through a process called "transcription." However, not all of 
the genes that specify proteins are "open" or ready to be transcribed; in any given cell, 
only some stretches of DNA will be transcription-competent (which requires that they be 
packaged by chromatin-proteins in the right way). A cell's type is determined by the open 
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or closed states of a relatively small number of genes. (In humans, these genes number 
more than a hundred and possibly fewer than a thousand, and they specify around 250 
different cell types).  
The open or closed state of a given gene, as well as the rate of its transcription, 
are regulated by proteins called transcription factors, which work by binding to specific 
sequences of DNA. These transcription factors may be activators, which increase the rate 
of a gene's transcription, or repressors, which decrease it (Forgacs & Newman 2005, Ch. 
3). Transcription factors are themselves proteins specified by genes and produced by 
transcription; thus there can be circuits or networks of transcription factors that mutually 
regulate one another's expression. The best way to gain insight into such autoregulatory 
networks is, once again, to use the tools of dynamic systems theory. Keller (1995) 
modeled six different autoregulatory transcription networks as nonlinear dynamic 
systems. Each system consisted of various different transcription factors whose 
concentrations vary over time and depend on one another in complex ways. These 
systems were found to be multistable: each transcription network had multiple attracting 
fixed points, corresponding to multiple stable biochemical states. These stable states were 
sufficiently different from one another to offer a possible explanation for differentiation: 
if each biochemical state corresponded to a different cell type, then differentiation would 
take place through a cell's shifting from one stable state into another (Fig. 21). This shift 
would require a fluctuation in the system's biochemical state (i.e. in the concentration of 
various transcription factors within the cell) large enough to push the system out of one 
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basin of attraction and into another. This fluctuation could be caused by changes in the 
cell's chemical environment.84 
 
 
Fig. 21. Schematic representation of differentiation in the Keller model: a fluctuation in 
the concentration of transcription factor X shifts the system out of its initial stable state 
into a new basin of attraction, corresponding to a different cell type. 
 
In the developing embryo, a cell's immediate environment usually consists of 
other, similar cells. The embryo thus consists of multiple autoregulatory transcription 
networks, which interact and mutually constrain one another dynamically over time. In 
order to understand differentiation during development, then, we need a model of a 
second-order autoregulatory network—an autoregulatory network of autoregulatory 
networks. Kaneko and Yomo (1999) have constructed such a model, representing the 
changing biochemical states of multiple cells interacting dynamically with one another by 
                                                
84 It could also be brought about in other ways, such as asymmetrical cell division, in which transcription 
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exchanging chemicals. This model starts out with a small population of identical cells 
that can replicate themselves by division. These model cells were found to spontaneously 
develop stable, periodic behaviors akin to the biochemical oscillations which regulate the 
reproductive cycles of real cells. (See 2.4.B above.) As the population of model cells 
grew by division, all the cells initially exhibited the same biochemical behavior 
(corresponding to a single, shared cell type). However, when the number of cells 
exceeded a certain critical threshold, this uniform state became unstable and the 
multicellular system underwent a symmetry-breaking bifurcation: the population of cells 
split into distinct clusters of cells, each cluster exhibiting a different stable biochemical 
state. These new clusters remained stable as they grew by reproduction, with daughter 
cells inheriting the "cell type" (i.e. the biochemical state) of their parent. As they grew, 
some clusters underwent new bifurcations, dividing into further clusters with new stable 
cell states. As in a real body, different types of cell in the model arose through different 
developmental lineages, which could all be traced back to a single original cell type. 
(These qualitative outcomes were robust under both variations in initial conditions and 
fluctuations in parameters over time, suggesting that this may be a realistic model of 
differentiation and development in real multi-cellular bodies.) 
This model demonstrates how a group of initially identical, self-reproducing 
systems could—simply by interacting with one another over time—generate a diverse 
population of systems with distinct, stable behaviors.85 It also supports and deepens the 
claims I made above in Section 1.4 about the role of DNA in development. In the 
Kaneko-Yomo model, DNA is neither a blueprint nor a program for development. 
                                                                                                                                            
factors are unequally distributed between the two daughter cells (Forgacs & Newman 2005, p. 69). 
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Rather, DNA corresponds in this model to the parameters of the dynamic subsystems 
(the individual cells) whose interactions generate the higher-order dynamic system of the 
multicellular body. As we saw in Section 2.3, the parameters of a nonlinear dynamic 
system are not a blueprint or program for that system's behavior. To say that a system is 
nonlinear is precisely to say that there is no part-for-part correspondence between 
changes in the system's parameters and changes in its behavior. In a nonlinear system 
such as the Kaneko-Yomo model, a small change in the parameters of the original cells 
may produce a disproportionately large change in later outcomes—or it may produce no 
change at all. This is an accurate reflection of the relation between DNA and 
developmental outcomes: a large mutation may have negligible effects, while a small 
mutation may have enormous effects. Evolution, then, does not occur through tiny 
changes in a blueprint or program for development, but through small variations in the 
parameters of development as a dynamic, self-regulating process.86 
 
                                                                                                                                            
85 Kaneko and Yomo (1999) have termed this process "isologous diversification." 
86 Notice that in Keller's model, the role the environment plays in differentiation is to push the cell out of 
one stable biochemical state and into another; whereas in the Kaneko-Yomo model, the cell's environment 
changes which of its biochemical states are stable. In dynamic systems terms, the environment in Keller's 
model is only a source of fluctuations, whereas in the Kaneko-Yomo model the environment can also alter 
the stability of the system, resulting in symmetry-breaking bifurcations (qualitative shifts) in the system's 
behavior. As a result, the biochemical states that are stable for cells in the multicellular system are not 
necessarily stable for the same cells taken in isolation. In other words, the behavior of the multicellular 
system cannot be predicted on the basis of the behavior of isolated cells; it is a non-additive whole. Here 
we see how the concepts of dynamic systems theory can give us insight into the relation between parts and 
wholes in nature. Two dynamic systems interacting with each other can destabilize each other, settling into 
a new state which would not be stable for either system in isolation. The dynamics of the individual 
systems are parameters with respect to the larger system; a change to the parameters of either subsystem, if 
it alters that system's dynamics, will alter the parameters of the larger system, which may alter its 
dynamics. 
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C. Morphogenesis 
The Kaneko-Yomo model assumes that cells interact only with their immediate 
neighbors, exchanging chemicals by osmosis. (This is known as "juxtacrine signaling".) 
However, cells can also interact with one another over larger scales ("paracrine 
signaling") through chemicals that spread by diffusion (Forgacs & Newman 2005, Ch. 7). 
Such long-range interactions play an important role in both differentiation and 
morphogenesis. To conclude our discussion of embryogenesis, let us look at the role of 
these interactions in an important morphogenetic process: the symmetry-breaking 
formation of the embryo's body axes. Recall that the embryo starts out as a single cell that 
is more or less spherically symmetrical. Over the course of development, the embryo 
must somehow lose this initial symmetry in order to develop a front and a back, a top and 
a bottom, a left and a right. 
It has long been known that certain groups of cells, known as organizers, play a 
key role in this process (Forgacs & Newman 2005, Ch. 7). For example, the Spemann-
Mangold organizer in amphibians is a group of cells that induces the formation of the 
notochord, (the precursor of the spinal column). Other classes of vertebrates have similar 
organizers. Organizers work by secreting morphogens: chemicals that travel across the 
embryo by diffusion and alter the biochemistry of other cells. The process of diffusion 
generates a chemical gradient in which morphogen concentration decreases with distance 
from the organizer. If the effects of the morphogen on other cells depend on the 
morphogen concentration, as is often the case, then a single morphogen gradient can 
generate a variety of location-specific effects. This is one way in which symmetry-
breaking patterns are formed during development. 
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Transplant experiments in frogs and other model organisms have revealed several 
interesting features of the "organizer" phenomenon. If the Spemann-Mangold organizer is 
transplanted into another embryo at the right stage of development, the host embryo will 
develop two different body axes, resulting in conjoined twins. Even more surprising, 
however, is what happens in the embryo from which the organizer cells were removed: 
cells adjacent to the excised organizer differentiate into organizer cells and assume its 
role (Forgacs & Newman 2005, Ch. 7). Thus the formation of the organizer, and hence of 
the body axes, is a robust, self-organizing feature of the developing embryo—a stable 
attractor of this dynamic system.  
How does organizer-formation work? The fact that a new organizer forms when 
the old one is removed suggests the existence in this region of an activator: a morphogen 
that causes cells to differentiate into organizer cells. However, the fact that this does not 
happen if an organizer is already present suggests that the cells of the organizer secrete 
another morphogen which inhibits organizer-formation in nearby cells.87 Meinhardt 
(2001) has constructed a reaction-diffusion model of organizer-formation as a nonlinear 
dynamic system. Recall the Keller model above, in which different proteins in a single 
cell regulated one another's transcription rates, forming an autoregulatory system; and the 
Kaneko-Yomo model, in which multiple cells of this sort could interact with one another 
over short distances. Meinhardt's model adds another layer of complexity by allowing 
these cells to interact over large distances through diffusion, with different morphogens 
diffusing at different rates. In Meinhardt's model, a slow-diffusing activator is positively 
                                                
87 The pattern-forming possibilities of such "reaction-diffusion" systems was first observed by Alan Turing 
(1952)—the same Turing who originated the idea of the modern computer. (See Ball 2009, 154-158; 
Stewart & Golubitsky 1992, Ch. 7.) 
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self-regulating, i.e. it increases its own transcription rate. But this same morphogen also 
increases the transcription rate of a fast-diffusing inhibitor, which negatively regulates 
transcription of the activator. The result is a self-enhancing feedback loop acting over a 
short range, which competes with an inhibitory reaction acting over a longer range. 
Starting from a uniform distribution of the two morphogens, this system will undergo a 
symmetry-breaking bifurcation in which the activator becomes concentrated in a small 
"hot spot" surrounded by a cloud of inhibitor. By adding additional morphogens to his 
model, Meinhardt showed that the formation of one organizer could induce the formation 
of other organizers at different locations. This cascade of symmetry-breaking bifurcations 
offers a powerful and realistic model of morphogenesis in the developing embryo. 
 
D. Summary 
The process of development which appears so puzzling—even paradoxical—from 
a mechanistic standpoint becomes intelligible when we regard the developing embryo as 
a self-organizing dynamic system undergoing a cascade of symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations. The concepts introduced in this chapter allow us to understand how it is 
possible for the complex form of the organism to develop reliably without this form being 
determined in advance by a design or plan. Development reliably generates viable 
organisms not because it is guided by a prospective view of this outcome, but because 
each stage of development—each symmetry-breaking bifurcation—is a stable, robust 
behavior of the stage that precedes it. 
Fertilization breaks the time-symmetry of the dormant ovum by pushing its 
biochemical state out of its stable fixed point and into a periodic oscillation. This 
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biochemical oscillation generates a cycle of periodic cell divisions that transforms the 
single-celled zygote into an aggregate of many cells (the blastula). The division of the 
zygote into many smaller cells makes possible a further series of symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations, in which different cells assume different stable biochemical states.  
The biochemical dynamics of each cell involve complex autoregulatory networks 
of gene transcription factors—proteins which both regulate and are produced by 
differential rates of DNA transcription. Some of these factors can pass through cell 
membranes, allowing the autoregulatory networks within different cells to regulate one 
another. Thus the growing body forms a self-regulating dynamic system of self-
regulating dynamic subsystems, in which individual cells both generate and are 
constrained by the multicellular whole. If the division of the zygote into many cells is 
what makes differentiation possible, then it is the ongoing interactions between these 
cells that actually cause differentiation to occur. 
Cells can exchange chemicals both locally, over small scales, and globally over 
larger scales. Global interactions are responsible for macroscopic symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations in development, such as the formation of body axes in the previously 
spheroid embryo. These bifurcations take place through the appearance of "organizers"—
self-organizing chemical "hot-spots" that regulate the differentiation of surrounding cells 
and the orientation of large-scale structures such as the spinal cord. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The living body poses a puzzle for us. How can something so orderly and so 
complex—a work of engineering more impressive than any human accomplishment—
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come to be without planning, without supervision, without intelligence? This perplexes 
us because we try to understand all creation, all coming to be, on the model of human 
manufacturing. In this chapter, I have tried to show that nature has its own ways of 
generating order and form, which are quite different from those of human artifice.  
In order to understand the genesis of form in nature, we have to replace our 
mechanistic concepts with dynamic ones. Mechanistic thinking conceives of wholes as 
constructed out of parts which are given in advance of construction. This static 
conception of wholes must be replaced by a dynamic one, in which larger systems arise 
out of the ongoing, reciprocal interactions of smaller ones. 
The concept of fixity must be replaced by the concept of stability. The products of 
human artifice are fixed: they remain the same so long as nothing changes them. Fixity is 
a static concept; stability is a dynamic concept. That which is stable does not merely 
persist by inertia in a given state, but actively resists change—not rigidly, the way a steel 
rod resists being bent, but elastically, the way a spring returns to equilibrium, or a marble 
returns to the bottom of a bowl. The stable system can be disturbed, but it takes work to 
shift the system away from the stable state; left to itself, it will soon damp out 
perturbations.  
Closely related to the concept of stability is the concept of robustness, which 
replaces the notion of outcomes guaranteed in advance. The robust outcome is insensitive 
to dynamic fluctuations and variations in initial conditions—not because these make no 
difference to the system, but because the system can produce the same outcome in a 
variety of different ways. A system with a unique stable state can arrive at that state by an 
infinite number of different trajectories—but they all end in the same place. A robust 
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outcome is not guaranteed: nothing determines it in advance, and no one is watching to 
make sure the system gets there. But a robust outcome happens more often than not, 
because there are more ways of getting there than there are ways of avoiding it. 
To be robust, a system must be flexible: it must adapt to and accommodate 
change. The mechanistic version of this is the program, in which different preordained 
responses are set to be triggered by different anticipated situations. But true flexibility is 
dynamic; it cannot be arrived at by multiplying static responses.88 A dynamic system can 
be flexible in several ways. One is multistability, in which a large fluctuation in the state 
of the system can push it out of one stable state and into another. Another kind of 
flexibility can be seen in the phenomenon of bifurcations, in which a change in the 
system's environment provokes a qualitative change in the system, resulting in new stable 
behaviors.  
 
The human experience of order is that it requires work on our part, both to create 
it and to maintain it. In my garden, for example, it takes work to get the flowers and herbs 
I like growing where I want them to grow, to protect them from squirrels and insects, and 
to keep the weeds from taking over the soil. If I left the garden to itself, it would soon be 
an overgrown mess. Things will not simply order themselves; and if the order we've 
made is left to itself, it will soon revert to disorder. This is certainly true of the kinds of 
order that human beings seek to establish; but it is not true of the kind of order that we 
find in nature—of which our own bodies are one example. Nature's garden has its own 
                                                
88 "A machine is capable only of operations for which it has been constructed; the idea of a machine which 
would be capable of responding to an indefinite variety of stimuli is a contradictory one, since automation 
is obtained only by submitting the initiation of work to certain chosen conditions" (SB 87/96). 
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order, different from that which we try to impose on it; and this natural order is prior to 
the order we seek to create. In nature, order is not a positive quantity which must be 
created and maintained by special efforts, and which therefore requires special 
explanation when it is discovered. On the contrary, order in nature arises by subtraction, 
by the breakdown of nature's initial symmetry. Natural order is not positive, but 
negative—a lack. It arises through the loss of disorder. Thus nature does not require the 
constant action of God or natural forces to prevent matter from reverting to a disordered 
state. Order and form arise in nature because, contrary to our expectations, it takes less 
work to maintain them than it would to maintain a more disordered state. Thus form can 
be more stable than disorder because it is a lower-energy state.89  
In the next chapter, we will apply this dynamic perspective to the study of 
behavior, and in particular to learning: the genesis of new behavior. We will see that 
learning is a process of development, continuous with the anatomical development that 
we have studied in this chapter. And we will see, further, that anatomical development 
can be understood as a slow behavior. 
                                                
89 In the global long-term, this is not the case. The Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us that in a closed 
system—such as the universe itself—the lowest energy state, in which the system will eventually settle, is 
one of maximum disorder and uniformity: the so-called "Heat-Death of the universe". However, in local, 
thermodynamically open systems driven by external energy inputs—such as our planet, or an individual 
living body—order and form can arise as stable, lower-energy states. 
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CHAPTER THREE: How do living bodies make sense? 
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1. Introduction 
In Chapter One, I argued that the living body is not a machine. I distinguished 
growth from manufacturing, and traced the conflation of these two processes to the 
mechanistic research program in Modern science. By studying the facts of development, 
we saw that growth cannot be understood by analogy to manufacturing as the imposition 
of a pre-determined form on passive materials. However, this left us with a problem 
which I called the "paradox of development": how do living bodies consistently develop 
from a single cell into a highly complex, species-typical adult form without this form 
being specified anywhere in advance? In Chapter Two, I attempted to resolve this 
paradox by turning to dynamic systems theory, in search of a non-synthetic account of 
how form arises in nature. There we found a new definition of form as asymmetry, which 
allowed us to re-frame the problem of morphogenesis as the question of how differences 
arise in nature: why are things different in one place than another, and why are they 
different now than they used to be? The mechanistic research program assumes that 
asymmetrical causes have equally asymmetrical effects. Thus differences in nature can 
only be explained in terms of pre-existing differences, and complex forms must have 
equally complex causes. This amounts to a demand that natural forms be determined in 
advance by their causes in the same way that artificial forms are determined in advance 
by their human designers. However, the study of nonlinear dynamic systems shows that 
effects can be more asymmetrical than their causes. Quantitative variations in the 
parameters of a nonlinear dynamic system can give rise to symmetry-breaking 
bifurcations in which the old configuration of the system is destabilized and a new stable 
configuration arises which is less symmetrical than its predecessor. The concepts of 
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symmetry-breaking and stability explain how order and organization can arise in nature 
without being planned in advance or directed by an external intelligence. Human beings 
create complex wholes by assembling them out of pre-existing parts according to a pre-
established design or plan. In nature, on the other hand, complex wholes organize 
themselves by division rather than addition, articulating themselves into parts by 
progressively losing their initial symmetries. 
At the end of Chapter Two, we looked at how the growing embryo becomes 
increasingly asymmetrical over time through the self-organizing dynamics of nested 
"autoregulatory networks" at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Within each cell, the 
genome both regulates and is regulated by its own transcription factors; and these 
intracellular dynamics also regulate and are regulated by those of other cells, both local 
and distant. Each stage of development—each symmetry-breaking bifurcation—is a 
robust outcome of the preceding stage's dynamics. Thus the endogenous dynamics of the 
growing embryo robustly generate a species-typical adult body without being guided by 
any design or plan that would specify the form of this body in advance. In this chapter, 
we will extend our account of development and morphogenesis from anatomy to 
behavior. If the living body's anatomy is not fixed in advance by its genes, then neither is 
its behavior. Thus learning, like growth, must be understood as the dynamic emergence 
of increasingly asymmetrical forms. The form we sought to explain in the previous 
chapters was a form in space: the anatomical form of the adult organism. What we 
learned, however, was that this form is only one moment in an ongoing process that is 
never finished: the growth and development of the living body. Thus the spatial form of 
the adult's anatomy is only a cross-section, so to speak, of a larger form, which is spread 
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out in time as well as space.90 We saw in Chapter Two how this growth arises from the 
repeated division of one cell into two, and the subsequent differentiation of these once-
identical cells into different types, tissues, and organs. Thus growth takes place through 
the articulation of the body into parts that can oppose one other, pushing one other in 
different developmental directions. In animal bodies such as ours, the movement of 
growth eventually generates a new kind of articulation which makes possible a new kind 
of movement: the articulation of limbs into joints. The joint allows the body to oppose 
itself in a new way, using muscle tension to move one part of the body by pushing off of 
another.91 This self-opposition allows the body to push off of its surroundings as well, 
moving across immobile surfaces and manipulating movable objects. It is these gross 
bodily movements that psychologists study under the rubric of "behavior." 
We saw in Chapter One that what calls for explanation in the anatomical form of 
the living body is the internal coordination of its many parts into a functional whole, and 
the adaptation of this whole to its environment. Similarly, the challenge for any theory of 
behavior is to explain the internal coordination of the living body's movements and the 
adaptation of these movements to the organism's immediate situation (SB 10/8). Living 
bodies do not move in a chaotic or haphazard way; their movements appear organized 
and purposeful. They seem to respond in intelligent and goal-directed ways to the various 
and changing features of their environments: avoiding predators and other dangers, and 
seeking out food, shelter, and mates. The goal of a theory of behavior is to explain how 
the complex coordination of behavior comes about: how the various parts of the living 
                                                
90 See SB 38/38: "[A]natomy should be considered as a stage [coupe] in the development of physiology." 
91 See Aristotle's Movement of Animals, Ch. 8, and Progression of Animals, Ch. 3. For helpful discussion of 
these texts, see Sanday 2008 and Beith 2011. 
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body's movements come together in a harmonious way to solve the problems presented 
by its environment. As in the previous chapters, I will argue that this question must be 
studied developmentally. Just as the anatomy of the adult body is not present from 
conception, but has to develop over time out of a much simpler form, so too do the 
coordinated and adaptive movements of the mature organism have to develop over time 
from much simpler behaviors.  
As in Chapter One, I will begin by considering the best attempts to explain the 
organization of behavior mechanistically (3.1): Reflex theory, Cognitivism, and 
Connectionism. We will see that these theories face the same conceptual difficulties as 
the mechanistic theories of anatomical development that we studied in Chapter One. 
They distinguish absolutely the parts to be coordinated, determining them completely in 
advance of their interactions with one another. This then makes it necessary to find some 
external agent that would be responsible for coordinating these mutually indifferent and 
external parts—an agent that would also have to be given in advance of the coordination 
it effects. By framing the problem in this way, mechanistic theories set an impossible task 
for themselves. No cause given in advance can explain the flexibility and contingency of 
development, its adaptability and its capacity for bizarre "mistakes." As we will see, the 
facts of behavior, no less than those of embryology, call for a genuinely developmental 
account. 
Mechanistic theories assume that the form of the body's movements is determined 
by the form of its nervous system. Thus motor development must be caused by changes 
in the anatomy of the brain. These anatomical changes, in turn, must be determined in 
advance by a genetic program. We have already undermined the beginning of this causal 
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story, by showing that the growth of the body—including the nervous system—is not 
determined in advance by the body's genes. In section 3.2, we will refute the rest of this 
story. We will see that the relation between anatomical development and behavior is a 
circular one: the body's movements are shaped by its anatomy, but also shape this 
anatomy in return. And we will see that the form of bodily movement is not contained in 
advance in its nervous system: the moving body is a self-organizing dynamic system 
whose behavior is more asymmetrical than its causes. 
In section 3.3, we will turn to the phenomenon of perception, in order to refute the 
mechanistic claim that the form of behavior is pre-determined by the situation it is 
responding to. We will see that perception is not the passive reception of discrete 
sensations, but the active discovery of environmental differences through movement. The 
living body learns to move by exploring its surroundings, and the asymmetries it 
discovers in its environment lead to the development of increasingly asymmetrical 
movements. Thus learning is not a process of synthesis or association, as mechanistic 
theories would have it, but rather one of differentiation, in which the body's increasingly 
coordinated movements allow it to distinguish increasingly subtle differences in its 
environment. The environment that behavior responds to is therefore not given in 
advance, but develops in tandem with the organism's own exploratory movements. 
 
2. Mechanistic theories of behavior 
A. The reflex theory of behavior 
Mechanistic explanations of behavior are as old as the mechanistic conception of 
the living body, originating in the seventeenth century with Descartes' mechanistic 
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physiology. Descartes noted the existence of involuntary reactions in human beings—
actions that we do not perform deliberately, and that we are even powerless to prevent. 
For example, when someone pretends to strike me in the face, I find it impossible not to 
blink, even if I know that they do not really plan to hit me.92 Descartes argued that these 
actions must be produced by automatic mechanisms in the body, without the intervention 
of mind or will. The body's sense organs must be connected to its muscles in such a way 
that certain changes or movements in the sense organs bring about, through a chain of 
mechanical causes and effects, a contraction of certain muscles. Descartes thus held a 
dualistic theory of human behavior: involuntary behaviors are caused by bodily 
mechanisms, while voluntary, rational actions are caused by the immaterial mind acting 
on the body. However, Descartes also held that human beings are unique among animals 
in having minds and being capable of rational, voluntary action. He thus argued that non-
human animals are automatons whose behavior can be explained entirely in terms of 
bodily mechanisms. 
Nineteenth century physiologists took Descartes' mechanical hypothesis even 
further: they argued that human beings are no different from other animals, and that our 
behavior too can be explained in entirely mechanistic terms, without appealing to an 
immaterial mind. Thomas Huxley, the famous champion of Darwinism, argued that 
consciousness is not the cause of behavior, as Descartes believed, but a mere side-effect 
of the bodily mechanisms that produce behavior (Huxley 1874). Anatomical research 
since Descartes' time had clarified how nerves transmit changes from one part of the 
body to another, and also revealed the existence of two different classes of nerve cells: 
                                                
92 Passions of the Soul, Article 13 (CSMK Vol. 1, p. 333; AT XI, pp. 338-9). 
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"afferent" nerves, which connect the sense organs to the central nervous system (CNS), 
and "efferent" nerves which connect the CNS to the body's muscles. These discoveries 
led to a simple mechanistic theory of animal behavior. Each afferent nerve ending at the 
surface of the body is connected via the CNS to an efferent nerve controlling a single 
muscle or muscle group. When things in the organism's environment stimulate nerve 
endings in the body's sense organs, these stimuli trigger contractions in the body's 
muscles. These contractions together produce the gross bodily movements we call 
"behavior." The connection from nerve ending to CNS to muscle became known as the 
"reflex arc", probably because the CNS "reflects" the stimuli it receives into muscle 
contractions, so that the animal's behavior is a straightforward mechanical reflection of its 
situation.93 
 
 
 
Fig. 22. Schematic of the reflex theory of behavior 
 
The underlying logic of this theory should be familiar to us from the mechanistic 
theories of development we discussed in Ch. 1. Recall how geneticists attempted to 
explain the coordination of the living body's anatomy by dividing the body into a 
                                                
93 For a history of the reflex theory's development, see (Phillips 1971). 
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collection of discrete traits, and positing the existence of a single, discrete gene as the 
cause of each trait. Similarly, the reflex theory attempts to explain the coordination 
between behavior and environment by analyzing the body's movements into discrete 
muscle contractions and positing the existence of a single, discrete stimulus as the cause 
of each muscular response. Just as genetics attempted to show how the form of the living 
body is determined in advance by finding a one-to-one correlation between gene and 
phenotypical trait, the reflex theory aims to determine behavior in advance by finding a 
one-to-one correlation between stimulus and response.  
The relation between these two theories is more than simply analogical: they 
share an underlying conception of the living body as a machine, a collection of discrete 
parts and mechanisms assembled according to a clever plan. The reflex theory explains 
the adaptation of behavior to its environment—the fact that stimuli trigger appropriate, 
useful responses in the organism—by appealing to a fixed anatomy optimized by natural 
selection. Like a well-designed machine, the living body is provided with causal 
mechanisms that detect relevant features of its environment and produce responses which 
are advantageous to the organism. In human-made machines, this design is crafted by an 
intelligent being who anticipates the situations to which the machine will need to 
respond, and builds mechanisms into the device that will produce appropriate responses. 
In the living body, according to Huxley and his successors, this human foresight is 
replaced by the blind trial and error of evolution to achieve the same result: a blueprint 
for a machine whose automatic responses are well-suited to its environment.  
Because the reflex theory understands the living body as a machine—a collection 
of mutually external parts—it can only conceive of behavior as a series of mutually 
3.2. Mechanistic theories of behavior 
 
 119 
external events (SB Ch. 1). The internal coordination of behavior—the way that the 
organism's various movements seem to form an organized and purposeful whole—is only 
apparent, a unity attributed to behavior by the observer (SB 9/7). In reality, the living 
body is simply a collection of blind mechanisms which give the illusion of goal-
directedness thanks to the cunning of their assembly. All of the unity and foresight 
exhibited by the living body lies in its design, and none of it in the actual performance of 
bodily movement. If the parts of the organism's behavior are coordinated with one 
another, this can only be due to the orderly arrangement of the individual stimuli that 
caused them. The organism is like a musical keyboard (SB 12-13/10-11); if it produces a 
harmonious melody, rather than a mere cacaphony, this is not due to any intrinsic 
harmony in the machine itself, but only to the harmonious order in which the keys were 
depressed. The form and organization of behavior must be present already in its causes; it 
is inconceivable that the living body should spontaneously produce order where none was 
given in advance, that the movements of the living body should be less symmetrical than 
their antecedents. 
Given the common conceptual logic of the reflex theory of behavior and the 
"blueprint" theory of genetics, it should come as no surprise that the two theories face 
similar empirical difficulties. We saw in Ch. 1 that the blueprint theory ran into trouble 
when one-to-one correlations between gene and trait—upon which the whole theory was 
based—could not be found. It turns out that genes are not trait-makers, but difference-
makers (Fox Keller 2010). If all its other genes are held constant, a variation in one gene 
may produce a corresponding variation in the anatomy of the adult organism. But these 
effects are not additive: we cannot predict the effects of varying multiple genes by first 
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varying each one "in isolation." Indeed, the very notion of an isolated gene effect turns 
out to be incoherent. Individual features of the adult organism do not have a single cause; 
they are products of the total process of development. But this means that the adult 
organism cannot be divided into a collection of discrete traits, and that genes are not a 
"blueprint" for development. 
A similar surprise awaited the psychologists and physiologists who tried to work 
out the empirical details of the reflex theory. They discovered that constant correlations 
between a single stimulus and a single response—the "reflex arc" which was supposed to 
constitute the basic unit of behavior—were virtually nonexistent in animals (SB Ch. 1; 
Goldstein 1995 [1939], Ch. 2). The "reflexes" they thought they had discovered turned 
out to be largely artificial phenomena, produced in the laboratory by holding constant 
(and then ignoring) the rest of the organism and its situation. Like gene actions, the 
effects of individual stimuli on the living body are not additive: one cannot predict the 
organism's response to multiple stimuli by testing each one "in isolation." But this calls 
into question the whole picture of the living body as a collection of discrete causal 
mechanisms, and the very possibility of dividing the organism's behavior into discrete 
responses to discrete stimuli. 
 
B. Cognitivism 
We saw in Ch. 1 that the empirical shortcomings of the "blueprint" theory of 
genetics have led to its replacement by a new model of the genome as a "program" or 
algorithm for development. In response to the shortcomings of the reflex theory of 
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behavior, a parallel move has taken place in psychology with the rise of Cognitivism.94 
According to the Cognitivist, behavior is caused by a program or algorithm executed by 
the brain, which is a biological version of our own digital computers. This new theory 
still analyzes the organism's perceptions and behavior into discrete stimuli and individual 
muscle contractions. However, it offers a more complex picture of what takes place 
between stimulus and response.95 Instead of simply connecting afferent nerve endings to 
muscle cells, as in the reflex theory, the CNS is now held to construct a representation of 
the external world on the basis of the input it receives from the senses. The CNS then 
uses this internal model of the body's surroundings to formulate a motor program or plan 
for moving the body through its environment, which it transmits to the body's muscles. 
This computational theory is supposed to remedy the shortcomings of the reflex theory, 
whose simple "clockwork" picture of behavior required that the organism's movements 
correspond, part for part, to the stimuli it receives from the world. The new picture of the 
CNS as "information processor" purports to explain the complex, nonlinear relation 
between behavior's "inputs" (perception) and its "outputs" (movement). Since perception 
and movement are mediated by an algorithm that represents the world and formulates 
plans for motor action, the organism's movements do not need to resemble its sensations. 
Individual stimuli are no longer taken to be the causes of individual muscle contractions; 
                                                
94 The reflex theory was already coming under fire by the end of the 19th C. (see e.g. Dewey 1896), but the 
rise of Cognitivism had to wait for the invention of the digital computer in the middle of the 20th C. In the 
interim, the reflex theory was propped up by a series of auxiliary hypotheses (which Merleau-Ponty 
catalogues in Ch. 1 of SB). 
95 "Thus, although cognitive psychologists continue to insist that their task is to explain what "goes on" 
between the stimulus and response, they fail to notice that they do not thereby reject stimulus–response 
psychology but remain trapped within its limitations" (Costall 2004). 
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instead, they contribute to the CNS' internal model of its environment, which then 
informs its motor plans. 
 
 
 
Fig. 23. Schematic of the Cognitivist theory of behavior 
 
Notice that for Cognitivism, as for the reflex theory, things in the world are the 
cause of perception, and perception is the cause of behavior. Once again, it is 
inconceivable that behavior should be less symmetrical than its causes. Whatever order 
and organization is present in behavior must have been present already, either in the 
environmental causes of behavior or in the design of its anatomy—in this case, the design 
of the algorithm which is embodied in the structure of the CNS. For the reflex theory, the 
form of things in the world is transposed into the stimuli they produce in the organism, 
and from there into the organism's behavior. For Cognitivism, this transposition is less 
simple: the form of things in the external world is indeed transmitted to the CNS through 
their effects on the body's sense organs, but as a sort of "coded message" which the CNS 
must decipher. The sensory input received by the CNS contains all the information it 
needs to construct an accurate model of its environment, but the sense-data must be 
processed in order to extract this information from it. Notice, however, that if the CNS 
does its job correctly—if it processes the information it receives in the right way—the 
end result is an internal representation whose form mirrors that of the external world. 
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Thus the purpose of all this information processing is not to introduce any new order into 
the system, but merely to replicate the form already present in the body's surroundings.96 
For Cognitivism, as for the reflex theory of behavior, the form and organization of 
behavior must be present already in its causes. It remains inconceivable that the 
movements of the living body could be less symmetrical than their antecedents, 
introducing new order into the world which was not already there. 
Developmentally, this new theory is no more plausible than its predecessor. The 
reflex theory attempted to show that the living body's behavior is predetermined by its 
anatomy, assuming that this anatomy is in turn specified in advance by some sort of 
genetic blueprint. For Cognitivism, behavior is the product of an algorithm, rather than a 
clockwork mechanism; but this algorithm must still be embodied in the organism's 
anatomy, which must again be specified in advance by some sort of plan. If there is no 
"genetic blueprint" for the adult brain, as I argued in Ch. 1, then the Cognitivist must 
explain how the algorithm for behavior develops organically over the organism's lifetime, 
starting from the single-celled zygote. It does no good here to appeal to so-called 
"learning algorithms" which alter their own code over time, for such algorithms do not 
develop "from scratch"—their "learning process" begins with an already-complex 
program written by a human programmer.  
                                                
96 "[S]uch an explanation would permit us to understand how physical things are duplicated in behavior by 
a representation of themselves. Thus behavior remains defined, according to the simplest of schemata, as an 
imitation of things." (SB 135/145). 
"We began from a world in itself that acted upon our eyes in order to make itself seen by us; we have 
arrived now at a consciousness or a thought about the world, but the very nature of this world is unchanged. 
It is still defined by the absolute exteriority of its parts and is merely doubled across its extension by a 
thought that sustains it" (PP 41/64). 
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Our thinking about the Cognitivist picture will become clearer if we set aside for 
the moment the fact that the brain's algorithm is supposed to represent the external world 
and generate actions on the basis of this representation. An algorithm is essentially an 
input-output device: it specifies a sequence of mechanical operations which, when 
performed on data of the right kind, produces a useful result. The Cognitivist's algorithm 
takes sensory stimuli as input and produces muscle contractions as output. But notice that 
this algorithm is imbedded in a moving, living body, which is itself imbedded in a 
changing world. The muscle contractions that the algorithm produces as output cause the 
body to move, exposing its sense organs to new stimuli, which are fed back into the 
algorithm where they are transformed into new movements. Thus the algorithm's output 
shapes its subsequent input; what looks like a linear input-output device when considered 
in isolation turns out, when we put it back into its bodily context, to be part of a circular 
feedback loop—a self-regulating system that includes the nervous system, the moving 
body, and the environment it moves through. Moreover, we know that the nervous system 
is not static, but changes over time as a result of the body's interactions with its 
surroundings. Thus if the structure of the nervous system instantiates an algorithm, then 
that algorithm must be constantly changing as a result of its own activity. As we saw in 
the context of embryogenesis (Ch. 1), programs are more flexible than blueprints, but 
they still represent an attempt by the scientist to specify the course of development in 
advance. In the case of growth, the notion of a "genetic program" is an attempt to specify 
the behavior of each of the growing body's many cells in advance of their interaction with 
one another. In the case of behavior, the notion of a program in the brain is an attempt to 
specify the organism's behavior in advance of its interactions with its environment. But 
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even if the Cognitivist's description of the CNS' activity as algorithmic information-
processing were correct, knowing this algorithm would not allow us to predict the 
organism's behavior. For one thing, the algorithm would not be the "sole author" of 
behavior, but would determine behavior only in collaboration or "conversation" with the 
world. For another, the algorithm's dialogue with the world would have to be such as to 
continuously modify the algorithm itself. And since the body's interactions with the world 
cannot be predicted in advance, every organism would have its own unique algorithm 
which could not be known in advance of its development. Thus if we want to understand 
behavior, it will not suffice to study the CNS in isolation. We will have to study the 
whole self-organizing system of the nervous system in its body in the world, following 
the endogenous dynamics of this system to see how it develops over time. 
I suggested above that we set aside, temporarily, the Cognitivist's claim that the 
CNS constructs an internal representation of the external world. Would it alter our 
conclusions if this claim were brought back into play? In fact, Cognitivism's own 
mechanistic ontology demands that this claim remain suspended. From a strictly 
mechanistic standpoint, the Cognitivist's algorithm would be a representation of the 
external world only for us as observers, not in itself. We saw in Ch. 1 that the concepts of 
a "genetic blueprint" or a "genetic program", though seemingly mechanistic, are in fact 
anthropocentric and therefore impermissible within a strictly mechanistic ontology. 
Something can be a program or a design only for an intelligence that plans ahead and 
anticipates the product of its designs. In a mechanistic universe there are no purposes or 
plans, only causes which are indifferent to their effects. Similarly, the CNS is on 
Cognitivism's own account a machine—a collection of mutually external parts operating 
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according to causal laws. There is no room in this picture for anything to be a 
representation of anything else. The mechanical actions of the world on the body produce 
movements in the "circuits" of the brain, which in turn produce movements in the rest of 
the body. There are no representations here, but only the unbroken chains of cause and 
effect that make up the clockwork universe, some of which happen to pass through the 
living body. For a human being designing an algorithm, it might be indispensable to think 
of certain variables as representing certain states of the external world, and to distinguish 
software—the algorithm considered as an abstract set of instructions and procedures—
from the hardware in which this algorithm will be instantiated. But for the computer 
itself, there is no hardware/software distinction. There are only transistors clicking open 
and closed, magnetic bits switching from one state to another in a linear series of 
mechanical actions. Without form, there can be no representations. If form has no reality 
in nature—if it is only an anthropomorphic projection, an idea in the mind of the 
observer—then no part of nature can represent any other part. One atom cannot represent 
another; one arrangement of atoms may resemble another, but this macroscopic 
resemblance has no causal reality—it exists only in the mind of the observer who 
compares them. Yet when it comes time to study this mind scientifically, mechanistic 
science must insist that the form does not exist there either! Even the scientist's own 
perceptions of form, however indispensable they may be to the practice of science, must 
ultimately be explained away. 
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C. Connectionism 
Cognitivist models treat the brain as an abstract symbol-processing device, 
formally equivalent to our own digital computers. Thus they assume that the algorithm 
instantiated in the brain can be reverse-engineered without knowing anything about the 
"hardware" it is running on. The computer engineer's distinction between hardware and 
software, when applied to the brain, provides a new justification for the old dualism 
between mind and body: if mind is an algorithm, then it can be studied in abstraction 
from the neuro-anatomy in which it is instantiated. Concerns over the biological 
implausibility of Cognitivism's disembodied algorithms gave rise in the 1980s to a new 
"Connectionist" approach, which aimed to devise a more biologically realistic model of 
the brain (Thompson 2007, pp. 8ff). The result was the "neural network" model, which 
treats the brain as an ensemble of idealized neurons linked together by numerically-
weighted connections which can be strengthened or weakened by the network's own 
activity. The behavior of such artificial neural networks can be studied by simulating 
them on a digital computer. Instead of being programmed in advance by a human 
designer, the simulated neural network is "trained" to carry out a given task by 
undergoing repeated trials. As a result, the operations of the network are opaque to its 
creators: they know that it works, without knowing how it works. The goal of the neural 
network is not to generate a representation of the world, but rather to carry out some 
concrete task—usually one of pattern recognition or categorization. The most successful 
neural networks seem to replicate the generality that is one of the strengths of organic 
behavior: having been trained on an appropriate data-set, the network can respond 
appropriately to new cases that it has never encountered before. 
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In some ways, the Connectionist model seems to move beyond the mechanistic 
prejudices of its predecessors. The complex web of connections between neurons 
generates complex feedback loops within the network, giving rise to non-linear, self-
regulating patterns of system-wide activity. Thus, although they are simulated on digital 
computers, neural networks are not themselves computers (i.e. finite-state automatons), 
but self-organizing dynamic systems whose architecture is modified over time by their 
own activity. Instead of being designed in advance to carry out a given task, neural 
networks grow over time, developing increasingly successful responses through repeated 
exposure to different situations. Simulated neural networks thus offer a more realistic 
model of how real nervous systems develop over time in living bodies. However, the 
Connectionist approach has so far been limited by its retention of a number of Cognitivist 
assumptions. Connectionists still tend to think of neural networks as "parallel processing" 
variants of our own digital computers. That is, they treat the neural network as an 
information-processing device whose function is to turn inputs into outputs, and the 
"training" process as a way of generating new algorithms which human programmers 
might not have come up with on their own. Thus Connectionism remains all too 
disembodied: its models try to capture the salient features of real biological nervous 
systems, but it makes no attempt to place these models within a realistic body and 
environment. Instead, neural networks are fed artificial inputs and trained to generate pre-
determined outputs. Instead of being allowed to interact with a rich environment in an 
open-ended way, as organic, embodied nervous systems do, artificial neural networks are 
restricted to solving predefined problems whose solutions have been determined in 
advance by human designers.  
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Simulated neural networks could be a powerful tool for understanding how living 
bodies learn to move and perceive. In order to realize this potential, however, we will 
have to begin placing these networks in bodies—simulated or robotic—and allowing 
these bodies to explore realistic situations. Only then will artificial neural networks begin 
to help us understand how intelligent behaviors develop over time through the living 
body's interaction with its environment. For now, however, let us turn away from 
artificial models of the brain, and return to the phenomenon of the living body. We have 
now seen that mechanistic theories, which assume that behavior is determined in advance 
by its causes, are unable to explain the empirical facts of behavior and its development 
over time. Let us now study these facts in greater detail, to see how the living body's 
behavior, like its anatomy, organizes itself into qualitatively novel forms which are 
nowhere fully given in advance. 
 
3. Learning to move97 
A. The view from above and the view from below 
Biologists have always been struck by the resemblance between organisms of a 
given species, and especially between parents and their offspring. This focus on intra-
species similarity led to the view that there is a single, fixed species-form which all the 
members of a species share, and which is transmitted from parents to offspring. Darwin's 
genius was to stop thinking like a taxonomist and to start thinking like a breeder (Darwin 
1985 [1859]). The breeder wants to promote certain characteristics in the breeding 
                                                
97 The discussion in this section is greatly indebted to Morris 2004, Ch. 2. 
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population and discourage others. Thus what she notices is not the similarities between 
siblings and conspecifics, but rather the differences between them.98 
Psychologists Esther Thelen and Linda Smith (1994) propose a similar conceptual 
move with respect to development. From afar—what Thelen and Smith call "the view 
from above"—what strikes us about development is how similar it is from one individual 
to another within a given species. For example, early studies of human motor 
development found that all children pass through the same series of developmental 
stages. In one landmark study, M. B. McGraw described how infants learning to walk go 
through seven phases of erect locomotion (Fig. 24): reflex stepping (A), static phase (B), 
transition phase (C), deliberate stepping (D), independent stepping (E), heel-toe 
progression (F), and finally integrated walking (G) (McGraw 1945; Thelen & Smith 
1994, p. 3). However, when we look more closely—what Thelen and Smith call "the 
view from below"—we see enormous variability in how different infants develop. No 
two individuals learn to walk in exactly the same way; and each person develops her own 
unique gait. Neither the path that development takes nor its outcomes are exactly identical 
from one individual to another. 
 
                                                
98 "Not one man in a thousand has accuracy of eye and judgment sufficient to become an eminent breeder" 
(Darwin (1985 [1859], p. 91); "Nor let it be thought that some great deviation of structure would be 
necessary to catch the fancier's eye; he perceives extremely small differences" (Darwin (1985 [1859], p. 
97). 
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Fig. 24. McGraw's seven stages of erect locomotion (McGraw 1945). 
 
The classification of development into stages made the flexible, dynamic, and 
individual process of development appear fixed, rigid, and universal. This in turn 
suggested that development has a single cause which determines its timetable in advance, 
and which is indifferent to environmental factors. Psychologists located this "biological" 
cause of development in the process of brain maturation, whose timing they assumed was 
genetically pre-determined. Thus the division of development into distinct stages, which 
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began as a description of the phenomenon, became reified as its cause by projecting these 
stages backwards—first into the brain and then into the genes (Thelen & Smith 1994, p. 
7). We see here once again the tendency to avoid the question of how new forms are 
generated, by postulating that they have been fixed in advance. This approach simply 
avoids all of the interesting questions about development:99 What propels the infant from 
one "stage" of motor development to the next, and why does this happen when it does? 
How do infants with different bodies, growing up in a variety of different environments, 
reliably develop into independent walkers? And how do some infants fail to do so? 
In Chapter Two, we saw how the dynamical concepts of stability and symmetry-
breaking can explain how complex systems robustly and reliably generate similar, 
functional outcomes without these outcomes being somehow determined in advance. 
Having seen how these concepts can help us to understand anatomical development, let 
us now apply them to motor development. We will see that the moving body, like the 
growing body, is a self-organizing dynamical system. Moreover, we will discover that 
growth and learning are not two separate activities, but a single process of development 
seen at two different temporal scales. 
 
B. The moving body as a dynamic system 
McGraw's description of the phases of erect locomotor development in infants 
presents us with a puzzle (Thelen & Smith 1994, Ch. 1). When newborns are held erect, 
they lift and lower their legs in alternating movements which strongly resemble the 
                                                
99 Indeed, the belief among psychologists that the details of motor development were a problem for 
biologists led to a "nearly universal disinterest in motor development studies for nearly 40 years" (Thelen 
& Smith 1994, p. 7). 
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stepping motions of walking. (McGraw calls this "reflex stepping.") This is a surprisingly 
precocious behavior to find in newborns, who will not walk on their own for another 
year. The real puzzle, however, is that at about two months of age this behavior 
disappears—infants no longer perform these stepping movements when held erect. 
(McGraw calls this the "static phase.") Stepping behavior does not reappear until eight to 
ten months of age, when infants become capable of bearing their own weight on their 
feet. This loss of a coordinated and well-articulated movement challenges traditional 
views of development as a linear, progressive process. If kicking is a "reflex" in 
newborns, what could account for the loss or suppression of this reflex at two months, 
and its return as part of functional locomotive behavior a few months later? Careful 
experimental work by Thelen and colleagues has provided answers to these questions. 
But these answers demand that we revise traditional assumptions about the nature of 
movement and development.  
Study of the kinematics (patterns of movement in space) and muscle activation 
patterns of newborn stepping revealed that it is nearly identical to another common 
newborn behavior: the infant's kicking while lying on its back. Kicking and stepping had 
always been seen as two distinct behaviors; but this new evidence suggested that they 
were in fact the same movement performed in two different postures. This discovery was 
especially significant because these two behaviors—stepping when erect and kicking 
when supine—have different developmental trajectories. Whereas erect stepping stops at 
around two months, infants continue to kick throughout their first year when supine, 
prone, or sitting. Thus what psychologists since McGraw had taken to be a fixed 
developmental stage (the "static phase") caused by genetically predetermined changes in 
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the infant's nervous system turned out to be a flexible behavior that varies with the 
infant's posture. Further experiments confirmed that the stepping behavior was much 
more labile than McGraw's account suggested: when infants in the "static phase" were 
held erect with their legs submerged in water, the stepping behavior magically 
reappeared. Conversely, stepping could be suppressed in infants under two months by 
attaching small weights to their legs. The lability of newborn stepping and its sensitivity 
to context posed a challenge to traditional accounts which posit that motor behavior has a 
single cause which is located in the central nervous system. Thus Thelen and colleagues 
were led by their studies of newborn stepping to offer an alternative, dynamic account of 
motor behavior. 
What is striking about newborn stepping is its precocious coordination: hip, knee 
and ankle joints simultaneously trace a smooth and rapid path, first toward and then away 
from the body; in each leg, kicks follow one another in rhythmic succession, usually 
alternating with kicks in the other leg (Thelen & Smith 1994, Ch. 4). Traditional accounts 
assume that such highly coordinated movements must be heavily regulated by the CNS. 
Thus they hold that the timing of the legs' oscillations is controlled by some "central 
pattern generator," which produces the alternating flexion and extension of each leg by 
alternating contractions of each leg's flexor and extensor muscles. However, Thelen and 
colleagues' careful study of muscle activation patterns during infant kicking revealed that 
no such precisely timed alternation was taking place (Ibid.). Instead, the entire 
coordinated movement is produced by a single, simultaneous contraction of both flexors 
and extensors at the beginning of each kick. Because the flexor muscles are more 
powerful than the extensors, the net effect of this simultaneous contraction is to draw the 
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infant's feet up toward its body. Once the muscles have relaxed, the springiness of the leg 
causes it to rebound away from the infant's body, extending the leg. This same 
springiness finally draws the leg back to its initial resting position. Thus the highly 
coordinated kicking movement is not produced, as expected, by a highly coordinated 
pattern of muscle contractions, but by a single uncoordinated burst of activity in all the 
muscles of the infant's leg. It turns out that the rhythm and coordination of infant kicking 
and stepping is not due to CNS regulation at all, but to the intrinsic "mechanical" 
properties of the legs themselves.100 Each leg acts like a mass on a spring: when energy is 
pumped into this system by muscle contractions, the forces of gravity and spring tension 
combine to produce a rhythmic oscillation of the leg, (like that of the simple harmonic 
oscillators we considered in Ch. 2). Thus the coordination of infant stepping—its cyclic 
trajectory and rhythm, as well as the timing of each phase of the movement—turns out to 
be a dynamically self-organizing phenomenon: a form in space and time that is more 
complex (i.e. less symmetrical) than its causes. 
These observations call into question the traditional, mechanistic assumption that 
the form of behavior—the coordination in space and time of the body's various moving 
parts—must be caused by a corresponding form in the CNS. Indeed, a bit of reflection 
will show that as a general principle there can be no one-to-one correlation between 
                                                
100 We are running into a terminological difficulty here: the scientific study of motion has traditionally been 
known as "mechanics," and the properties of bodies that affect their displacement and deformation when 
forces are applied to them (e.g. mass, elasticity, viscosity) are accordingly known as "mechanical 
properties." Thus in describing the parameters of the moving body as a dynamic system, I find myself 
referring to the "mechanical" properties of the body, even though my aim in describing these properties is 
to show that the body is not a machine. See Appendix A, where I argue that even a simple "mechanical" 
system such as a driven harmonic oscillator can exhibit nonlinear dynamics which violate our expectations 
of how a "machine" should behave. 
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patterns of CNS or muscle activity and patterns of bodily movement.101 Try shaking your 
hand vigorously at the wrist, or raising your arm above your head and then letting it go 
limp. Notice that the movements of your hand and arm in these cases are only partly 
determined by the contraction of your muscles—they also depend on the force of gravity 
and the mechanical properties (mass, elasticity, etc.) of your limbs and joints. If you were 
upside-down, or under water, or holding something heavy in your hand, the exact same 
muscle contractions would produce quite different movements. In general, the 
consequences of a given muscle contraction always depend on the positions of your limbs 
with respect to one another and their orientation in the Earth's gravitational field. Thus 
the moving body is a nonlinear dynamic system whose movements are caused by a whole 
field of forces—a field that is constantly changing in response to these very movements. 
Thus the nervous system could not possibly coordinate bodily movement by rigidly 
determining the position of every joint and limb at every instant (Morris 1999; Morris 
2004, Ch. 2). Rather, it sets the body in motion by pumping energy into the system and 
then modulating the dynamic patterns of coordination that emerge. 
It follows that the idea of a "motor program" in the CNS that would fully 
determine the body's movements in advance must be abandoned. The CNS cannot 
regulate movement by sending "instructions" (in the form of muscle contractions) to the 
body, because the relation between muscle contractions and bodily movement is 
nonlinear: as we saw in the case of infant stepping, the same muscle contractions that 
produce kicking when the body is supine may produce no movement at all when the body 
is erect. Since the effect of any given muscle contraction is so variable, the nervous 
                                                
101 This point was first made by the Russian physiologist Nikolas Bernstein. See Berstein (1967); Thelen & 
3.3. Learning to move 
 
 137 
system can only regulate bodily movement if it receives constant feedback from the 
moving body. But this means that the nervous system cannot regulate bodily movement 
without also being regulated by this same movement. In other words, these two dynamic 
systems—the nervous system and the moving body in which it is imbedded—must be 
coupled to each other in a circular feedback loop. It follows that the mechanistic view of 
the CNS as a central control unit that could be understood apart from what it controls—a 
cause that is indifferent to its effects—is untenable. It is the ongoing, circular interaction 
between the nervous system, the moving body, and the world that gives rise to behavior 
in real time (Fig. 25).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 25. The self-organization of behavior. 
 
 
Mechanistic theories of behavior seek a single cause that would contain already 
all of the complexity and coordination of the body's movement. But this search is in vain, 
for no such cause exists. Instead, complex, coordinated forms emerge dynamically out of 
the interactions between the CNS, the body's own biomechanics, and its surrounding 
context—without being determined in advance by any one of these. This picture of motor 
                                                                                                                                            
Smith (1994) pp. 75-77. 
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behavior as self-organizing dynamically in real time allows us to make sense of the 
flexibility of behavior, the living body's capacity to improvise new movements on the fly 
as its situation changes. When one or more legs are amputated from a dung beetle, it will 
immediately resume walking by reorganizing its gait, spontaneously inventing a new 
mode of locomotion (SB 39-40/39-40). Similarly, when my own foot begins to hurt, my 
body of its own accord finds a new way of walking that takes some of the weight off that 
foot. On a mechanistic account, behaviors such as these must be stored up in advance as 
programs or reflexes, which are merely triggered by changes in the body or its 
circumstances (ibid.). On a dynamic account, on the contrary, motor behaviors such as 
walking are self-organizing forms—a kind of stable equilibrium between the body and 
the world. When either body or world changes, the equilibrium between them will 
naturally shift as well, without needing any mechanism in the body to detect the change 
and switch over to a different pre-programmed response. 
Mechanistic theories of behavior can only explain the coordination of movement 
by dividing it into discrete, pre-determined units. The question, for these theories, is how 
the CNS assembles complex movements out of individual muscle contractions. But we 
have now seen that this question is ill-posed. The relation between the body's muscle 
activity and its movements is nonlinear: there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
individual muscle contractions and individual movements, and the effects of muscle 
contractions on bodily movement are not additive. Thus the living body's movements are 
not composed of discrete muscle contractions. Its behavior, like its anatomy, can only be 
understood as a self-organizing form—a whole that articulates itself into parts. The 
organism does not build new behaviors out of pre-existing parts, like machines, but 
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grows them in the same way that it grows new organs: through a cascade of symmetry-
breaking bifurcations. We now turn our attention to this development. 
 
C. Motor development as morphogenesis 
Not only does the dynamic account of behavior help us to make sense of how 
behavior adapts to change in real time, but it can also help us to understand how and why 
behavior changes over the course of development. Mechanistic theories of behavior must 
posit not only a fixed "motor program" behind each of the body's movements, but also a 
further "developmental program" to explain why these motor programs gradually change 
over the course of development. Because mechanistic theories appeal to static entities for 
explanation, change is always a problem for them. For our dynamic account, on the 
contrary, change need not be grounded in static structures. Instead, stasis is explained in 
terms of change: what appear to be static structures are in fact temporarily stable forms 
arising out of underlying dynamic processes. Thus the very same processes that generate 
stable, self-organizing behaviors also generate instability and the growth of new, more 
complex behaviors. We learned in previous chapters that nothing about the living body is 
fixed: its anatomy is also in movement, though the growth of anatomy is much slower, 
and therefore less apparent to us, than the movements of behavior. To understand motor 
development, we must understand how these two movements—growth and behavior—
are related.  
We saw above that motor behavior arises in real time out of the ongoing 
interaction between the nervous system, the moving body, and the world, and that this 
explains the real-time flexibility of behavior: when the body or the world changes, 
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behavior naturally changes along with them. These same dynamics also explain how 
behavior changes over the course of development: slow changes in the body's anatomy 
(including its neuro-anatomy) alter the stability landscape of the moving body, giving rise 
to new self-organizing patterns of movement. We have already encountered one example 
of this: the disappearance of newborn stepping. Thelen and colleagues discovered that the 
disappearance of this behavior was due to the increasing weight of growing infants' legs. 
Kicking remained a stable pattern when infants were supine, because these kicks did not 
need to lift the legs against gravity. When the infants were held erect, however, the same 
muscle contractions were no longer sufficient to set the legs into motion. This example 
illustrates the continuity between behavioral development and the anatomical 
development we studied in previous chapters: the growth of the body (including the 
nervous system) alters the parameters of bodily movement, giving rise to new motor 
behaviors (and the disappearance of old ones). 
However, this continuity goes both ways: growth changes behavior, but behavior 
also shapes anatomy. This takes place in two ways, both familiar to us from our own 
lives. The first is well known to us under the name of "exercise": the way we use our 
bodies slowly changes our musculo-skeletal anatomy over time. Our own movements 
generate biomechanical and biochemical changes in our muscles and bones, which grow 
larger, stronger, denser, and more efficient the more we use them. The second is what we 
call "learning": the way we move our bodies changes the anatomy of our nervous system. 
The athlete or the musician who practices the same movements over and over again is not 
only strengthening her muscles and bones, but also reorganizing the synaptic connections 
in her brain. Mechanistic prejudices have led scientists to look for a fixed architecture in 
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the brain, in which each function would have its own pre-determined location. But in 
fact, the brain's organization is quite flexible—especially in children, whose brains are 
still growing (Kelso 1995, Ch. 9). 
 
 
 
Fig. 26. Motor development arises from the feedback between behavior and 
anatomy 
 
I have attempted to depict these relationships between behavior and anatomy 
schematically in Fig. 26. The central figure in the diagram represents the feedback loop 
between the limb dynamics of the moving body and the dynamics of the body's nervous 
system. Behavior arises in real time from the coupling of these two dynamic systems. At 
behavioral time scales—i.e. seconds or minutes—the anatomy of the body (including the 
nervous system) is relatively invariant, and can be treated as a set of fixed parameters for 
the moving body as a dynamic system. Over developmental time scales, however, the 
tiny anatomical changes wrought by each real-time movement add up, altering the 
stability landscapes of the moving body and its nervous system. These changes 
eventually give rise to symmetry-breaking bifurcations in the dynamics of these coupled 
dynamic systems, which generate qualitatively novel motor behaviors. 
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I have used the familiar terms "learning" and "exercise" to distinguish between 
changes in musculo-skeletal anatomy and changes in neuro-anatomy. However, we must 
not be fooled by this distinction into thinking that learning is something that takes place 
only in the brain, or something the brain could do on its own without the body. On the 
contrary, as Fig. 26 aims to show, the nervous system's anatomical development, like its 
real-time dynamics, is tightly coupled to the development and dynamics of the rest of the 
body.102 However, they tend to develop at different rates: neuro-anatomy typically 
changes more quickly than musculo-skeletal anatomy. Thus one can learn to move in a 
new way in just a few minutes or hours, with the relevant anatomical changes taking 
place almost entirely within the nervous system. This is the process that I have labeled 
"learning" above; but this is somewhat misleading, since larger developmental changes, 
such as learning to walk, will involve changes not only in the nervous system but also in 
the rest of the body.103 
Mechanistic theories of development try to locate the cause of motor development 
in anatomical growth, which they take to be determined in advance of, and therefore 
indifferent to, its effects on behavior. But we have now seen that anatomy is both cause 
and effect of behavior. Anatomy conditions behavior in real-time; but over the course of 
development these real-time behaviors slowly alter their own conditions, giving rise to 
new behaviors. Indeed, we can now see that behavior and development are not two 
                                                
102 For the sake of simplicity, this diagram omits other aspects of the body's anatomy such as the endocrine 
system and the cardio-pulmonary system. These can be viewed as dynamic systems in their own right, and 
they are also coupled to both the moving body and the nervous system. Thus movement and neuro-
dynamics are coupled in other ways not shown here. 
103 Even talking about the moving body and the nervous system as two distinct dynamic systems can be 
misleading, given how tightly coupled they are. It may be useful for heuristic purposes to think about the 
intrinsic dynamics of each system in isolation; but the stability landscapes of the two coupled systems are 
quite different than they would be if the systems were isolated. 
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separate phenomena, but the same process observed at two different time-scales. Think 
again of the athlete or the musician practicing a given movement. The aspiring pianist 
plays the same scales again and again; slowly, imperceptibly, this repetition leads to 
improvement. Each repetition is slightly different from the one before, though this 
difference is vanishingly small. It is only over weeks and months that we can hear how 
the student's playing has changed. But there are not two separate movements here, one of 
playing the scale and the other of developing greater skill. Rather, the playing and the 
development are one and the same movement, observed at two different scales. When the 
student says, "I'm practicing," she means both, "I am playing the piano," and "I am 
getting better at playing the piano." A practice is an activity that we engage in precisely 
in order to change ourselves, to grow. As we change, our practice changes too, opening 
up new possibilities for action and new avenues for growth. 
We can think of the relation between behavior and anatomy as analogous to the 
relation between a river and its riverbed. The direction of water's flow at any given time 
is determined by the shape of the landscape; but over time, the water's movement 
reshapes the land by erosion, changing the direction of its own flow. Thus there is a 
circular relation between moving water and apparently static landscape: the land shapes 
the river, but the river also—more gradually—shapes the land. The banks of the river are 
also in motion, though their movement is too slow to be seen at normal human time-
scales. If we want to explain why the water flows the way it does, we cannot simply 
appeal to the shape of the land as the cause of the river's path, as if the landscape were 
fixed and indifferent to the water that flows through it. The shape of the land is a product 
of the water's flow; the river carves its own path through the landscape over time. 
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Similarly, we cannot appeal to anatomy as the cause of behavior, as if the body's anatomy 
were fixed and indifferent to its movements. The shape of the body is a product of its 
own activity, just as the shape of the land is a product of the water's flow. 
 
 
 
Fig. 27. Ontogenetic Landscape for Locomotion (Thelen & Smith 1994) 
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Thelen and Smith (1994) have tried to depict this complex process of 
development in an "ontogenetic landscape" diagram.104 Fig. 27 shows one such diagram, 
which depicts the development of human locomotion. The diagram has three dimensions. 
Each horizontal line represents the stability landscape of the moving body as a dynamic 
system at a single moment in time. As with the stability landscapes we studied in Ch. 2, 
the curvature of the line represents the stability of the system: "basins" represent stable 
attractors of the system's dynamics; the deeper the basin, the more stable the attractor. 
The vertical dimension of the diagram represents time, moving forward in time as we 
move from the top of the diagram to the bottom. Thus changes in the curvature of the 
horizontal lines as we move from top to bottom represent changes in the stability 
landscape of the moving body as a dynamic system. As you can see, most of the 
horizontal lines have multiple basins, meaning that the moving body is a multistable 
system which can shift between multiple stable behaviors. A change in the body's 
situation can push it out of one basin and into another. For example, a change in the slope 
of terrain can shift the body from walking to climbing; a change in the speed of 
locomotion can shift it from walking to running (Kelso 1995, Ch. 3). Over time, the 
number of stable behaviors available to the growing child increases through a series of 
symmetry-breaking bifurcations, depicted by the transformation of one basin into two. 
Just as the movement of the river reshapes the landscape it flows through, the activity of 
the moving body reshapes its own stability landscape. The ontogenetic landscape diagram 
thus depicts, in a qualitative way, how a behavior such as walking can be a robust 
outcome of human motor development without being specified anywhere in advance. 
                                                
104 The concept of an ontogenetic landscape is adapted from biologist C.H. Waddington's "epigenetic 
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Mechanistic theories of behavior try to locate the cause of behavior in the body's 
anatomy, and the cause of this anatomy in a genetic plan. This is a description drawn 
from manufacturing: the machine's movements are determined in advance by its parts and 
their arrangement, which are in turn pre-determined by its design. But this is a poor 
description of the living body, whose anatomy is never fixed, cannot be determined in 
advance, and is continuously altered by the very movements it generates. Aristotle 
famously observed, with respect to human life, that our actions shape our character: we 
become what we do (Nicomachean Ethics II.1). We have now seen that this is the 
structure of all life: what the living body is at any given moment (its anatomy) is a 
product of what it has done in the past (its behavior). Neither the form of the living body 
nor the form of its movements can be determined in advance, for both are constantly 
developing "on the fly" through the body's creative engagement with its surroundings. 
From a mechanistic standpoint, learning how to move means assembling new 
behaviors out of pre-existing units. But we have now learned that the body's movements 
are not built out of discrete muscle contractions. Development does not begin with a set 
of parts that must be assembled into a whole, but with a whole that must articulate itself 
into parts. Thus the body grows new behaviors in the same way that it grows new organs: 
through a cascade of symmetry-breaking bifurcations. We saw in our study of newborn 
kicking that the infant's lower body initially acts like one big muscle: the muscles of the 
legs can only contract all at once. In order for the infant to develop more complex, 
coordinated behaviors, this single muscle must articulate itself into many smaller ones. 
That is, the pattern of muscle activity generated by the infant's nervous system must 
                                                                                                                                            
landscape", which depicted anatomical growth as a dynamic process. 
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become less symmetrical. This process can be observed in the development of supine 
kicking over the infant's first year. We noted above that supine kicking, unlike erect 
stepping, does not disappear at two months; but neither does it simply persist unchanged. 
On the contrary, the alternating kicks of the newborn are gradually replaced by other, less 
symmetrical patterns: first single-leg kicking, often favoring one of the two legs; and later 
kicking with both legs simultaneously (Thelen & Smith 1994, p. 93). 
This loss of symmetry is driven by the growing infant's interactions with its 
environment. We noted above that the nervous system and the moving body are coupled 
dynamic systems, with the nervous system receiving constant feedback from the moving 
body. This feedback occurs in two ways: through nerve endings in the muscles 
themselves, and through the body's sense organs. Thus the regulation of bodily 
movement circulates through the world; the growing body learns how to move in a more 
coordinated way through the perceptual feedback it receives from its own movements. 
This perceptual feedback also accounts for the increasing responsiveness of the child's 
movements to its surroundings. In the next section, we will study perception in more 
detail, in order to understand the role it plays in behavior and development. 
 
4. Learning to perceive 
A. Perception and the self-organization of behavior 
Have you ever tried to walk around your own home in the dark without bumping 
into anything? It is surprisingly hard for a sighted person to navigate even the most 
familiar space without visual guidance. Indeed, even standing in one place becomes 
difficult for the sighted person deprived of her usual visual reference points. Try to keep 
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your balance while standing on one leg; now, see how much harder it becomes when you 
close your eyes. Harder still is to stand on a leg that has gone numb—we cannot balance 
on a foot that does not feel the floor beneath it pushing back against our body's weight. In 
sum, even the most practiced and familiar movements become difficult or impossible 
without constant perceptual feedback. If the purpose of perception were to construct an 
internal representation of the world, as Cognitivism proposes, then these phenomena 
would be difficult to explain. Once I have constructed a reasonably accurate internal 
model of my environment, this model should suffice to guide my movements without 
further perceptual feedback, as long as my surroundings stay relatively fixed. The 
necessity of constant perceptual feedback—even in static environments—suggests that 
the purpose of perception is not to generate an internal representation of the world, but 
rather to regulate the body's movements in real time. It is a longstanding philosophical 
prejudice that we perceive in order to know, and that knowing consists in representing.105 
But these ideas have no basis in biology. The living body perceives not in order to know, 
but in order to act. It needs no internal model of the world to guide its movements, for it 
receives constant perceptual feedback from the world itself (Brooks 1991). 
 
 
 
Fig. 28. Mechanistic view of the role of perception in behavior 
 
                                                
105 These prejudices have been identified and criticized at length in Heidegger's Being and Time (1962 
[1927]). 
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Mechanistic theories of behavior can only explain the perceptual regulation of 
bodily movement by positing that the organism's movements are caused by things in its 
environment (Fig. 28).106 The problem of behavior, on this view, is to explain how things 
in the world affect the body's nervous system, and how these effects give rise to the 
body's movements. Mechanistic theories try to answer these questions by dividing world, 
perception, and behavior into discrete parts. They assume that the effects of the world on 
the nervous system can be analyzed into a collection of individual stimuli, and that bodily 
movement can be analyzed into a collection of individual muscle contractions. Thus the 
project of Behaviorism and Cognitivism alike is to reverse-engineer the nervous system 
in order to understand how different stimuli cause different muscle contractions. 
On this view, the relation between the nervous system and motor behavior is one of linear 
causation: each part of movement has its own discrete cause within the nervous system, 
and these causes are indifferent to their effects. Thus the form of bodily movement is 
present in advance in the nervous system's activity. The CNS issues "commands" to the 
body, and these commands taken together constitute a "plan" or "program" for how the 
body will move. 
 
                                                
106 Machines are not self-moving; their natural state is to be at rest. Thus if the living body is a machine, the 
causes of its movement must ultimately lie outside of it. 
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Fig. 29. Dynamic view of perception as feedback from movement to nervous system 
 
However, we learned above (3.2) that the causal relation between the nervous 
system and the moving body is not linear, but circular: the moving body and its nervous 
system are coupled, nonlinear dynamic systems (Fig. 29). Thus the effects of muscle 
contractions on bodily movement are neither constant nor additive: there is no one-to one 
relation between muscle activity and bodily movement, which means that the nervous 
system cannot issue "commands" to the moving body, but only modulate its intrinsic 
dynamics. Since the effects of muscle contractions on movement are nonlinear and 
therefore highly variable, the nervous system cannot be indifferent to these effects, but 
must receive constant feedback from the movements it helps to generate. Perception is 
the body's way of producing this feedback: every movement of my eyes generates a 
change in my visual field; every movement of my hands produces a different pattern of 
tactile feedback. Thus the body's movements modulate the intrinsic dynamics of its 
nervous system via its sense organs. Perception is the regulation of neuro-dynamics by 
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bodily movement. Together, perception and muscle activity couple the moving body and 
its nervous system, generating a continuous feedback loop between these two dynamic 
systems. 
Mechanistic theories assume that perception is passive: the nervous system waits 
to be affected by things in the world, and these effects are determined entirely by their 
causes. In the same way that the nervous system is supposed to be the linear cause of 
movement, things in the world are supposed to be the linear cause of the nervous system's 
activity (Fig. 28). Every change in the nervous system would be the effect of a discrete 
cause—the individual stimulus—and every stimulus would be the effect of some discrete 
thing in the body's surroundings. Thus the form of nervous activity would be given in 
advance by the form of things in the world. The total pattern of stimuli, like the pattern of 
bodily movement, would be no less symmetrical than its causes. 
However, the nervous system is a nonlinear dynamic system, like the moving 
body. Thus the effects of individual "stimuli" on this system are neither constant nor 
additive. In other words, there is no one-to-one correlation between the activity of 
individual sensory neurons and the activity of the nervous system as a whole. This means 
that perception cannot be analyzed into discrete parts any more than movement can. A 
change in any single neuron is a tiny fluctuation in the nervous system's dynamics, and its 
effects will vary according to the global state of the system at that moment. Thus instead 
of trying to understand perception as a collection of individual stimuli, we must see the 
body's sense organs as constituting a total perceptual field: a global sensitivity to the 
body's surroundings which changes constantly with the nervous system's own dynamics. 
Just as the form of movement is not determined in advance by the nervous system's 
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activity, this activity is not determined in advance by the form of the body's surroundings. 
The nervous system, like the moving body, is a self-organizing dynamic system whose 
activity is more asymmetrical than its causes. 
Furthermore, we have now seen that perception is not passive, but active: it is the 
body's own movements that produce changes in its perceptual field. Thus the body does 
not wait to be "stimulated" by its surroundings, but actively stimulates itself by moving. 
This point is easier to grasp with respect to some sense modalities than others. For 
example, it is not hard to see that tactile perception is active. We do not simply wait for 
things to touch us, but actively explore them with our hands: picking them up, palpating 
them, and running our fingers over them. The texture of a surface can only be felt by 
moving our hands over it at the right speed and in the right direction. Roughness and 
smoothness cannot be perceived in an instant, by a single touch, but only through 
movement. In the case of vision, however, we are more tempted to think that perception 
is passive, like a camera taking a picture—perhaps because we are less aware of the 
movements of our eyes than we are of the movements of our hands. Studies show, 
however, that movement is no less necessary to vision than it is to tactile perception. If 
the eyes are prevented from moving—or if an image is "stabilized" on the retina by 
tracking the eye's movements—visual perception fades to a homogeneous field 
(Martinez-Conde et al 2004). (See Fig. 30 for a simple demonstration of this.) To see is 
to actively explore the world with our eyes, just as we do with our hands—"palpating it 
with our look" (VI 131).107 
                                                
107 See also Noë & O'Regan (2000): "Just as it would be curious to propose a mechanism whose purpose it 
is to compensate for hand movements in haptic object recognition (for example, a mechanism that ensures 
that the object is not perceived as disappearing when the hand is briefly lifted off it), there is no need for a 
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Fig. 30. Fix your eyes on the red dot, and you will find that the grey annulus disappears. 
Under voluntary fixation of the eyes, stationary objects in the periphery of vision fade. 
Movement of the eyes or the peripheral objects makes the objects reappear. (Adapted 
from Martinez-Conde et al 2004.) 
 
Perception, then, is not simply an effect of the world on the body; rather, the body 
is the cause of its own perceptions. Perception and movement are thus two inseparable 
aspects of one sensorimotor loop: the nervous system modulates the intrinsic dynamics of 
the moving body through muscle contractions, and the body's movements in turn 
modulate the dynamics of the nervous system through perception.108 It follows that we 
                                                                                                                                            
mechanism to compensate for eye movements in visual recognition. … Vision occurs through movement, 
not despite movement." 
108 "[W]e should consider the afferent sector of the nervous system as a field of forces which express 
concurrently the intraorganic state and the influence of external agents; these forces tend to balance 
themselves according to certain modes of preferred distribution and to obtain movements from the mobile 
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cannot understand perception simply by studying the effects of different situations on 
individual sensory neurons, or even on the total perceptual field of a stationary organism 
that has been sedated and restrained. Instead, we must study how the body's own 
movements produce changes in its nervous system via the world that it is moving 
through. But this requires a significant shift in the way we think about the role of the 
world in perception. We can no longer divide the body and its surroundings into parts, 
and ask how each part of the world affects each part of the body. And we can no longer 
think of the body as passively receiving messages from an active world. Instead, we must 
learn to reverse these roles—to see the body as active in perception, and the world as 
passive. We can then ask how the moving body uses its surroundings to generate the 
perceptual feedback it needs to guide its own movements, and how different situations 
allow the body to generate different kinds of perceptual feedback. 
This is not an easy shift to make. But we can begin by noticing the following fact: 
in order for the body's movements to generate perceptual feedback, its surroundings must 
be asymmetrical. In a uniform environment, the movements of the body have no effect on 
its sense organs. For example, within a ganzfeld—a field of completely uniform color and 
illumination—one sees the same thing no matter where one looks, (provided of course 
that one does not look at one's own body). Thus the movements of one's eyes, head and 
trunk do not produce any visual feedback, any changes in one's visual field. Similarly, we 
can imagine a uniform tactile environment, in which one would feel the same thing no 
                                                                                                                                            
parts of the body which are proper to this effect. These movements, as they are executed, provoke 
modifications in the state of the afferent system which in turn evoke new movements. This dynamic and 
circular process would assure the flexible regulation which is needed in order to account for effective 
behavior" (SB 46/48-9). 
 
3.4. Learning to perceive 
 
 155 
matter how one moved one's hands. (This could perhaps be simulated by donning very 
thick, padded gloves.) In such situations, perception becomes impossible—not because 
the body's sense organs have suddenly become defective, but because an environment 
without differences offers nothing to perceive, no responses to the body's questing 
movements.109 Thus perception requires an asymmetrical world. The less symmetrical 
the environment is, the more rich and nuanced will be the perceptual feedback it offers to 
a moving body. We can see this by considering a few highly abstract, schematic 
"environments."  
 
 
 
Fig. 31 
 
First, imagine an environment that is completely uniform except for a single point 
(Fig. 31). This is as symmetrical as an environment can be without being completely 
uniform. A body exploring this space with its eyes or hands will receive very little 
sensory feedback. It might never find the point at all; and even if it does, moving across 
the point will produce only a tiny, momentary change in its perceptual field.  
 
                                                
109 "A truly homogeneous area, offering nothing to perceive, cannot be given to any perception" (PP 4/26, 
emphasis in original). 
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Fig. 32 
 
Next, imagine a slightly more asymmetrical environment that is divided into two 
regions, each completely uniform, but different from each other (Fig. 32). This 
environment is richer than the previous one, but only slightly: it offers perceptual 
feedback to an exploring body only when the body crosses from one region to the other. 
These are the only movements that produce a change in the body's sensory field. As long 
as the body remains within one region, there is nothing to perceive. Only the boundary 
between the two regions is perceptible; it is the difference between the two regions that 
the body perceives, rather than any absolute property of either region taken on its own. 
Gestalt psychologists long ago observed that the smallest possible percept is not a 
sensation or punctiform sense-impression, but a figure on a background (PP 4/26). We 
can now both confirm this observation and also make it more precise: the smallest 
possible percept is not a sensation, but a difference. A figure on a background—such as 
the point in Fig. 31—is the smallest possible percept because it is the contrast of figure 
with ground that makes them perceptible as such. 
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Fig. 33 
 
These first two "environments" were highly symmetrical. Let us now consider a 
less symmetrical one, which offers more perceptual feedback to a moving body (Fig. 33). 
Unlike the first environment, which contained just a single point against an otherwise 
uniform background, this one contains many points, regularly distributed. In this 
environment, unlike the previous two, almost any movement will produce some 
corresponding change in the body's sensory field. Exploring this space will generate a 
rhythmic pattern of perceptual variation, the rate of which will vary with the speed of the 
body's movements. Thus this environment, unlike the previous two, offers the body 
feedback on how fast it is moving—provided that the body is sensitive not only to 
changes in its perceptual field, but also to changes in the rate of those changes. Notice 
how the spatial asymmetries of the environment are converted into temporal asymmetries 
(patterns of periodic change) by the body's movements. To be more precise, it is temporal 
asymmetries in perceptual feedback that give rise to the perception of a spatially 
asymmetrical environment.  
 
3.4. Learning to perceive 
 
 158 
 
Fig. 34 
 
Finally, consider an even more asymmetrical "environment," this time one that 
offers a smooth gradient of differences to perception (Fig. 34). Here, as in the previous 
environment, almost any movement will generate some perceptual feedback, and the rate 
of perceptual variation will correspond to the speed of the body's movements. But unlike 
the previous environment, the rate of perceptual variation here will also be highly 
sensitive to the direction of the body's movement, varying from a maximum when the 
body moves along the "B" axis to zero when the body moves along the "A" axis. Thus 
this environment offers an exploring body feedback not only on how fast it is moving, but 
also on the direction of this movement.  
As these schematic examples show, it is the asymmetry of our surroundings—the 
fact that the world is different in one place than in another—that makes perception 
possible. This asymmetry is the very texture of reality, which allows us to get a 
perceptual grip on our surroundings. However, our schematic environments have so far 
all been static; they are asymmetrical in space, but not in time. What about the temporal 
texture of reality? How do the dynamics of the changing world affect the perceptions of 
the moving body? We should begin by noting again that perception always involves 
changes in the body's perceptual field over time. Thus the difference between a spatial 
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asymmetry and a temporal one, from the point of view of the living body, lies in the 
different temporal patterns of perceptual feedback they offer to the moving body. Spatial 
asymmetries produce changes in the perceptual field when the body moves, but not when 
it is at rest. Temporal asymmetries produce changes in the perceptual field when the body 
is at rest, but not when it moves along with them in the right way. For example, to track a 
moving object visually is to move one's eyes and head in such a way that the object 
remains centered in one's visual field. If we treat the body's movements as 
transformations (in the mathematical sense) of its perceptual field, then we can say that 
spatial differences in the world show up as asymmetries in the perceptual field (i.e. 
transformations that alter the field), whereas temporal differences show up as symmetries 
(transformations that leave the perceptual field unchanged). A perceptual field that 
remains stable in response to the body's own movements is perceived as a change in its 
surroundings. Thus, patients whose eye muscles have been temporarily paralyzed 
experience the world as moving to the left when they try to move their eyes to the left (PP 
48-9/74). A disruption of the body's habitual movements can create the illusion of 
movement in its surroundings.  
Psychologists have also produced the converse effect, creating the illusion of 
bodily movement by disrupting the body's habitual surroundings. Psychologists studying 
the visual regulation of balance in human beings placed toddlers in a "room" whose walls 
and ceiling were suspended from above, allowing them to swing forward and backward 
(Lee & Aronson 1974).110 When the wall the toddlers were facing swung away from 
them, they lost their balance, stumbling or falling forwards. When the wall swung toward 
                                                
110 Video footage of this experiment can be found online: http://youtu.be/RJrEnK8tQxc. 
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the toddlers, they stumbled or fell backwards. The investigators interpreted these results 
as showing that toddlers use the "optic flow" patterns produced by their own movements 
to regulate their balance. When a toddler sways forward, asymmetries in her visual field 
"stream outward," moving away from the center of the field; when she sways backward, 
asymmetries in her visual field stream inward. The movements of the swinging room in 
this experiment simulated the optic flow patterns ordinarily produced by the toddler's 
own swaying movements. Because the subjects were accustomed to rooms with stable 
walls, they perceived the change in their visual fields as a movement of their own bodies, 
generating a compensatory movement in the opposite direction which caused them to lose 
their balance. 
This experiment offers an excellent demonstration of the role perception plays in 
the regulation of bodily movement. The toddler's balancing movements are regulated by 
the changes they themselves produce in the toddler's visual field. When asymmetries in 
the visual field stream outward—as they do when the toddler sways forward—her weight 
shifts backward to compensate. When asymmetries in the visual field stream inward, her 
weight shifts forward. Thus balance arises from the feedback loop between the body's 
movements and the changes they produce in the nervous system via vision. This feedback 
loop generates upright balance as a stable state by damping out perturbations in the 
body's posture—namely forward and backward sway (Fig. 35). I argued earlier that 
perceptual feedback is necessary for the nervous system to regulate bodily movement. 
But we could equally say that the purpose of both nervous system and perception is to 
allow behavior to regulate itself. That is, the basic function of the nervous system is to 
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create a feedback loop through which the body's movements will be regulated by their 
own (perceptual) effects.111 
 
 
 
Fig. 35. Stability landscape for balancing body as a self-regulating dynamic system 
 
If the organism's behavior is acutely sensitive to changes in its environment, it is 
not because the environment is the cause of behavior, as mechanistic theories would have 
it, but rather because the self-regulation of behavior depends on the asymmetries of its 
surroundings. These asymmetries condition behavior, but they do not cause it. A change 
in the organism's environment may produce a change in its behavior, as in Lee and 
Aronson's experiment. But the fact that moving walls cause toddlers to lose their balance 
does not imply that stationary walls cause toddlers to balance successfully under normal 
circumstances. It would be more accurate to say that the toddler's body takes advantage 
of the visual asymmetries presented by stationary walls to facilitate the self-regulation of 
                                                
111 See Varela (1997): "Whenever motion is an integral part of the lifestyle of a multicellular, there is a 
corresponding development of a nervous system linking effector (muscles, secretion) and sensory surfaces 
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its upright stance. Thus instead of asking how the body's movements are caused by things 
in its environment, we should ask how changes in the body's situation, or differences 
between one situation and another, make a difference to the self-regulation of the body's 
movements. 
 
B. Motor programs vs. sensorimotor habits 
It is the self-regulating, self-organizing character of behavior that gives it the 
appearance of intelligence and purposiveness. The balancing body adapts to perturbations 
in its posture, resisting forces that push it out of balance, and finding ways of returning to 
an upright stance. Thus the body seems to have a certain optimal posture as its goal and 
to pursue this goal in creative ways, finding intelligent solutions to problems posed to it 
by the world. Faced with the apparent goal-directedness of behavior, it is tempting to 
think that the goal must be given in advance of the behavior it directs, as some kind of 
representation. We encountered this same logic in our discussions of growth (Ch. 1) and 
motor development (3.2): the robustness of developmental outcomes makes us think that 
they must be given in advance as plans or programs directing the course of development. 
Similarly, the robustness of behavioral outcomes such as balance—their resistance to 
perturbations and their adaptation to changing circumstances—makes us think that these 
outcomes must be given in advance as representations that direct the body's movements. 
(For example, we might posit a motor program for balance that measures the body's 
deviation from its desired vertical stance, and generates motor commands designed to 
close the gap between the body's current state and its goal-state.) However, we have 
                                                                                                                                            
(sense organs, nerve endings). The fundamental logic of the nervous system is that of coupling movements 
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learned that self-organizing dynamic systems can generate seemingly goal-directed 
behavior without plans, designs, or representations. The robustness of the toddler's 
upright posture is not due to any explicit representation of its desired stance, but to the 
self-regulation of its movements. The body acts as if it knows the difference between a 
leaning and an upright stance, between a movement away from and a movement towards 
its goal; but this "knowledge" is not a representation or a static structure located 
somewhere within the body—it is not a thing that one could point to. It is a knowledge in 
movement, a dynamic equilibrium that emerges from the circular interactions of the body 
with its surroundings, and of the parts of the body with one another. Thus we find in 
behavior—as in growth and motor development—an intelligence without consciousness, 
a purposiveness without concepts or representations, and a goal-directedness whose goal 
is not given in advance. 
Of course, there is more to intelligent behavior than robustness and stability; if a 
behavior is too robust, then the organism will always be doing the same thing, regardless 
of its circumstances. Skillful behavior requires not only that the body be able to achieve 
the same outcome in varying conditions, but also that it be able to change its goals as the 
situation changes—for example, switching from pursuing prey to fleeing from predators 
to attracting a mate. Thus the moving body, as a self-organizing dynamic system, must be 
multi-stable: it must have many stable attractors, each of which is a robustly self-
regulating, skillful behavior in its own right. If any one of these behaviors is too stable, 
the organism will be unable to flexibly switch from one behavior to another, instead 
getting stuck in one "mode," one sensorimotor feedback loop. We might think of 
                                                                                                                                            
with a stream of sensory modulations in a circular fashion." 
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obsessive behavior in human beings as an example of such an excess of stability. 
Conversely, an inability to stay "on task" without getting distracted might be an example 
of excessive instability. Thus skillful behavior depends on having the right mix of 
stability and instability. A body that does the same thing in every situation is not acting 
skillfully; but neither is one that changes its behavior in response to trivial or irrelevant 
changes in its environment.  
Since behavior arises dynamically through the interaction of the body with its 
surroundings, it is intrinsically context-sensitive. Psychologists have long acknowledged 
the context-sensitivity of behavior while still attempting to preserve some static "essence" 
of behavior, arguing that the body's variable performances are imperfect reflections of 
more stable competencies located within the organism (Thelen & Smith 1994, pp. 25-27). 
On our dynamic view, this distinction between competence and performance is 
untenable. The body is not the sole cause of its own movements; every action is a 
collaboration between the body and the world, which neither is capable of producing on 
its own. But if the organism's own behavior is not something it can "pull off" on its own, 
then we can no longer locate the organism's powers and abilities exclusively within its 
own body. Learning a skill—such as how to walk, or how to pick things up with one's 
hands—is not like acquiring a new tool which one would then possess absolutely and be 
able to deploy in any circumstance. Rather, the body's powers belong not to the body 
alone, but always to the-body-in-a-situation.112 For example, it turns out that the toddler 
who has learned to stand on her own two feet has not acquired an unconditional skill, but 
                                                
112 We are here discovering with respect to the living body a principle analogous to Heidegger's (1962 
[1927]) definition of human subjectivity as "Being-in-the-World". 
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one that depends on certain environmental conditions. In a situation whose spatial and 
temporal asymmetries diverge too far from those she is accustomed to—for instance, in a 
room with moving walls—the toddler's habitual way of visually regulating her upright 
posture may fail. Indeed, Lee and Aronson's experiment shows that in certain situations, 
the same sensorimotor habits that normally enable the toddler to stand upright will cause 
her to lose her balance. Thus the very habits that empower us in familiar situations may 
prove disabling in unfamiliar circumstances. 
In the body's habituation to certain familiar situations, we find another kind of 
"knowledge in movement." The toddlers in Lee and Aronson's experiment have learned 
from experience that walls do not move—but this knowledge does not reside in an 
internal representation of walls as objects with certain properties. Rather, the toddler acts 
as if walls were stationary; she perceives the movement of walls in her visual field as a 
movement of her own body, and reacts accordingly. This is not a matter of judgment or 
inference, as we have seen, but an immediate result of the body's sensorimotor loop, 
which joins perception and movement together so closely that no intellectual act could 
intervene between them. The optic flow pattern of the moving wall has a certain 
significance for the toddler's body, which is expressed in her motor response. We can 
read in the loss of the toddler's balance the meaning that the wall's movement holds for 
her body. But this is not an intellectual significance, for it relies on no concepts, 
judgments, or inferences. Rather, it is a motor-perceptual significance which arises from 
the body's sensorimotor habits (PP 144/178).  
The toddler's sensorimotor knowledge of the world can also be described as a 
kind of expectation: toddlers expect that when they encounter new rooms, these rooms 
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will be stationary, like those they have encountered in the past. When this expectation is 
not fulfilled, the toddler falls flat: like someone expecting to find a step beneath her foot 
and encountering only air, the toddler suddenly finds that her environment is not 
supporting her habitual movements in the way she has come to expect. However, this 
expectation is not an idea—it is not an image or a map which might or might not 
resemble the "external world." The expectation cannot be located anywhere else than in 
the body's sensorimotor habits, its developed ways of being sensitive to the perceptual 
feedback generated by its own movements. The living body carries its history along with 
it: its habits of moving and perceiving grow out of its encounters with a particular set of 
concrete situations, and they bear the mark of the conditions in which they developed. It 
is in the context of these past experiences, with the sensorimotor habits that developed 
out of them, that the living body perceives and moves in every new situation it 
encounters. Thus, how the body will perceive and respond to a given situation can be 
neither understood nor predicted simply on the basis of that situation's own 
characteristics. Rather, the motor-perceptual significance a situation has for the organism 
depends not only on the situation itself, but also on the whole history of moving and 
perceiving that the body brings to bear on it. A toddler who had learned to stand in 
different circumstances—for example, one who had never before encountered a room 
with orthogonal walls—might react quite differently to Lee and Aronson's experimental 
set-up. It is precisely because of their familiarity with rectilinear spaces that the subjects 
of this experiment experienced the moving walls as unfamiliar and disruptive of their 
established motor habits. 
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Mechanistic theories of behavior face great difficulties in accounting for the 
flexibility and generality of behavior, because they appeal to static structures to explain 
the coordination of behavior. In order to explain a skillful motor performance in terms of 
a static mechanism or motor program in the nervous system, one must explain how the 
body is able to adapt this program to the unique demands of each particular situation. Our 
dynamic account of behavior does not face this difficulty, because it does not assume that 
the coordination of skillful movement is given in advance of its performance, prior to the 
body's encounter with particular situations. A sensorimotor habit is intrinsically general 
(SB 30/30): it is not a fixed pattern of movements or a universal algorithm, but a 
determinate way of being sensitive to differences in the world, which is expressed in 
articulate movement. Such habits are neither completely particular, nor completely 
universal. The toddler who has learned to stand upright in the rooms of its home can also 
do so in rooms that it has never seen before; its sensitivity to certain optic flow patterns, 
though learned in one particular set of situations, turns out to be functional in a wider 
range of circumstances. On the other hand, the same toddler is unable to remain upright 
in a room whose walls are mobile; thus the range of circumstances in which its habits 
generate skillful behavior is not unlimited. The context-sensitivity of behavior, which we 
noted above, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is what gives behavior its 
flexibility, its capacity to adapt dynamically and creatively to different situations. On the 
other hand, it means that the body's powers are always conditional on circumstances 
beyond its control. We have all experienced the bizarre failures to which behavior is 
susceptible, in which skills we thought we had mastered abruptly betray us: I trip over my 
own feet or spill my drink on myself for no reason, despite years of experience in 
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walking and drinking; the right words suddenly desert me at the crucial moment of 
speech; I am mysteriously unable to produce my partner's name—or worse, I call him by 
the name of another. 
 
C. Perception and motor development 
Behavior is a self-organizing form which arises from the dynamic interplay of the 
living body with its environment. If we treat behavior as the activity of a dynamic 
system, then the parameters of this system at any given time include both the anatomical 
form of the body and the form of its situation. When psychologists study behavior, they 
do so by varying one or more of these parameters, and observing how the organism's 
behavior changes in response. In dynamic terms, we could say that they are probing the 
stability of the system, searching for critical points at which the quantitative variation of 
some control parameter produces a qualitative change—i.e. a symmetry-breaking 
bifurcation—in the system's dynamics. (Of course, this is not always or even usually how 
psychologists understand their own experiments.) We can distinguish two kinds of 
behavioral experiment: those that vary parameters in the body's environment, and those 
that vary parameters in its anatomy. 
The easiest experiments to perform are those which vary some aspect of an 
organism's situation and study its response. These experiments seek to discover which 
changes in the body's environment will leave its behavior unchanged, and which will give 
rise to different self-organizing behaviors. The designers of these experiments are usually 
asking questions either about what a given organism is capable of, or what it is sensitive 
to. They typically study the organism over a short enough time scale that its anatomy can 
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be treated as fixed. Thus this kind of experiment is synchronic, in the sense that it studies 
an organism at some particular point in its development, rather than asking about how its 
behavior changes over time. Psychologists who are interested in diachronic questions 
about the development of behavior must proceed differently: instead of studying how a 
given body responds differently to different situations, they must look at how an 
organism's responses to a given situation change as its body develops over time. This is 
generally more difficult than the synchronic experiment, since it is much harder to vary 
the form of the living body than it is to vary its situation; anatomical changes are slow 
and difficult to control. One approach that psychologists have developed in response to 
this problem is the so-called "microgenetic study." In this kind of study, the experimenter 
attempts to "speed up" the organism's development by artificially enhancing its powers of 
movement and perception, and observing how this alters the organism's performance in a 
given situation, as well as the consequences for the organism's general behavior and 
development (as compared to similar control subjects who did not receive the 
experimental "enhancement"). 
One such microgenetic study, performed by Esther Thelen, examined the 
development of leg coordination in young infants. Thelen's study was based on a series of 
important experiments on infant learning and memory by psychologist Carolyn Rovee-
Collier and colleagues (Rovee and Rovee 1969). In these experiments, infants between 
nine weeks and six months were placed on their backs under a colorful, noisy mobile. 
This mobile was attached by a ribbon to the infant's ankle, in such a way that the infant's 
kicks would set the mobile in motion. The sounds and movements of the mobile 
increased in proportion to the strength and frequency of the infant's kicks. Subjects in the 
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control group were placed under the same mobile, but it was not attached to their legs; 
instead, an experimenter continuously activated the mobile, simulating the sights and 
sounds experienced by the infants in the experimental group. The two groups of infants 
reacted quite differently to their experience with the apparatus. Those in the experimental 
group became alert and engaged, smiling and laughing. They quickly began to kick 
harder and faster than the infants in the control group, and they grew upset when their 
legs were detached from the mobile and it stopped responding to their movements. The 
infants in the control group, who were exposed to the same moving mobile, but only as 
passive observers, were much more subdued. This showed that the infants in the 
experimental group were not responding to the pleasing sights and sounds of the 
activated mobile per se, but to the mobile's responsiveness—the way that the sights and 
sounds produced by the mobile covaried continuously with their own movements. 
Thelen's microgenetic study was a variation on Rovee-Collier's experiment, in which a 
similar apparatus was used to test whether infants could learn not only to kick more, but 
to kick in a different way (Thelen 1995). At three months, infants usually kick either by 
alternating legs, or using a single, favored leg. It is rare at this age for infants to kick with 
both legs simultaneously. In Thelen's experiment, three-month-old infants were attached 
to the mobile in such a way that the greatest activation of the mobile could only be 
achieved with a double kick. As predicted, infants in this experiment learned to kick their 
legs simultaneously—a behavior they would not normally learn until later in life. 
The genius of Rovee-Collier's apparatus is that it provides the infant with a 
precocious link between movement, sight, and hearing—a form of perceptual feedback 
that would not ordinarily be available to the infant at its current stage of development. 
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Infants under six months have quite limited mobility: they are still developing the 
strength and coordination needed to support their own heads and to roll over; they 
typically cannot crawl yet; and they are still learning how to grasp objects and bring them 
to their mouths. Thus the young infant's capacities for actively exploring its world are 
still very limited. In particular, the movements of its legs are not yet strong enough to 
produce significant changes in what it sees, hears, or feels with its mouth and hands. 
Rovee-Collier's apparatus acts as a kind of prosthesis, then, which amplifies the effects of 
the infant's leg movements on her perceptual field, allowing her to explore her 
environment by moving her legs. This exploration is limited to the mobile above the 
infant's head. But Thelen's microgenetic study demonstrated that even this limited 
exploration is sufficient to generate new, precocious motor behaviors in the infant—
effectively accelerating its development by several weeks. This suggests that the infant's 
exploration of its surroundings in the course of ordinary development plays a key role in 
the growth of motor coordination. In order to establish this more conclusively, one would 
have to perform the converse experiment, depriving infants of perceptual feedback to see 
if this would retard ordinary motor development. Obvious ethical concerns prevent us 
from performing such experiments on human infants. However, they have been 
performed (ethically or not) on kittens (Held & Hein 1963). As expected, it was found 
that kittens deprived of motor control over their own perceptions did not develop normal 
motor coordination.113 
                                                
113 In this experiment, pairs of newborn kittens were placed in an apparatus which allowed one kitten to 
move, while the other kitten was restrained in such a way that its movements followed those of the other 
kitten. Thus the two kittens received the same perceptual "stimuli," but one was a passive spectator while 
the other was permitted to generate its own stimuli by moving. We experience something similar as 
passengers in a car. You may have noticed that you can be taken along the same route many times as a 
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Thelen's microgenetic experiment equipped infants with a prosthesis that let them 
precociously explore their environment with their legs. In another microgenetic study, 
Needham and colleagues devised a prosthetic apparatus that allowed infants to 
precociously pick things up with their hands (Needham, Barrett, & Peterman 2002).114 
The experimenters had three-month-olds wear velcro-covered mittens and presented them 
with velcro-covered toys, allowing them to experience prehension 0.5-1.5 months before 
infants typically learn how to reach for and grasp small objects. Needham and colleagues 
found that repeated experience with this prosthesis led to precocious developments in 
hand-eye coordination, and a precocious increase in object exploration with the eyes, 
hands, and mouth. In both of these microgenetic studies, prostheses that allowed infants 
to engage in precocious exploration of their environment led to precocious developments 
in motor coordination. These and other studies have led developmental psychologists to 
conclude that it is the growing body's active exploration of its environment that teaches it 
to move in new ways (Bourgeois et al. 2005; Palmer 1989). However, they tend to 
interpret this phenomenon in Cognitivist terms, claiming that the body explores its 
surroundings in order to acquire information about the properties of objects, which it then 
uses to plan its own movements.115 As the body acquires more information about its 
environment over time, its action plans become more sophisticated and well-adapted to 
                                                                                                                                            
passenger without ever learning how to follow that route as a driver. One might think that this was simply a 
matter of "paying attention"; but our study suggests that the meaning of the visual spectacle is different for 
the driver, whose movements the spectacle is responding to, than for the passenger who is a passive 
observer. What would it mean to "pay attention," as a passenger, in such a way that one could drive the 
same route oneself? One would have to put oneself in the driver's place, experiencing the motor 
possibilities presented by each intersection as if one were choosing the route for oneself. 
114 Video footage of an infant using this prosthesis can be seen here: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJGRM4LFJjU. 
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its surroundings. This account recognizes that the body learns about its environment by 
moving around in it, and that this learning manifests itself in new motor behaviors. 
Unfortunately, it succumbs to the temptation to reify this learning as "information" 
captured from the environment and stored somewhere in the body. In other words, this 
account recognizes that the body learns to move by moving—that the body's own 
movements are what drives its motor development. But it insists on interpolating, 
somewhere between one movement and the next, a static representation of the body's 
changing surroundings, and a static plan for its subsequent movements. I have argued, to 
the contrary, that the goal of perception is not to construct an internal model of the world, 
but to regulate movement in real time; and that the body's knowledge of its environment 
does not reside in any representation, but rather in its developed ways of using its 
surroundings to perceptually regulate its own movements. On this view, what the body 
gains from exploring its environment is not new information about the world, but new 
sensorimotor habits. The infant exploring its surroundings with mouth, eyes, and hands is 
not cataloguing abstract facts about objects and their properties, but learning to move and 
perceive in new ways. 
In rejecting the traditional distinction between perception and movement, we have 
also ruled out any absolute distinction between exploration and action. When the 
psychologist is interested in the real-time coordination of the infant's movements, she 
calls them "actions"; when she is interested in how these movements develop over time, 
she calls them "exploration." But they are the very same movements in each case. The 
                                                                                                                                            
115 "The information that infants register about objects guides their manual actions, but at the same time, 
these actions help infants to register important information about objects' properties" (Bourgeois et al. 
2005). 
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body's actions are always perceptually guided, which means that every action is a 
perceptual exploration of the world. When I walk, I am exploring the ground with my 
feet and the world moving past me with my eyes; when I hit a tennis ball, I am exploring 
the ball with my racket. Conversely, perception takes place only through movement, 
which means that all perception is a kind of action. When I look at the world around me I 
am actively exploring it by moving my eyes; when I feel the shape, weight, and texture of 
an object, I am actively exploring it by running my fingers over its surfaces and hefting it 
in my hand. As the body moves, it is also learning how to move; as it perceives, it is also 
learning how to perceive. Thus the body is always both active and passive, acting and 
exploring, doing and learning. 
Although we must reject any absolute distinction between exploration and action, 
we may still recognize that some movements seem more exploratory than others. When I 
am running at full speed, there is a sense in which I am exploring the ground with my 
feet; but there is another sense in which I am simply taking the ground for granted, 
trusting that it will be there to support my next stride. When I suddenly trip, or step on 
something sharp, or the ground goes soft beneath my feet, my behavior changes abruptly. 
Where before my movements had been smooth and sure, now they become halting, 
tentative, exploratory—I am suddenly unsure of how to move in and with this new 
situation. Something has changed, but I do not yet know what. My situation is suddenly 
ambiguous, indeterminate; I do not know what I am seeing or touching, and I must feel 
my way around until I get my bearings again. Suddenly something "catches," and the 
situation resolves itself: I have stepped on a nail, or landed in mud, or tripped for no 
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reason at all. Things are familiar again, and I know what I am seeing, how to move, and 
what to do next. 
Skillful actions are smooth and decisive, attuned to and harmonized with their 
situation; the body seems to know in advance what it will encounter, and to already be 
preparing for it. Body and world seem to be cooperating in a common project: the body 
finds just what it needs to support its actions, and minor fluctuations in the situation or 
the body are easily compensated for. When the body's skillful movement encounters an 
unexpected or unfamiliar situation that interrupts its comfortable operation, it becomes 
exploratory: the body shifts from taking the situation for granted to feeling its way around 
in it, unsure of how to move. In dynamic terms, we could say that the moving body finds 
itself hovering unstably on the edge of several basins of attraction, dipping into one and 
then another without falling completely into any one stable behavior. Sometimes the 
body ends up finding its way into an existing basin, an established sensorimotor habit that 
turns out to be stable in the current situation. In such cases, the result of the sudden 
instability and subsequent exploration is simply that the body shifts from one familiar 
way of moving and perceiving to another. However, if the new situation is sufficiently 
unfamiliar, the stability landscape of the body-world system may undergo a substantial 
change, such that all of the body's established motor habits are destabilized. This can be a 
moment of profound crisis, in that the body's movements may initially be incoherent, 
confused, and dangerously maladaptive. However, this can also be a moment of great 
opportunity, in which the body discovers new stable ways of moving and perceiving, new 
sensorimotor habits made possible for the first time by its new situation. At the same time 
that it is exploring its environment, then, the moving body is also exploring the "space" 
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of possible self-organizing behaviors. The organism is constantly bringing its established 
sensorimotor habits to bear on new situations, which have the power to destabilize those 
habits and so to give rise to new ones. 
In the microgenetic studies of Thelen and Needham et al., we saw how growing 
bodies can use prostheses to explore their environment, and thus to develop new 
sensorimotor habits. This same phenomenon is pervasive in ordinary human 
development: we are constantly learning to use new prostheses that allow us to explore 
the world in new ways, and thus teach us new ways of moving and perceiving. When we 
first encounter a new tool—be it a pencil, a baseball bat, a car, or a telescope—we begin 
by exploring it with our eyes, hands, and mouth. Depending on the possibilities it seems 
to offer us, we may lift it, tap it, squeeze it, turn it over in our hands, or look at it from 
different angles; we may sit on it, push it around, press its buttons, or pull its levers. In 
other words, we try out various habitual ways of moving and perceiving, to see whether 
and how they cohere with this new situation. As we explore the unfamiliar object, we 
discover new possibilities in it: banging it makes a pleasing noise that we have never 
heard before; rubbing it on a surface produces a lasting mark; swinging it amplifies our 
power to hit other objects; riding in it amplifies our powers of locomotion. The tool is 
initially an alien object, an unfamiliar situation that presents a challenge to our existing 
habits. As we explore the object and become familiar with it, however, it ceases to be an 
object of exploration, and becomes instead a means for exploring other objects and 
situations. Thus the tool goes from alien object to prosthesis: it becomes an extension of 
my body, an integral part of my sensorimotor habits, which I rely on for the 
accomplishment of my everyday tasks. 
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Any part of my environment can become a prosthesis in this sense, not just the 
objects we commonly identify as tools. The ground is initially an unfamiliar part of the 
infant's environment, which she explores with her eyes, hands, and feet. But over time, as 
she learns to crawl, walk, and run, the ground becomes an integral part of the child's 
sensorimotor habits—a familiar part of her situation whose support she takes for granted, 
and which allows her to move around and explore other aspects of her world. This 
prosthetic structure is the structure of learning and behavior in general: familiar situations 
and established habits "scaffold" the exploration of new situations and the development 
of new habits. Learning to walk frees the child's hands and elevates its gaze, allowing it 
to explore the world in new ways, to encounter new challenges, and to develop new 
powers and skills. This hierarchical structure of habits built on other habits, prostheses 
built on other prostheses, is the source of human behavior's enormous power, flexibility, 
and adaptability. However, it also renders behavior susceptible to unexpected 
"regressions." When the ground beneath my feet becomes too steep, uneven, or unsteady 
to support walking, I revert to crawling on all fours—something I may not have done for 
years. In this archaic posture I lose other powers that I have come to take for granted, 
such as the ability to carry things in my hands or to see what lies far ahead of me. 
Similarly, when I return to my childhood home, I may find myself reverting to old ways 
of acting and relating to others; the familiar surroundings call forth from my body the 
behaviors they once enabled, even though these may no longer be appropriate. 
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D. Learning as differentiation 
Alongside the Cognitivist view of learning as the accumulation of information 
about the world, the traditional behaviorist view of learning as conditioning continues to 
flourish in psychology. On this view, organisms learn to associate certain behaviors with 
certain perceptual stimuli through positive or negative reinforcement: pleasurable results 
strengthen the association between stimulus and response, while painful consequences 
weaken it. Thus the organism learns by trial and error to respond to its environment in 
adaptive ways: with time and experience, responses that produce positive results increase 
in frequency, while those that fail or actively cause harm become less frequent. For 
example, Rovee-Collier and colleagues interpret the results of their infant learning study 
as a case of "operant conditioning" (Rovee and Rovee 1969).116 The pleasurable stimulus 
of the moving mobile acts as a "conjugate reinforcement" of the kicking response—a 
reinforcement whose strength varies with that of the subject's response. Thus the infant 
learns to associate kicking with the pleasurable sights and sounds of the activated mobile. 
Because more intense kicking produces a stronger pleasurable stimulus, the infant learns 
to kick harder and more frequently.  
The fundamental assumption of this theory of learning as conditioning is that 
learning consists in the association of a discrete stimulus with a discrete response. I want 
to point out three related problems with this assumption. The first problem is that it 
assumes what needs to be explained—namely, how a given "response" is learned in the 
first place. For example, Rovee-Collier and colleagues take for granted that the infant is 
                                                
116 "Operant conditioning" is the reinforcement of a voluntary response, as opposed to "reflex conditioning" 
which reinforces an involuntary response such as the salivation of Pavlov's famous dogs. 
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already capable of kicking, and of varying the speed and frequency of these kicks.117 In 
general, however, the question facing the student of child development is not simply how 
the child learns to perform old behaviors in new contexts, but how the child learns to do 
new things which it could not do before. This is precisely the point of Thelen's 
microgenetic study, which demonstrates that Rovee-Collier's ingenious apparatus can be 
used not only to encourage existing behaviors in the infant, but also to generate 
qualitatively new behaviors. This genesis of new behaviors cannot be interpreted as an 
association of existing elements, unless we take every behavior to be composed of units 
that are given in advance.  
This is the second problem with the association theory of learning: it takes 
behavior to be composed of discrete responses to discrete stimuli. But we have now seen 
that neither movement nor perception can be decomposed into discrete elements. Both 
the moving body and its nervous system are nonlinear dynamic systems. Thus there is no 
one-to-one correlation between individual muscle contractions and bodily movement, or 
between the activity of a single sensory neuron and that of the whole nervous system. The 
infant's kicks in Rovee-Collier's experiments are not discrete or instantaneous 
"responses," but self-organizing forms spread out in space and time; and they do not 
produce discrete or instantaneous "stimuli," but rather an ongoing pattern of changes in 
the infant's perceptual field. The concept of a "stimulus" in psychology is notoriously 
ambivalent, referring sometimes to the thing in the world that is doing the stimulating, 
and sometimes to the effect of that thing on the sensory surfaces of the living body. 
                                                
117 The focus of their experiments was on infant memory, rather than learning per se. Rovee-Collier and 
colleagues used their apparatus to test whether infants would exhibit a learned behavior again if returned to 
the same context some time after the learning took place. 
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Unfortunately, this ambivalence tends to produce an illusion of rigor: in theory, the 
stimulus has a precise anatomical definition as the "firing" of a single sensory neuron; but 
in practice, psychologists often identify the cause of these stimuli as "the stimulus," thus 
avoiding the difficult task of analyzing the effects of the organism's environment on its 
individual nerve-endings. This slippage of meaning allows the experimenter to describe 
as a single, discrete stimulus what must in fact be a complex pattern of changing 
stimuli.118 It also conceals from view the crucial question of how things in the organism's 
environment become "stimuli" for it, i.e. how environmental differences come to make a 
difference to the organism and its behavior.119 
This brings us to the third problem with the association theory of learning: it treats 
the stimulus and the response as two mutually external events occurring in succession, the 
first causing the second. But we have learned that the relation between perception and 
movement is a circular one: the moving body is the cause of its own perceptions, 
"stimulating itself" by moving around in its asymmetrical environment.120 In Rovee-
Collier's and Thelen's experiments, it is the ongoing feedback between movement and 
perception that teaches the infant to move in new ways. Thus it is impossible not only to 
divide movement and perception into discrete parts, but also to separate them from each 
other.121 Perception and movement are two aspects of a single ongoing process, the 
                                                
118 This is a form of what Merleau-Ponty calls the "experience error" (PP 5/27). 
119 "On analysis, the equivocal notion of stimulus separates into two: it includes and confuses the physical 
event as it is in itself, on the one hand, and the situation as it is 'for the organism,' on the other, with only 
the latter being decisive in the reactions of the animal" (SB 129/139). 
120 "Situation and reaction are linked internally by their common participation in a structure in which the 
mode of activity proper to the organism is expressed. Hence they cannot be placed one after the other as 
cause and effect: they are two moments of a circular process" (SB 130/140). 
121 "The mutual exteriority of the organism and the milieu is surmounted along with the mutual exteriority 
of the stimuli" (SB 161/174). 
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sensorimotor feedback loop. This process is not built up out of any minimal units: it 
cannot be understood as a series of discrete events, or a linear chain of causes and effects. 
Thus the very concepts of the discrete stimulus and the discrete response must be 
abandoned, and with them the view of learning as association.  
Mechanistic theories of behavior are obliged to conceive of learning as a synthetic 
process of association because they assume that behavior is a collection of mutually 
external events. All behaviors are built out of the same basic elements, and so learning 
can only be a matter of putting these constant units together in more and more elaborate 
ways. For these theories, the moving body is all too differentiated, with its myriad 
muscles and sensory nerve endings; the problem is to understand how all of these parts 
get assembled into one coordinated, responsive movement. On the view I have been 
arguing for, on the contrary, the moving body begins as a relatively undifferentiated 
whole, which is relatively insensitive to differences in its environment. Thus learning is 
not a matter of association, but rather of differentiation (Gibson & Gibson 1955): the 
development of increasingly articulated movements which respond to increasingly subtle 
differences in the body's surroundings. 
Psychologists have long noted how people differ in their capacities for perceptual 
discrimination. William James, in his Principles of Psychology (1890), wrote:  
That 'practice makes perfect' is notorious in the field of motor accomplishments. But motor 
accomplishments depend in part on sensory discrimination. Billiard-playing, rifle-shooting, tight-
rope dancing demand the most delicate appreciation of minute disparities of sensation, as well as 
the power to make accurately graduated muscular response thereto. In the purely sensorial field we 
have the well-known virtuosity displayed by the professional buyers and testers of various kinds 
of goods. One man will distinguish by taste between the upper and lower half of a bottle of old 
Madeira. Another will recognize, by feeling the flour in a barrel, whether the wheat was grown in 
Iowa or Tennessee. (p. 509, my emphasis) 
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However, psychology's understanding of these phenomena has been held back by 
its mechanistic assumption that sensation is passive. On this view, the novice and the 
expert placed in the same situation must receive the very same sensations. In order to 
explain why they nevertheless perceive different things, psychologists and philosophers 
have long distinguished between sensation—the passive reception of stimuli—and 
perception: a second stage of intellectual operations that would synthesize the body's 
disconnected and ever-changing sensations into the perception of a world of stable 
objects (PP 34-5/56-8; Gibson & Gibson 1955). But this whole second stage becomes 
superfluous once we realize that sensation is not the passive reception of disconnected 
stimuli, but the active exploration of the body's environment. Thus in overturning the 
distinction between perception and movement, we have also overcome the distinction 
between sensation and perception. The expert and the novice move in different ways 
because they perceive the world differently; but they perceive the world differently 
because they move in different ways. In learning how to move, we are also learning how 
to perceive.122  
Consider an infant learning to explore its surroundings, or an adult in a new and 
unfamiliar situation, learning how to play a new sport or a new musical instrument. As 
novices, we start out making relatively gross and uncoordinated movements: we swing 
the racket wildly, or bash the guitar pick against all the strings at once. The perceptual 
feedback we receive from these movements is as blunt and unsubtle as the movements 
themselves. Large, uncoordinated movements reveal only the largest and most prominent 
                                                
122 "The gaze obtains more or less from things according to the manner in which it interrogates them, in 
which it glances over them or rests upon them. Learning to see colors is the acquisition of a certain style of 
vision, a new use of one's own body" (PP 154-5/190). 
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differences in our situation: for example, the difference between hitting the ball or 
striking the strings and missing them completely. Thus we at first experience our new 
situation as relatively formless and undifferentiated; we seem to be moving in a void, 
struggling to find reference points on which to anchor our movements. But as we explore 
our new surroundings, our motions become more sensitive and refined, revealing smaller, 
more subtle differences. Our movements become more attuned to the form of our 
situation, and we begin to perceive it in greater detail. What started out as a formless void 
takes on new contours, becoming rich and inviting, and offering many avenues for new 
explorations. Thus learning takes place through a positive feedback loop between 
movement and perception: as our movements become more articulated and differentiated, 
we encounter ever more subtle differences in our situation, and these encounters in turn 
give rise to even more asymmetrical movements. The world we perceive becomes more 
articulated at the same time as our movements do. Thus learning is the simultaneous 
growth of determinacy and differentiation in the body and in its situation. 
Mechanistic theories of perception suffer from a prejudice of determinacy (PP 31-
33/53-55): they assume that the body's perceptions must be as determinate as the world it 
perceives.123 Thus the organism's perceptions must be composed of discrete, fully 
determinate parts. Learning to perceive, on this view, can only be a matter of learning to 
synthesize these determinate elements in the right way. The difficulty, for the beginner, is 
not that her perceptions are ambiguous or indeterminate, but rather that they are all too 
distinct from one another: she is overwhelmed by their sheer variety and unable to 
organize them into coherent categories. Take the wine novice, for example. On the view 
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that learning takes place through association, the wine novice's predicament is that every 
wine tastes completely different from every other one: each one offers a unique 
combination of many determinate flavors.124 To become expert, the novice must learn to 
identify the flavors that certain wines have in common, which mark them as coming from 
the same region or being made from the same grape varietal. In other words, she must 
learn which of the many flavors to pay attention to, and then to associate particular 
flavors with particular names. But this account of learning is at odds with the actual 
experience of being a beginner. The wine novice's predicament is not that every wine 
tastes different, but that they all taste more or less the same. This is why she cannot 
distinguish one varietal from another, or an excellent wine from a mediocre one. What 
confuses the novice is not how many different flavors she can taste, but how few. Before 
she can ask what various wines have in common, she must first be able to tell them apart; 
the question of classification or similarity is secondary to the recognition of multiplicity 
or difference. When beginners exclaim in despair that "There is so much to learn!", it is 
not the variety of their own perceptions that is daunting, but the variety of distinctions 
that the connoisseur expects them to absorb—distinctions that do not yet correspond to 
any differences in their own experience. The expert may inform the beginner that there 
are so many different kinds of grape, or so many different genres of music; but these 
distinctions will be meaningless to the novice until she begins, through practice, to taste 
or hear these differences for herself. Indeed, the beginner is often skeptical of the expert's 
                                                                                                                                            
123 More precisely, mechanistic theories assume that the body's perceptions must be as determinate as the 
world that the scientist perceives; we will return to this point in the next chapter. 
124 One might go even further, and say that even a single wine yields a different flavor profile with every 
sip. 
 
3.4. Learning to perceive 
 
 185 
claims, suspecting that her many fine distinctions have no basis in reality. There is a 
scene in the film "The Devil Wears Prada" in which the editor of a fashion magazine is 
trying to decide which of two green belts to use in a photo shoot. "I don't know," she 
says, "they're just so different." The protagonist, who is new to the world of fashion, 
betrays her ignorance by laughing. To her, the belts look identical, and the editor seems 
pompous and ridiculous. To the expert, of course, it is the novice who seems ridiculous, 
for she cannot see what is right in front of her. In cases such as this, there is no way for 
the beginner to verify the expert's claims except by entering the expert's world and 
gaining some expertise for herself. 
I argued above that bodily movement is self-organizing, and that the purpose of 
the animal nervous system is to allow movement to regulate itself via perception. 
However, we could say with equal justification that it is the perceptual field that regulates 
itself via the body's movements. From this perspective, behavior and motor development 
appear as the self-organization of the perceptual field. Psychologists have long noted that 
the living body can perform the same task in a variety of ways: playing the same melody 
on a new instrument, or signing one's name with a different part of one's body.125 From 
the body's point of view, to carry out these tasks is to generate a certain pattern of 
perceptual feedback: I can play the same melody on a different instrument because I am 
listening to myself play; I can sign my name with my toes because I am watching myself 
write. The robust outcome of these various performances is not any particular sequence 
of movements, but the perceptual form that the movements produce. The body perceives 
                                                
125 "[H]abits acquired by one group of muscles can be transferred immediately to another: my handwriting 
on the blackboard resembles my handwriting on paper although the muscles concerned in each case are not 
the same" (SB 30/30). 
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in order to move; but it also moves in order to perceive. Gilchrist and colleagues report 
the remarkable case of a young woman, "AI", whose eye muscles have been paralyzed 
since birth (Gilchrist et al. 1997). We learned above that vision requires constant 
"saccadic" eye movement: we see by exploring the visual texture of the world with our 
eyes. Yet AI exhibited little or no visual impairment: she was able to read, write, and 
perform visually guided motor tasks. What Gilchrist and colleagues found was that AI 
saw by making saccadic movements with her head instead of with her eyes. Evidently, 
saccadic movement is a robust outcome of human motor development—not because 
saccadic eye movements are "hard-wired" in the brain, but because the body learns to 
move by seeing, which is to say by being attuned to visual differences in its environment. 
What is self-organizing in the development of vision is not the movement of the eyes per 
se, but rather the determinacy of the visual field: the body robustly discovers whatever 
patterns of movement will yield the most detailed and differentiated perceptions.126 
In a world constructed out of discrete parts, there can be no ambiguity or 
indeterminacy. But the world that the living body perceives is not built out of already-
determinate sensations. It is an ambiguous, indeterminate whole that grows more 
determinate over time as the organism learn to perceive differences within it. Thus the 
situation that the living body perceives and that its behavior is responding to will be more 
or less differentiated, depending on how familiar the body is with its situation and how 
skillful its sensorimotor habits are. The perceived world of the organism grows along 
with its body and behavior, and in the same way: through a cascade of symmetry-
breaking bifurcations. 
                                                
126 "[T]he eye always places itself in such a way that it receives the richest possible stimulations from the 
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that the living body's behavior, like its anatomy, is 
self-organizing—a form that arises dynamically through symmetry-breaking rather than 
being constructed out of discrete parts according to a plan. I have tried to show, contra 
mechanistic theories, that the living body's behavior is not determined in advance either 
by its nervous system or by its environment. In each case, I argued that the purported 
cause of behavior is also its effect. The nervous system is regulated by the body's 
movements, both in its real-time activity and in its growth over time. Similarly, the 
environment that the organism perceives, and to which its behavior responds, depends on 
the organism's own exploratory movements and grows over time along with them. It is 
the world that teaches the organism how to move—but a world that is only revealed to 
the organism by its own movements. Thus the organism and its world grow together 
dialectically, each driving the other to become more determinate through its own 
increasing determinacy. The self-organization of the living body is also the self-
organization of its perceived world.  
That which we call "the living body" is not a static thing made out of discrete 
parts, like a machine, but a self-organizing movement. Being, acting, and becoming are 
all one for the living body: what it is, what it does, and how it comes to be are one and the 
same. "Growth," "learning," and "behavior" are all names for this same movement; they 
designate not three different phenomena, but one self-organizing activity observed at 
three different time-scales. Thus they are each a valid answer to the question, "What is 
                                                                                                                                            
object looked at" (SB 36/36). 
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life?" or "What is a living body?" Because it is self-organizing, the movement of life is 
constantly generating new forms which are nowhere fully given in advance; life is a 
genuinely creative process whose outcomes are never completely pre-determined. This is 
not to say that they are arbitrary or unintelligible, but rather that life is the source of its 
own intelligibility: in searching for the causes of life, we have found that nothing external 
or indifferent to the organism can explain it. The living body is self-explanatory: not in 
the way of a tautology, but because it is the cause of itself, and can only be explained in 
terms of its own activity. This is not to say that the organism is self-contained; on the 
contrary, it can only be understood in relation to its situation, and to the whole history of 
situations it has lived through. However, these situations can themselves be understood 
only in relation to the organism that inhabits them. Thus our very definition of the 
organism must undergo a peculiar expansion, coming to encompass not only the body 
itself but the whole world as it is perceived by the body. What appeared to us initially as 
an object in our own world—a thing among things—turns out to be a whole world of its 
own.  
The world of the other appears within my own world without being reducible to 
it: it is neither completely alien nor completely familiar, neither perfectly transparent nor 
utterly opaque. The other appears as a point of view on the same world that I inhabit, 
which is nevertheless not perfectly convertible with my own. Thus my own perspective 
on the world is revealed to me as a limited point of view, which does not exhaust the 
reality onto which it opens. 
Up until now, we have taken up the perspective of the scientist who studies the 
living body from the outside, seeking a causal explanation for its anatomy and behavior. 
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However, this very study has now revealed the limitations of its own perspective, and 
indeed has carried us beyond them. Mechanistic theories seek the causes of behavior in 
the world that we, as scientists, perceive, assuming that this is "the real world." But we 
have discovered that the causes of the organism's behavior do not lie in the world that we 
perceive, but in the world that the organism perceives—a world that can only be revealed 
to us by its behavior. We have thus established the causal reality of meaning in nature: 
the world has a motor-perceptual significance for the living body, and its behavior can 
only be understood in terms of this significance. Moreover, this significance is not the 
same as that which things have for us as scientists. Thus our study of the living body has 
brought us to a point where we can no longer take our own perspective for granted. We 
are now forced to acknowledge that we ourselves are living bodies; that we are not 
outside of nature looking in; and that the scientist who studies behavior is one organism 
perceiving another. The natural world that we as scientists observe is revealed to us by 
our own sensorimotor habits. Thus the scientific project is a motor-perceptual project of a 
living body, and scientific progress is nothing other than the education of our powers of 
perception by nature. I will now conclude the present study by taking up this new 
perspective in earnest, in order to stake out the philosophical implications of the 
discoveries we have made in the last three chapters. 
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The problem that motivated the present study was the problem of meaning. Ever 
since Descartes, the question of the place of consciousness in nature has been understood 
as a question of whether and how it is possible for a machine to think. Contemporary 
theories of consciousness claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism by showing that 
machines can think, provided that thinking is understood as computation: the mechanical 
manipulation of symbols according to fixed rules. I argued in the Introduction that these 
theories take the meaningfulness of their symbols for granted. They confuse the meaning 
things have for us as scientific observers with the meaning they have for the systems 
(living or artificial) that we are observing. As a result, they fail to explain how symbols 
become meaningful in the first place. In order to explain the origin of meaning, I 
proposed that we return to the phenomenon of the living body. I claimed that a careful 
study of the living body would demonstrate that the problem of consciousness and nature 
has been poorly posed. The living body is not a machine; and as long as we continue to 
think of nature in terms drawn from human techne, we will never be able to understand 
how meaning arises in nature. 
In order to show that the living body is not a machine, I had to face two 
orthodoxies: atomism and Neo-Darwinism. Atomism is both a philosophical doctrine and 
a scientific research program, which holds that all apparently complex wholes can be 
reduced to (i.e. completely explained in terms of) their simple, indivisible parts. Neo-
Darwinism is the theory in biology that evolution by natural selection produces genetic 
blueprints or programs for building adult organisms. In Chapter One, I argued that both 
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of these dogmas collapse in the face of the phenomenon of development. According to 
atomism, nature is made of atoms in the same way that a machine is made of parts. The 
central problem for this view is the problem of form: how to explain the arrangement of 
these atoms into the complex wholes we find in nature? Who or what plays the role for 
nature that the human manufacturer plays for the artifact? Nowhere is this problem more 
acute than in the case of the living body, because of the astonishingly complex and 
harmonious arrangement of its many parts. Neo-Darwinism claims to resolve this 
problem by showing that the living body is a machine assembled according to a genetic 
blueprint or program, which is itself produced by the blind forces of natural selection. 
However, I argued that this theory is completely incapable of accounting for the facts of 
development, and has persisted only by ignoring them. No pre-established plan or 
program could explain the growth of the organism, for the organism has no builder whose 
synoptic view could guide its development. The living body, unlike the machine or 
artifact, is not synthesized out of pre-existing parts according to a pre-established plan; it 
grows by division, differentiating itself into parts that organize themselves into a 
harmonious whole without needing to be shaped from the outside by an intelligent 
designer. Thus the phenomenon of development calls into question atomism's definition 
of form as a shape imposed on passive matter, and calls for a new concept of form that is 
not drawn from human techne, but rather from nature itself. 
In search of this new concept of form, I turned in Chapter Two to the emerging 
science of complexity. There I discovered a novel account of form as asymmetry, which 
mathematicians define as variation under a transformation. We are accustomed to 
associating form and order with symmetry; however, it turns out that the most 
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symmetrical state is one of total formlessness or uniformity in space and time. Thus what 
we call form is not symmetry, but asymmetry—differences in space and changes in time. 
The human experience of order and form is that they take work to produce and maintain. 
Thus we are accustomed to thinking of form as a positive quantity that must be added to 
things, a shape that must be imposed on indifferent or even recalcitrant materials. The 
materials we build things out of are forever trying to go their own way: rusting, rotting, 
sprouting, eroding, and just generally falling apart. But what seems, from the point of 
view of human artifice, to be a breakdown of order is in fact nature's way of generating 
new forms. Form arises in nature through the loss or breakdown of spatial and temporal 
symmetries.127 
Atomism assumes that nature is linear, and that symmetry is conserved. To say 
that nature is linear is to say that causes and effects are additive: a change in one part of a 
system produces a proportional change in the system's global state, and the system's 
global behavior is a simple sum of the changes in each of its parts. A linear system's 
apparently complex behaviors can be decomposed into simple parts, each with its own 
discrete cause. Thus symmetry is conserved in linear systems: a symmetrical cause will 
have an equally symmetrical effect, and an asymmetrical effect must have an equally 
asymmetrical cause. It follows that the form of a system's behavior is always given in 
advance in its causes and conditions, just as the form of a human artifact is fully 
determined in advance by its design. Form, on this view, is like matter and energy: it can 
neither be created nor destroyed. Thus nature is entirely predictable, for it is incapable of 
generating anything truly new. 
                                                
127 See Bergson 2004 [1896], Ch. 2; see also the discussion of constraints in Morris 2004, Ch. 2. 
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For a long time, scientists assumed that we lived in a linear world. However, we 
now know that this is not the case. The second law of thermodynamics states that a 
closed system will always evolve toward thermal equilibrium—a state of total uniformity 
or maximum symmetry. However, in an open system that receives constant energy inputs 
from the outside—such as oil in a frying pan, the Earth bathed in the light of the Sun, or a 
living body that absorbs nutrients from its environment—the energy input can destabilize 
the system's initial, more symmetrical state. At this point, the slightest external 
disturbance or internal fluctuation will abruptly push it into a more stable, but less 
symmetrical state. Dynamic systems that exhibit these sorts of abrupt, qualitative changes 
are nonlinear: they do not respond proportionally to changes in their parts or parameters. 
Nonlinear systems can be extremely robust, maintaining the same stable behavior in the 
face of large external fluctuations; but they can also be extremely sensitive when 
destabilized, such that a tiny disturbance can shift the system from one behavior into 
another.  
These new concepts of form and morphogenesis allow us to pose the problem of 
embryogenesis in a new and fruitful way, and thus to resolve the paradox of 
development. Rather than asking how the complex form of the adult organism is 
assembled out of pre-existing parts, we can ask how the relatively symmetrical zygote 
becomes progressively less symmetrical over the course of its development. Nature does 
not synthesize: the living body grows not by addition, but by division. Cell division is a 
kind of paradigm of morphogenesis in general: the body grows by dividing itself into 
parts which become increasingly differentiated from one another in and through their 
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reciprocal regulation of one another's internal dynamics. Embryogenesis takes place 
through a cascade of symmetry-breaking events at multiple spatial and temporal scales. 
Development reliably generates viable organisms not because it is guided by a 
prospective view of this outcome, but because each stage of development—each 
symmetry-breaking event—is a stable, robust behavior of the stage that precedes it. 
The view that living bodies are machines has long shaped our understanding of 
animal and human behavior. The rise of Neo-Darwinism has brought with it a widespread 
genetic determinism: if our bodies are machines, then the functioning of these machines 
must be determined in advance by their genetic designs. My arguments against Neo-
Darwinism and its view of the living body as a machine also tell, a fortiori, against all 
mechanistic theories of behavior. Nevertheless, I chose in Chapter Three to examine 
these theories of behavior in detail, in order to refute them on their own terms. I argued 
that Behaviorism, Cognitivism, and Connectionism share a common view of the 
organism as a mechanical input-output device. These theories all attempt to explain 
behavior by breaking it down into a collection of discrete inputs and outputs, or causes 
and effects. Motor development, on this view, is a synthetic process in which discrete 
muscle contractions are assembled into progressively more complex wholes. The 
increasing adaptedness of behavior to the body's surroundings can only be understood as 
a process of association, in which experience conditions the body to associate certain 
sensory inputs with certain motor outputs. By studying the empirical details of motor 
development, I argued that the living body's behavior cannot be decomposed into 
independent parts, any more than its anatomy can. The effects of individual muscle 
contractions on gross bodily movement are not additive; the body's movements are more 
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asymmetrical than their causes. Thus the moving body, like the growing body, is a 
nonlinear dynamic system. Indeed, the movements of anatomical development cannot be 
distinguished absolutely from the gross bodily movements of behavior: growth, motor 
development, and behavior are one continuous movement seen at three different temporal 
scales. What the organism is (its body) and what it does (its behavior) cannot be 
separated. New behaviors grow like new organs: through a cascade of symmetry-
breaking events.  
Since behavior is nonlinear, it cannot be decomposed into a collection of discrete 
causes and effects: if movement is not a collection of discrete muscle contractions, then 
perception is not a collection of discrete stimuli. Indeed, the very distinction between 
perception and movement, input and output, breaks down: unlike a machine, which 
passively waits to be set into motion by outside forces, the living body is always already 
in movement; and it is this very movement that exposes the body's sense organs to its 
environment. Thus perception is equally cause and effect of movement: perception 
regulates movement and movement regulates perception—which is to say that behavior 
regulates itself through the sensory feedback it receives from its surroundings. This 
perceptual self-regulation of movement is only possible, however, if the body's 
environment is asymmetrical. A uniform environment produces no changes in the body's 
sense organs when the body moves. Thus perception takes place through the moving 
body's encounter with differences in its surroundings. Precisely which differences the 
body encounters, however, depends on the form of its own movements: the more subtle 
and differentiated the organism's movements are, the more subtle the differences it 
discovers will be. Learning to perceive is not a matter of synthesizing discrete sensations 
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into meaningful wholes, or associating them with discrete motor responses. Rather, it is a 
matter of differentiation: learning to perceive increasingly subtle differences in one's 
surroundings by moving in increasingly differentiated and responsive ways. It is the 
world that teaches the living body how to move—but a world that the body only 
encounters in and through its own movements. Thus development is a dialectical process 
in which the organism's behavior grows together with the situations it is responding to, 
each driving the other to become more complex, differentiated, and determinate.  
 
With the revelation that perception is the discovery of differences in the body's 
environment, we have come full circle. I argued in Chapter Two that nature is not 
composed of atoms, but of differences; and that the real project of science is not to 
explain how nature is put together of out pre-existing parts, but to explain why there is 
difference rather than indifference: why things are different in one place than another, 
and why things are different now than they were before. We have now discovered that 
perception is precisely the discovery of differences in nature, or asymmetries in our 
surroundings. The definition of asymmetry that I offered in Chapter Two—variation 
under a transformation—was a mathematician's definition, and therefore an abstract one: 
it said nothing about how to discover which of the infinite possible transformations would 
reveal a particular system's asymmetries. But we have now discovered the roots of this 
abstract definition in embodied perception: bodily movements are the original 
"transformations," which discover asymmetries in the body's surroundings by producing 
"variations" in its own sense organs. In speaking of asymmetries or differences, then, we 
have always already installed ourselves at the level of perception. We cannot conceive of 
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a difference in nature except by reference (implicit or explicit) to a bodily movement that 
would reveal this difference.128 This is not to say that the living body creates the 
differences it discovers in nature; on the contrary, as we have seen, it is nature's self-
differentiation that creates the living body. However, it is to say that we cannot give an 
account of nature that is not an embodied account, that does not take up the point of view 
of a moving body situated within the nature it describes. 
This may seem like a disappointing or even a skeptical conclusion. In saying that 
we can only know nature from our own finite perspective, are we not admitting that we 
cannot know nature at all? We have become accustomed to atomism's promise of a "view 
from nowhere"—a non-perspectival account of the natural world. But in fact, atomism 
takes up a very particular perspective on reality: that of a creator contemplating her 
creation. Though it long ago ceased to appeal to God as an explicit hypothesis, atomistic 
science continues to appeal implicitly to a God's-eye-view of the cosmos. It thus remains 
"metaphysical" in the Heideggerian sense: the truth of this world lies elsewhere; we can 
understand nature only by transcending it. Atomism claims to strip nature of all 
anthropological predicates in order to arrive at an account of reality as it exists "in itself." 
But in fact, nothing could be more anthropological than this way of describing nature as 
if human beings had manufactured it. The meaning of a manufactured thing lies not in the 
thing itself, but in the mind of its creator. The parts of an artifact are strictly indifferent to 
one another; it is only in the human mind that these parts are constituted as a unified 
whole. If nature is an artifact—a blind mechanism, atoms in a void—then it has no 
                                                
128 In this sense, Merleau-Ponty is right to say that physical form is "conceivable only as an object of 
perception" (SB 144/156). 
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meaning of its own. The meaningful wholes that we perceive in nature are our own 
projections, products of the mind's synthetic activity. Thus materialism turns into its 
supposed opposite: idealism is simply a self-conscious atomism that has made its own 
standpoint explicit. The idea of a constituting consciousness for whom all of nature 
would be a single, transparent idea is a direct corollary of the view that nature is a 
machine. If there is no room for consciousness within Descartes' view of nature, that is 
only because Descartes' nature is already an idea for a pure consciousness. The Cartesian 
mind is no less mechanical than the Cartesian body; they arise from the same ontology, 
and neither can exist without the other. Thus materialism is not a true monism, but only a 
half-hearted dualism; it can only be maintained so long as the scientist's own perspective 
remains implicit, taken for granted. As soon as this perspective becomes explicit, we find 
ourselves inexorably committed to a transcendental idealism. But this idealism is no less 
mechanistic than the materialism it replaces. The transcendental turn cannot consist in 
this move from materialism to idealism, which really changes nothing. It can only consist 
in a rejection of the ontology that underlies this false choice. 
A nature that can only be known from the outside cannot truly be known at all, 
but only mastered and controlled. It has no meaning of its own, and so it can only have a 
meaning imposed upon it. To reject this ontology is to affirm that nature has its own 
endogenous meaning which is not constituted by consciousness. It is precisely this 
nascent meaning that we have discovered in the phenomenon of form. Form is neither 
thing nor idea, neither atom nor artifact. It cannot be known by a disembodied mind, but 
only perceived by a living body. The perception of form is not a matter of representation; 
it is not a question of duplicating nature's forms within a consciousness. Perception arises 
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within nature, through nature's own self-differentiation into an inside and an outside, a 
living body and its environment, perceiver and perceived. Nature is a creative power, a 
continuous process of morphogenesis; it is a whole that complicates itself of its own 
accord into different parts or regions, creating form out of uniformity, difference out of 
indifference. The appearance of life in nature was a fundamental ontological mutation, a 
singular event in the history of form. In the behavior of the living body, we witness form 
folding back upon itself to generate a new kind of form, which I have called motor-
perceptual significance. Behavior is a natural form that develops in and through its 
encounters with other natural forms—a whole whose asymmetries reflect the history of 
these encounters, and thus is oriented toward a future. The world has a significance for 
the organism which is not an idea, but a developed way of responding differentially to 
differences in the world. Thus behavior is a form that points beyond itself to a meaningful 
world. The organism's behavior reveals to us the differences that have come to make a 
difference to it—differences that we may never have perceived before. 
We deliberately began our investigation from the point of view of the scientist, for 
whom the living body is just another natural phenomenon—albeit an especially complex 
one—that calls for scientific explanation. However, this phenomenon has now turned our 
investigation inside out. Our study of the living body has compelled us to make a 
transcendental turn: to recognize that we cannot simply study this natural phenomenon 
from the outside. We began by assuming, naturally enough, that the world we perceive is 
"the real world," and that the causes of behavior must be found in this world. What we 
discovered, however, is that behavior can only be understood as a response to differences 
that it itself reveals—differences that may be entirely new to us. Thus the phenomenon of 
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the living body reveals the limited and perspectival character of our own scientific 
standpoint. We ourselves are living bodies; the scientist who studies perception and 
behavior is one organism perceiving another. This means that the results of our 
investigations rebound upon us as investigators. We can no longer take our own 
perspective for granted; we must explain not only the behavior and perception of the 
other, but also our own perception of this behavior. That is, we must explain how the 
meaning of one organism's behavior can be perceived by another. 
We could have avoided a great deal of trouble by simply pointing this out at the 
outset, and thus beginning with the question of how life appears to life. But we would not 
then have encountered the problem of form, or the paradox of development. We would 
not have discovered the extent to which our understanding of life and nature is 
impregnated with artifice. And we would not have been compelled to search for a new 
account of form which was not drawn from human techne.129 Moreover, had we simply 
begun from the point of view at which we have now arrived with such difficulty, we 
would have had to place ourselves in opposition to the scientific point of view, arguing 
on a priori grounds that the living body challenges or escapes the scientist's "naturalistic 
attitude", and that the scientist is "naïve" because she takes her own point of view for 
granted. Such arguments have little purchase in scientific discourse. They criticize 
science from the outside, juxtaposing the philosophical attitude against that of the 
                                                
129 "The object of the preceding chapters was not only to establish that behavior is irreducible to its alleged 
parts. If we had had nothing other in view, instead of this long inductive research—which can never even 
be finished, since behaviorism can always invent other mechanical models with regard to which the 
discussion will have to be recommenced—a moment of reflection would have provided us with a certitude 
in principle. …But by following this short route we would have missed the essential feature of the 
phenomenon, the paradox which is constitutive of it: behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea. It is 
not the envelope of a pure consciousness and, as the witness of behavior, I am not a pure consciousness. It 
is precisely this which we wanted to say in stating that behavior is a form." (SB 127/138) 
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scientist; thus they cannot hope to persuade the scientist, and do not offer her any 
resources for pursuing her own projects in a different way. By beginning from within the 
universe of science, we have been able to criticize it on its own terms. We have 
discovered that the transcendental turn—the move from consciousness to self-
consciousness—does not need to be imposed on science from without, but arises within 
the scientific project as an internal necessity. And we have seen, moreover, that what this 
turn requires is not simply a change in attitude, but a change in ontology. Without this 
ontological mutation, our purportedly transcendental philosophy will remain infected 
with artificial concepts. Thus we began from the scientific perspective not only to 
criticize it, but also to learn from it what nature is, what life is, and what we are. Self-
consciousness cannot be achieved all at once, or once and for all. The only legitimately 
transcendental philosophy is the phenomenological one: the empirical, dialectical 
investigation that allows itself to be called into question by its own results, even to the 
point of starting all over again. 
If nature is a creative power, then it can never be known once and for all. The 
scientific project can never be completed, because nature is always changing, always 
becoming something new. We would have to give up the dream of mastering and 
controlling nature; but what we gain in return is the possibility of actually knowing 
nature, of learning new things and being transformed by this knowledge. The scientist 
who seeks a causal explanation for the complex forms she observes in nature is engaged 
in a perceptual project. Her goal is to discover which differences make a difference to the 
phenomenon she is studying; but this will often mean learning to perceive differences 
that had been invisible to her, and to ignore differences that had seemed to be of great 
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significance. The goal of science is not to discover the real world behind the world that 
we perceive, but to allow nature to educate our powers of perception, so that we may 
perceive the natural world in more determinate and insightful ways. This is precisely 
what atomism fails to do: it has decided in advance how nature is to be divided, in terms 
that are drawn from human techne rather than from the observation of nature itself. It is 
thus a perceptual stance that refuses to be educated by the world that it perceives. 
If I am myself a living body, then what does it mean for me to study the behavior 
of another organism? How is it possible for me perceive another perceiving, to see the 
world through another's eyes? How can the world of the other appear within my own? If 
perception were a mental representation, then the perceptions of the other would be 
forever hidden from my gaze, which sees only the movements of the other's body. But we 
now know that perception is nothing but the body's way of moving and exploring its 
environment. Thus perception does not take place within a private mental realm, but 
publically in the world. This is not to say that the meaning of the other's movements is 
immediately apparent to me; it is neither completely transparent nor completely opaque. 
To understand the behavior of another takes work. I can learn to perceive the world 
through another's eyes—but only by allowing the behavior of the other to teach me how 
to move and perceive in a new way. 
In fact, this is precisely how we learn to move and perceive in the first place: the 
first objects of perception for the human infant are not inanimate objects, but other 
human beings. The infant's powers of mobility—and thus its capacity to explore its 
environment—are at first extremely limited. The most responsive parts of the infant's 
surroundings are its caregivers, who respond to the infant's cries and facial movements 
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with sounds and facial movements of their own. Thus newborns are primarily interested 
in the faces of others, and only become interested in inanimate things around 4-6 months 
of age (Poulin-Dubois 1999). The adult is a kind of first prosthesis for the infant, 
providing her with the kind of rich and responsive sensory feedback that the rest of her 
environment cannot yet offer. As the child grows, her caregivers continue to act as 
prostheses, responding to her cries with food and physical contact, helping her to explore 
her surroundings, interpreting her desires and attempting to fulfill them. Thus human 
beings learn to move and perceive through our relations to others, who "scaffold" our 
behaviors and interpret the meaning of our gestures. Through the child's relation to the 
other, the meaning of her behavior can shape the development of that behavior, long 
before it has a meaning for the child herself. The child's relation to her adult caregivers is 
thus a kind of pre-reflective reflection, prior to the child's learning to reflect on the 
meaning of her own actions. 
The child does not initially encounter the other as a problem, as a challenge to her 
own point of view; indeed, she does not encounter the other as an other at all, but as an 
object of perception, a prosthesis, an extension of her own body. It takes around 9 months 
for the typical child to become aware of the perspectives of others on inanimate things. 
Until the age of four, most children are incapable of recognizing that other people may 
not know everything that they themselves know (Poulin-Dubois 1999). To construe the 
child as a self in relation to others and a mind in relation to its own body would be to 
confuse once again the meaning things have for us as observers with the meaning things 
have for the child, and thus to foreclose any possibility of understanding how things come 
to have the meanings for us that they do. The problem of consciousness is precisely to 
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understand how the living body becomes a self-conscious self; how the anonymous, pre-
reflective relation between the living body and its surroundings can differentiate itself 
into self and other, mind and body. 
The problems of consciousness and symbolic meaning with which we began have 
not been answered; we have only learned to pose them in a better way. Rather than 
asking how a machine can think, or how a disembodied mind can synthesize an objective 
world out of disconnected sensations, we can now ask how nature becomes conscious of 
itself, how it differentiates itself into knower and known. By studying the development of 
the living body, we have borne witness to nature's division into perceiver and perceived. 
In perception, form is folded back upon itself, giving rise to a new kind of motor-
perceptual significance. Symbolic meaning must arise, in a parallel way, from the folding 
back of behavior upon itself in reflection: behavior that thematizes its own motor-
perceptual significance. A self-conscious self is not a disembodied mind, but a body for 
whom the meaning of its own behavior has become an issue. Consciousness, on this 
view, is itself a form of behavior: not something we have, but something we do. Thus we 
ought to be able to study it in the same way we that we studied anatomy and behavior: by 
observing its development. If we follow the gradual development of a single cell into an 
adult self, we may be able to observe the cascade of symmetry-breaking bifurcations that 
give rise to subjectivity, and thus catch life in the act of becoming conscious. 
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APPENDIX A. 
Dynamic systems theory: 
A different kind of scientific model 
 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to offer an introduction to the basic concepts and 
approach of dynamic systems theory (DST), for the reader who wants more mathematical 
detail than Chapter Two provides. We will begin by looking at the origins of DST in 
classical physics. Then we will study some of the basic concepts of DST. Finally, I will 
develop the implications of these concepts for the present project. 
 
1. Origins of Dynamic Systems Theory 
Modern science is characterized by its method of constructing ideal models of 
natural phenomena on the basis of experiment. These models are typically expressed in 
the language of mathematics. The natural phenomenon is reduced to a set of variables 
which together describe the state of the phenomenon at a given time; the model consists 
of a mathematical description of how these different variables depend on one another, i.e. 
how they vary with respect to one another. The purpose of experiment is to determine 
these quantitative relationships by varying a single aspect of the phenomenon 
(corresponding to a single variable in the model) in a controlled way, and measuring the 
effect of this variation on other aspects of the phenomenon (represented by other 
variables). Of special interest to Modern science are models that describe the dynamics of 
a phenomenon, i.e. how it changes over time.  
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The first great mathematical model of a natural phenomenon was the pre-Modern 
Ptolemaic model of the solar system, which could successfully predict the positions of the 
celestial bodies with great accuracy. Astronomy, however, does not permit experiments, 
but only observations. The first truly Modern scientific model— which could justifiably 
be said to have inaugurated Modern science—was Galileo's mathematical model of free 
fall (Galileo 1638/2000). In order to familiarize ourselves with the practice of modeling, 
let us construct a mathematical model of a small body falling freely near the surface of 
the Earth.130 To keep this model simple we will neglect air friction and assume that the 
body is only moving in one dimension (straight down).131 
The first step is to choose variables that describe the relevant features of the 
natural phenomenon. In this case, we are interested in how the falling body moves over 
time. We can describe this in terms of three variables: the distance (x) travelled by the 
falling body; the speed (s) at which it is falling; and its acceleration (a), the rate at which 
its speed is increasing or decreasing. Now, we are interested in how these variables 
change over time, or the dynamics of the system, so we will need a fourth variable t 
which represents the time elapsed since the start of the body's fall. What Galileo 
discovered, by careful experiment, is that the vertical distance travelled by a falling body 
is proportional to the square of the time elapsed. In algebraic terms, this relationship can 
be expressed as 
                                                
130 Galileo's mathematical methods are of considerable interest: the tools of algebra and calculus were not 
yet available; instead, Galileo proceeds by geometrical proofs, relying heavily on the ancient theory of 
proportion. For simplicity of exposition, however, I will present a model of free fall in modern algebraic 
terms. 
131 In what follows, I have tried not to assume any mathematical knowledge on the part of the reader 
beyond basic algebra. We will need to employ one concept from calculus, that of the derivative; but all the 
reader needs to know is that a derivative represents the rate of change of one variable with respect to 
another. Most of the derivatives we will encounter will represent rates of change with respect to time. 
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(1) x = kt2 
where k is a constant whose value has been determined experimentally to be 
approximately 5 m/s2. This equation states that the distance (in meters) travelled by a 
falling body near the Earth's surface is equal to the square of the time elapsed (in 
seconds) multiplied by five. We can plot this equation on a graph, showing how the 
position of the falling body varies over time. (Since x measures displacement from some 
initial position, I have chosen an arbitrary initial height of 500 m and plotted the height 
(h) of the body versus time.) 
 
 
It can be shown mathematically, on the basis of this relationship between distance 
and time, that the speed of the falling body is proportional to the time elapsed, or  
(2) s = gt 
where g is a constant whose value is approximately 10 m/s2.132 
                                                
132 Using basic calculus, it is easy to show that the speed s, which is the rate of change of x with respect to t, 
is dx/dt = 2kt. 
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And it can also be shown that the acceleration of the falling body is constant. In fact, it is 
equal to the constant g: 
(3) a = g ≈ 10 m/s2 
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(One of the surprising results of Galileo's investigations was that this constant rate of 
acceleration is the same for all falling bodies near the Earth's surface, regardless of their 
mass.133)  
Equations (1)-(3) describe how our three variables (distance, speed, and 
acceleration) vary as functions of time. (If we wanted to know how speed varies as a 
function of distance, or any other such combination, this could be found with a bit of 
simple algebra.) These equations can be expressed as a system of differential equations: a 
set of equations describing a function and its derivatives (rates of change) of various 
orders. In this case, distance (x) is a function of time; speed (s) is the derivative or rate of 
change of x with respect to time; and acceleration (a) is the rate of change of s with 
respect to time, or the second-order derivative (the rate of change of the rate of change) 
of x. In modern calculus notation, we can express these relationships as follows: 
(4) s = dx/dt = x' 
(5) a = ds/dt = d2x/dt2 = x'' 
(Reading the final symbol in equation (4) as "x-prime" and the final symbol in (5) as "x-
double-prime.") We have just constructed a simple model of a falling body as a dynamic 
system.134  
 
Isaac Newton's great achievement was to see the parallel between the small body 
falling freely near the Earth's surface and the orbit of the Earth around the Sun, and to 
                                                
133 To be precise and to avoid anachronism, we should note that Galileo did not have any concept of 
"mass"—he would have used the term "weight." 
134 Note the ambiguity in the term "system" here: it can refer either to the physical phenomenon being 
modeled, or (as in this case) to the model itself, (the "system" of differential equations). We must be careful 
not to confuse the two. 
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unite these two apparently disparate phenomena under the single concept of gravity. 
Newton showed that if we lift the small body up above the Earth's atmosphere (to avoid 
the drag of air friction), and give it a sufficient horizontal velocity, its free fall will take it 
in a stable orbit around the Earth. Thus vertical free fall near the Earth's surface and the 
orbit of one body around another are two particular cases of a more general phenomenon, 
the gravitational attraction between two bodies. Newton's model of this attraction is 
captured in the following equation: 
(7) F = Gm1m2 / r2 
where m1 represents the mass of the first body, m2 the mass of the second, r the distance 
between their respective centers of mass, G the gravitational constant (determined by 
experiment to be approximately 6.7×10−11 N m2/kg2), and F the force of attraction acting 
on each body.135 This equation states that every particle in the universe attracts every 
other particle with a force that is proportional to both their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them. In order to model the movement 
of two bodies that are attracted to each other gravitationally, we need to combine 
equation (7) with Newton's Second Law of Motion, 
(8) a = F / m 
which states that the acceleration produced by a force acting on a body is proportional to 
the magnitude of the force and inversely proportional to the body's mass. From these two 
equations together we can deduce Galileo's model of free fall, as well as Kepler's 
(empirically verified) model of planetary orbits around the Sun. The model of planetary 
                                                
135 In fact there are two equal and opposite forces at work, F1 and F2, each acting on one of the two bodies 
in the direction of the other, and both of magnitude F. 
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motion is more complex than our model of free fall near the Earth's surface, since it 
involves the movement of two bodies in two dimensions, rather than one body in one 
dimension.136 However, it has the same basic form, in that the positions, velocities and 
accelerations of each body can be represented as functions of time. 
It is easy to see how Newton's accomplishment led to Laplace's view of a 
mechanistic universe (1814/1951):  
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by 
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as 
the past, would be present to its eyes. (p. 4, translation modified) 
 
The Newtonian model made it possible to find the positions, velocities, and accelerations 
of two point-masses at any time in the future or past, given their present state. Laplace 
was simply generalizing from Newton's model of a two-body system to nature as a 
whole, conceived of as a system of many mass-points. Laplace takes a purely additive 
view of nature: he is imagining the cosmos as a simple sum of some vast number of two-
body systems, each of which can be understood in isolation. Force in Newton's model is 
additive: to find the total gravitational forces acting on any given body in a system of n 
bodies, one can simply add up the gravitational force contributed by every other body in 
the system (according to equation (7)). Having found the total force acting on the body, 
one can find its acceleration using equation (8); and from this, it would seem, one ought 
to be able to predict the future position of the body. 
                                                
136 The motion of the two bodies with respect to each other always takes place in a plane, and so can be 
treated as two dimensional. 
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In one of the great surprises of Modern science, this turned out not to be the case. 
Laplace's assumption that Newton's solution of the two-body problem could be extended 
to systems of n bodies proved to be false—and not only for high values of n. On the 
contrary, we now know that systems of just three bodies exhibit complexities of an 
entirely different order than two-body systems. As a result, it is impossible to "solve" the 
three-body problem, i.e. to find equations for all the variables of the system as functions 
of time, which would make the system entirely predictable. This surprising result was 
proved by the great French mathematician Henri Poincaré in 1890. This discovery 
spurred him to invent the new mathematical methods which form the core of what is now 
called dynamic systems theory. We now know that the difficulties presented by the three-
body problem are not unique. On the contrary, the vast majority of dynamic systems (i.e. 
systems of differential equations with time as the independent variable) cannot be solved 
as functions of time.137 It may be hard to imagine how this can be the case on the basis of 
our simple falling-body example, so let's look at another model which exhibits more 
complex behavior. One might think that the way to make a system more complex would 
be to add more variables. However, we will see that it is not the number of variables that 
determines whether a dynamic system can be solved for time—rather, it is the way these 
variables are related to one another. 
 
Imagine that the falling body we discussed above is hanging from a spring. Now 
in addition to the force of gravity, the falling body is also subject to a force in the 
opposite direction, whose magnitude depends on how far the spring has been stretched. 
                                                
137 More generally, we can say that only a small subset of differential equations have a closed-form or 
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So instead of a system in which acceleration is constant, as in the free-fall case, we now 
have a system in which the body's acceleration depends on its position. The number of 
variables we need to describe this system remains the same, but our description is 
nevertheless more complex, because of the way these variables are interrelated: the 
position x is changing at rate v (for velocity), which is itself changing at rate a 
(acceleration), which is in turn changing according to x. We thus have a circular or auto-
regulatory system, a feedback loop which can be described by the following differential 
equation: 
(9) ma + kx = 0 
where m represents the mass of the body, a the acceleration, k the spring constant (which 
measures the spring's resistance to being stretched or compressed), and x the 
displacement of the body from the system's equilibrium point (the point where the force 
of gravity and the resistance of the spring are in balance). This equation can also be 
rewritten (through simple algebraic manipulation) as 
(10) a = v' = x'' = – (k / m)x 
Notice that time does not appear explicitly in this equation; it is present only implicitly, 
in the fact that a = v' = dv/dt, i.e. that a represents the rate of change of v with respect to 
time. We would like to be able to express a, v, and x as functions of the independent 
variable t, so as to be able to find the state of the system at any given time. But it is not 
immediately obvious how to do that; all we know about the system is how a varies as a 
function of x.  
                                                                                                                                            
analytical solution. 
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As it happens, this dynamic system can be solved analytically.138 It belongs to a 
class of systems known as linear differential equations, which all have analytical 
solutions. However, most systems of differential equations are nonlinear ones, which can 
almost never be solved analytically; and most of the phenomena we encounter in nature 
can only be modeled by nonlinear equations. Strogatz (1994, pp. 8-9) explains the 
difference this way: 
Why are nonlinear systems so much harder to analyze than linear ones? The 
essential difference is that linear systems can be broken down into parts. Then 
each part can be solved separately and finally recombined to get the answer. This 
idea allows a fantastic simplification of complex problems, and underlies such 
methods as normal modes, Laplace transforms, superposition arguments, and 
Fourier analysis. In this sense, a linear system is precisely equal to the sum of its 
parts. But many things in nature don't act this way. Whenever parts of a system 
interfere, or cooperate, or compete, there are nonlinear interactions going on.  
 
Although most nonlinear systems cannot be solved analytically, they can be simulated 
using methods of numerical approximation. The simulation begins with some set of 
initial conditions, and uses the differential equations of the model (which give the 
instantaneous rates of change for the system's variables) to calculate the approximate 
state of the system a short time later. (These values will be only approximate because the 
simulation cannot take into account how the system's rates of change have themselves 
changed over this short span of time.) The new system state can then be plugged back 
into the differential equations to make another short step forward in time. This process 
can be repeated indefinitely. However, the further forward in time the simulation goes, 
the less accurate its predictions will be, because the error in each approximation is 
compounded in the next one. 
                                                
138 The general solution for x in terms of t is x = x0cos(ωt) + ωv0sin(ωt), where x0 and v0 are the initial 
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Predicting the future of nonlinear dynamic systems is made even more difficult by 
their sensitivity to initial conditions, (a phenomenon made famous under the name of 
"Chaos Theory"). In a linear system, a small change in the system's initial conditions 
produces a proportionally small change in the state of the system at some future time. In 
nonlinear systems, on the other hand, a small change in the system's initial conditions can 
set the system onto a very different path, resulting in a disproportionately large change in 
the future state of the system. (This is the phenomenon captured by the famous image of 
a butterfly flapping its wings and causing a hurricane on the other side of the planet.) 
This sensitivity to initial conditions has important implications for our practice of 
modeling natural phenomena mathematically. Our mathematical models never describe 
the world precisely; they are always approximations. We generally assume that the 
approximate nature of our measurements is not a problem, since a small error in our 
approximations will produce only a small error in our results or predictions. If this error 
turns out to be too large, we can always go back and try to make our initial measurements 
more precise. However, this assumption only holds for linear systems. In a nonlinear 
system, a small error in our initial measurements may produce a disproportionately large 
error in our predictions. What's more, this problem may not be ameliorated by going back 
and making the initial measurements more precise; an increase in the precision of our 
initial measurements is not guaranteed to produce a proportional increase in the accuracy 
of the model's predictions. 
The mechanical understanding of nature gained widespread acceptance in no 
small part because of the success of Newton and his successors in modeling natural 
                                                                                                                                            
position and velocity of the body, and ω = (k / m)2. 
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phenomena as linear dynamic systems. It was not until Poincaré's pioneering work near 
the end of the 19th C. that scientists began to realize the limitations of this approach, and 
to develop new concepts and techniques for understanding nonlinear systems. We now 
turn to a study of these concepts. 
 
2. Basic concepts of Dynamic Systems Theory 
Faced with the impossibility of finding an analytical or quantitative solution to 
the three-body problem in astrophysics, Poincaré pioneered a new, qualitative approach 
to the study of nonlinear differential equations (Hirsch 1984, 18). To see how this 
approach works, let's return to our model above of a mass hanging from a spring, its 
motion described by the equation 
(11) a = – (k / m)x 
We saw that this equation can be solved analytically in terms of t; but that does not mean 
that we cannot apply Poincaré's qualitative methods to it. Indeed, the reader may find that 
these methods offer more insight into the system than does the analytical solution given 
above. We would like to be able to visualize the motion of the body through space; but 
we have no way of doing this, since we do not know how its position varies with respect 
to time. All we know about this system is the relation between the acceleration of the 
body and its position. Is there some way to use this information to visualize the dynamics 
of the system?  
Doing so requires a difficult conceptual shift, one which is absolutely central to 
dynamic systems theory. We must move from modeling the motion of bodies in space to 
modeling changes in the state of the system as a kind of "motion" through "state space" 
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(also known as "phase space"). Instead of the familiar spatial dimensions of height, 
breadth, and depth, we can treat each of the system's variables as a dimension. These 
dimensions together constitute a space of all possible system states, and each point in this 
space represents one such state (i.e. one determinate value for each of the variables that 
describe the system). This conceptual move will allow us to apply to the dynamics of the 
system all of the geometrical tools developed for modeling the motions of bodies in 
space. 
In this case, we can think of our system as having two "dimensions": position (x) 
and velocity (v). The state space of this system can then be visualized as a plane with two 
axes, and the dynamics of the system can be plotted as a movement in this plane, much as 
we plotted the movement of a falling body above in the x vs. t plane. 
 
 
But how can we plot the relation between x and v? We do not have an equation that 
expresses v in terms of x. But we do know something about the rates of change of v and 
x. The velocity v is itself the rate of change of the position x, by definition. And the rate 
of change of v is the acceleration a, whose relation to x is given by equation (11) above. 
In algebraic terms, 
(12) x' = v 
(13) v' = – (k / m)x 
APPENDIX A 
 218 
These equations allow us to plot a vector field on the xv plane, which indicates, for any 
point on the plane, what direction (in state space) the system is moving in, and how 
quickly. (Recall that movement in the state space represents a change in the state of the 
system.) 
 
 
At the origin, where x and v are both equal to 0, x' = 0 (by equation (12)) and v' = 
0 (by equation (13)). Along the x-axis, where v = 0, x' = v = 0, while v' is negative for 
positive x and positive for negative x (because of the minus sign in equation (13)). Thus 
the vectors along the x-axis point straight up when x is negative and straight down when x 
is positive, and they get longer as x gets larger in magnitude. Along the v-axis, where x = 
0, v' = 0 and x' = v. Thus the vectors point horizontally to the right where v is positive, 
and left where v is negative, with the size of the vectors increasing as v increases in 
magnitude. To find the vector at any other point in the field, simply find the vector on the 
v-axis corresponding to the point's v-value, do the same thing on the x-axis for the point's 
x-value, and add these two vectors together. Doing this will yield the plot shown above. 
This vector field gives us a way of visualizing the dynamics of our system. For 
any point on the plane, representing an initial position and velocity, this field will 
produce a trajectory in state space, a set of states that the system will pass through over 
time. You can think of the vector field as a fluid, and its trajectories as steadily flowing 
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currents; an imaginary particle placed anywhere in this field will be carried along by 
these currents. The trajectories of our vector field look like this: 
 
 
This is called the phase portrait of the system: it gives an overall picture of the 
various trajectories possible in this system. The phase portrait does not allow us to predict 
the state of the system at a given time, the way a quantitative solution would; but it does 
reveal certain qualitative features of the system's dynamic. The origin (the point {0,0}) is 
special: a particle placed here will remain motionless. This is called a fixed point. A 
particle placed anywhere else will circulate around the origin, eventually returning to 
where it began. Such cyclical or periodic trajectories are called closed orbits. 
What does this phase portrait tell us about the physical system of a mass hanging 
from a spring? The fixed point at the origin corresponds to static equilibrium of the 
system: if the mass begins at rest (v = 0) in its equilibrium position (x = 0), then it will not 
move from this position. The closed orbits correspond to periodic motions or oscillations 
of the hanging body. (Indeed, this system is what physicists call a simple harmonic 
oscillator.) We can see from the phase portrait that the velocity of the oscillating body is 
0 where the body reaches its maximum displacement in either direction; this is where the 
body is about to change direction. And we can also see that it reaches its maximum 
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velocity when x = 0, i.e. when the body is passing through the spring's equilibrium point, 
which is also the mid-point of the oscillation.139 
 
 
Notice that the phase portrait does not merely show us a single trajectory of the 
system, but all possible trajectories. Each of these trajectories corresponds to a certain set 
of initial conditions of the system. For any initial x and v, the phase space gives a 
particular trajectory describing the path the system will follow, starting from that initial 
state. Thus it allows us to study the dynamics of the system, not as a function of time, but 
as a function of its initial conditions.140 This allows us to answer qualitative questions 
                                                
139 If we were to plot the movement of this oscillating mass in terms of position over time (using the 
analytic solution to the differential equation) we would see that it forms a sinusoidal wave. 
140 "[E]arlier analysts, with few exceptions, had studied individual solutions in isolation. It was Poincaré 
who systematically studied the mutual relations between all the solutions. In particular, … he made the 
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about the stability of the system: Are all of its trajectories periodic, (i.e. do they trace out 
the same path over and over)? How will a trajectory be affected by small changes to its 
initial conditions?141 We can see from this system's phase portrait that all of its 
trajectories are periodic, outside of the fixed point at the origin. However, none of these 
trajectories—including the fixed point—are stable: any random fluctuation or small 
change in the state of the system will shift the system out of one trajectory and into 
another. In physical terms, this means that if some external force acts on the oscillating 
mass—increasing or decreasing its velocity, say—it will be "knocked" into a new 
oscillation with a different amplitude and maximum velocity.  
The question of stability under small fluctuations is crucial in modeling natural 
phenomena, for two reasons. One is that the systems we are modeling are never 
completely isolated—there are always external forces acting on the system and 
introducing small perturbations. Thus the question of how the system's different 
trajectories respond to fluctuations is of great importance in making realistic qualitative 
predictions about the system's behavior. Second, as we noted above, our measurements of 
a system's initial conditions are always approximate. Thus, when it comes to making 
quantitative predictions (using simulations), it is important to know how sensitive a given 
trajectory is to small differences in its initial conditions. This lets us know when a small 
                                                                                                                                            
crucial innovation of considering the value of [the] unknown not as a function of the independent variable 
(time, in dynamics), but as a function of the initial conditions" (Hirsch 1984). 
141 Questions about the stability of the solar system motivated Poincaré's original development of these 
methods. "If there is only one planet and the sun, then Newton's equations of motion are easy to solve 
explicitly; the orbits are the Keplerian ellipses, and all questions are easily answered. When there are two or 
more planets the situation is quite obscure. Very little is known about such questions as these: will two of 
the planets ever collide? Do the mutual distances stay bounded away from zero and infinity? Is it probable 
that a planet can escape to infinity, or be captured from infinity? If we slightly alter the mass of a planet, 
how does that change the trajectories?" (Hirsch 1984, 20). 
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error in our initial measurements may result in a large discrepancy between our 
predictions and the system's future state. 
The concept of stability will be more clear if we consider a further example. We 
have been pretending, for simplicity's sake, that our mass hanging from a spring is not 
subject to friction. But now let us modify our model to take friction into account, turning 
it from a simple harmonic oscillator into a damped oscillator.142 This new model has the 
following phase portrait: 
 
Once again, the origin (0,0) is a fixed point. In this model, however, instead of all 
the trajectories being closed orbits circulating around the origin, they now spiral down 
into the origin. In physical terms, this means that no matter what velocity and amplitude 
the oscillating body starts with, these oscillations will get smaller and smaller until the 
                                                
142 We can do this by assuming that the force of friction acting on the hanging body is proportional to its 
velocity. Friction acts as a drag force, reducing the body's acceleration. Thus equation (11) above becomes 
a = – (k / m)x – hv, where h is some constant coefficient. Equations (12) and (13) then become x' = v, v' = – 
(k / m)x – hv. Whereas the frictionless system is described by a differential equation of the general form ax'' 
+ bx = 0, the frictional system's equation introduces a first-order derivative term, and has the form ax'' + 
bx' + x = 0. 
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mass eventually settles down to rest at the static equilibrium point x = 0. In the previous 
system, the fixed point at the origin was unstable: any little fluctuation would set the 
hanging mass into motion, and this motion would continue forever unless some later 
fluctuation cancelled it out. In the damped oscillator, on the other hand, the fixed point at 
the origin is stable: if some fluctuation or external force sets the system into motion, it 
will not continue to oscillate forever, but rather return to rest at the fixed point. Such a 
stable fixed point is also known as an attracting fixed point, since all nearby points and 
trajectories get "pulled into it." Once again, this phase portrait does not answer the 
quantitative question of how long it will take for the system to settled down at rest; but it 
does give us the qualitative prediction that the system will always end up at static 
equilibrium in the long term. 
 
So far, for the sake of simplicity, we have been considering linear systems. 
However, the real beauty of Poincaré's qualitative approach can be seen when we turn to 
more interesting, nonlinear systems. Consider the system with the following phase 
portrait:144 
                                                
144 This phase portrait can be generated by the following pair of (nonlinear) differential equations: x' = y + x 
– xy2 – x3, y' = y – x – x2y – y3 
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Here we see a new pattern, which combines the stability of an attracting fixed 
point with the periodic motion of a closed orbit. This is called a limit cycle. It represents a 
stable periodic orbit of the system, a repetitive cycle which the system generates of its 
own accord, regardless of its starting conditions. Notice how trajectories beginning inside 
the limit cycle spiral out to join it, while those beginning outside of the limit cycle spiral 
in to join it. Thus the limit cycle is a stable attractor: all nearby trajectories are pulled 
into it, which means that the system will always settle into this cycle in the long term, and 
that fluctuations pushing the system away from this cycle will be damped out. 
Many other behaviors are possible. There are unstable limit cycles: periodic orbits 
in which the slightest fluctuation will send the trajectory spiraling away; and half-stable 
limit cycles, which attract trajectories on one side and repel them on the other, so that 
they are stable under fluctuations in one direction and unstable under fluctuations in the 
other direction. 
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Similarly, several different types of fixed point are possible: 
 
 
In order to understand these different patterns of stability and instability, it can be 
very helpful to visualize the phase portrait in a different way. Rather than plotting the 
system's dynamic as a vector map, we can plot it as a potential landscape. Let's go back 
to our earlier example of a damped oscillator: a mass hanging from a spring, subject to 
friction. Instead of plotting the body's position (x) vs. its velocity (x'), we can plot x vs. 
the potential function V, which is defined by the equation 
(14) dV/dx = – dx/dt 
This yields the following graph: 
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The potential function derives from the physical concept of potential energy in a 
gravitational field. To read this graph, think of it as a landscape, and think of the state of 
the system as a heavy ball rolling through this landscape.  
 
 
Places where the landscape is flat correspond to the fixed points of the system's phase 
portrait; they are places where the system can come to rest. The potential landscape gives 
us an intuitive way to see whether such fixed points are stable or not. In the landscape 
above, the fixed point at x = 0 is stable: if a fluctuation moves the system "up the slope" 
in either direction, it will roll back down again to rest at the fixed point. This corresponds 
to the phase diagram above in which every trajectory spiraled down to this point. Stable 
fixed points in the potential landscape are denoted by a black ball: 
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However, consider the following potential landscape: 
 
 
Here we see a system with an unstable fixed point at x = 0, denoted by a white ball. The 
system can come to rest there, but the slightest fluctuation will send it "rolling down-hill" 
in one direction or the other. Finally, consider a third potential landscape: 
 
 
This represents a system with a half-stable fixed point at x = 0, denoted by a black and 
white ball. If the system comes to rest at this point, in will be stable in one direction, 
since fluctuations that send the ball rolling up-hill will be damped out as the ball rolls 
APPENDIX A 
 228 
back down to rest at the fixed point again. On the other hand, the slightest fluctuation in 
the other direction will send the ball rolling down-hill away from the fixed point. 
 
These potential landscape diagrams become especially useful when we consider 
systems with more than one fixed point, which are known as multistable systems. 
Consider the system with the following potential landscape:146 
 
 
 
This system has five fixed points: three stable, and two unstable. The fixed point at x = 0 
is the global minimum, meaning that it is the system's most stable fixed point. However, 
a large enough fluctuation in x could push the system over into the basin of attraction of 
one of the system's other two fixed points. Thus a multistable system is capable of 
multiple stable behaviors; and a sufficient "push" in the right direction can shift it from 
one stable state into another. Multistable systems can also be visualized using vector 
maps:  
                                                
146 This landscape was generated by the potential function V = -cos(x) – cos(2x). 
APPENDIX A 
 229 
 
 
Notice that a single system multistable system can exhibit multiple fixed points and limit 
cycles, each of which may be stable, unstable, or half-stable. Such a system is capable of 
multiple behaviors, both static and cyclical, and it can be shifted from one stable behavior 
to another by fluctuations or external forces. 
 
We have one final complication to consider. Up until now, we have been treating 
the dynamic of a system—as represented by phase portraits and potential landscapes—as 
itself fixed. However, we sometimes need to move to an even higher level of abstraction, 
to think about how the system's different ways of changing over time can themselves be 
changed. For example, when we considered the oscillating body hanging from a spring, 
we treated the mass of the body and the resistance of the spring as constant parameters—
and rightly so, since for any given mass and spring, these do not vary. But what if we 
wanted to consider all the possible mass-and-spring systems as a class? We would then 
need to treat the mass and spring-resistance as variable parameters, and ask how 
variations in these parameters alter the dynamics and stability of the system. Let's 
consider a more interesting, multistable system, whose potential landscape we looked at 
above. The potential function of this system is 
(15) V = – cos(x) – bcos(2x) 
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Notice that this function has one parameter, b. When b = 1, the landscape looks like the 
one we saw above: 
 
 
As we noted above, this system has three stable points (at x = 0, -π and π) and two 
unstable states. But let's see what happens to the system when we vary the parameter b 
from 1 to 0 : 
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As b decreases, the stable points at π and -π become less and less stable. Finally, 
at b = 0.25, these points become unstable, so that the system goes from having three 
stable points to only one. 
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Let's consider a more interesting nonlinear system, described by the equations 
(16) x' = y + (a – x2 – y2)x 
(17) y' = –x + (a – x2 – y2)y 
where a is a parameter. For a ≤ 0, the phase portrait of this system looks like this: 
 
 
Like the damped oscillator we considered above, this system has a single 
attracting fixed point at (0,0), and all trajectories spiral down into this point. However, 
when a > 0, the stable fixed point at the origin becomes unstable, and a new attractor 
appears: a limit cycle whose radius is the square root of a. Here is a phase portrait of the 
system when a = 0.5: 
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(The limit cycle is highlighted in blue.) In this class of systems, we see that varying the 
parameter a can produce an important qualitative change in the dynamics of the system. 
At a = 0, the stable behavior of the system changes from static equilibrium (the fixed 
point at the origin) to periodic oscillation (the limit cycle of radius √a). We can visualize 
this change by graphing the behavior of the system as a function of a: 
 
The single solid line represents the single attracting fixed point that exists when a 
< 0. At a = 0 this fixed point becomes unstable, which is indicated by the beginning of a 
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dotted line, and a stable limit cycle appears (indicated by the solid lines splitting off and 
circling around the formerly stable fixed point). The point a = 0 is called a critical point, 
and the change in the system's stability at this point is known as a bifurcation, (because of 
the way that the line representing the stable point splits in two). Accordingly, diagrams 
like this one are called bifurcation diagrams. This particular sort of bifurcation, in which 
a stable fixed point becomes unstable and spawns a limit cycle, is called a Hopf 
bifurcation. 
The parameters of a system do not vary as part of the system's intrinsic dynamics. 
However, sometimes these parameters can be varied by outside forces. Critical points 
thus take on an enormous significance in our modeling of physical systems: they 
represent points at which a quantitative variation in some feature of the system can 
produce a sudden qualitative change in the system's behavior—a behavior that was stable 
can suddenly become unstable, and the system may jump quite quickly to some new 
stable state. 
 
We have just done a lot of difficult conceptual work in a very condensed space. It 
took the work of several great geniuses and many human lifetimes to generate the 
conceptual shifts that we have quickly run through in just a few pages. Let us briefly 
review the mathematical practices we looked at, each founded on the one before: 
1. Modeling a dynamic system (e.g. a moving body) as variables related by 
algebraic equations. 
2. Modeling a dynamic system with differential equations, (algebraic equations in 
which some variables represent the rates of change of other variables). 
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3. Visualizing these differential equations as a vector field in state space (a.k.a. 
phase space), which is called a phase portrait. 
4. Visualizing this state space as a potential landscape. 
5. Looking at how this potential landscape changes with variations in parameters. 
6. Visualizing these changes with a bifurcation diagram. 
 
3. Implications of Dynamic Systems Theory 
We saw above how DST emerged from attempts to generalize the Newtonian 
model to more complex dynamic systems, and the realization that this was not possible. 
Nevertheless, our thinking about scientific models—and about nature itself—has tended 
to remain stuck in a Newtonian mode. Newton's model describes the motion of bodies in 
terms of universal forces acting on individual point-masses according to universal laws. It 
allows the future and past of the systems it describes to be predicted and retrodicted with 
great accuracy.147 The models of DST, on the other hand, are more like the model 
organisms of biology than they are like the models of classical physics. Biologists study 
simple organisms such as Drosophila (the fruit fly) and E. Coli, which are easy to 
observe and manipulate, in order to draw inferences about more complex organisms such 
as ourselves. Similarly, DST allows us to construct and study model systems which 
exhibit behaviors similar to those of the natural systems we are studying. Like the model 
organisms of biology, the dynamic systems model is understood to be a simplification of 
the more complex phenomenon we are studying. This model is easier to observe and 
                                                
147 Or at least, with an accuracy proportional to the accuracy of our measurements of the system's present 
state. 
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manipulate than the phenomenon itself, and allows us to gain insights into the latter by 
analogy. 
The Newtonian model is not just a simpler version of the phenomenon it models; 
it belongs to a different order entirely. It renders the phenomenon transparent, flattening 
it out so that past and future can be encompassed simultaneously by our gaze. In DST, the 
model is itself a phenomenon which requires careful study. It can be run forward and 
backward in a computer simulation, but this simulation itself takes time; the model must 
be allowed to exhibit its behavior in its own time and on its own scale, and the behaviors 
it exhibits may be quite unexpected. Thus the model in DST does not replace the 
phenomenon with an idea, transparent and intelligible. Instead, it offers us a new 
phenomenon, one which is easier to investigate but still retains its opacity and 
independence—even though it is we who have constructed it. 
Unlike the Newtonian model, models in DST do not yield quantitative 
predictions, but qualitative insights into the forms of a system's behavior. Phase portraits, 
potential landscapes and bifurcation maps make visible to us forms which would 
otherwise be imperceptible, because they reside in the variations between the various 
possible trajectories of a system. They allow us to perceive the stable patterns in a 
dynamic system's flow, and the sensitivity of these patterns to initial conditions, 
perturbations, and parameter variation. The diagrams of DST are not merely visual aids 
which the mathematical mind could dispense with; rather, they embody the geometrical ( 
or more accurately, topographical) approach which is the very essence of Poincaré's 
method. 
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Whereas the models of classical physics produces universal laws, the models of 
DST generate insights into patterns which possess a certain generality. Because these 
patterns concern the relations between the parts of a system, rather than the nature of 
these parts, the same dynamic pattern can appear in many different materials, at many 
different scales. For example, in the two-dimensional dynamic system we considered 
above which generated a stable limit cycle, the two variables x and y could represent the 
concentrations of two chemical reagents, two animal populations in an ecosystem, or the 
position of a particle moving in a plane. Rather than attempting to explain nature in terms 
of laws that operate only at the micro-scale, DST allows us to recognize the same patterns 
arising in self-organizing systems at multiple space-time scales, and to say something 
about how these different scales interact. 
The models of classical physics suggest (or at least support) a mechanistic 
understanding of nature: they divide nature into point-masses whose movements can be 
computed individually as linear effects of additive forces operating according to universal 
laws. DST, like classical physics, begins by dividing natural phenomena into different 
measurable features which can be represented by different variables. However, the 
complex interdependence of these variables requires that we consider the system as a 
circular whole, and study its behavior qualitatively. Moreover, the behavior of the system 
itself suggests new, higher-order variables—such as the period of a limit cycle, (the 
amount of time it takes for the system to return to a given state)—which arise out of the 
interaction of lower-level variables, and describe the behavior of the system in its own 
terms. Thus the models of DST suggest a non-additive view of nature, in which matter 
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organizes itself into complex systems whose parts constrain one another in nonlinear 
ways, generating new and unexpected forms which cannot be explained by analysis. 
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